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Nuclear Waste in Indian Country:
A Paradoxical Tradel
Nancy B. Collins* & Andrea Hall**
In the colonial and neocolonial alchemy, gold changes to scrap
metal and food into poison . .. [We] have become painfully
aware of the mortality of wealth which nature bestows and im-
perialism appropriates.2
Introduction
A radiological revolution occurred in the United States a half
century ago, marking the beginning of nuclear production on this
planet. Nuclear energy begins with the mining of uranium and
* Currently living in North Carolina and writing on Native American
environmental issues and African American/Native American relations. From 1989
to 1993 she was an Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of
Law and had served as a Trial Attorney in the Environmental Enforcement Section
and in the Torts Branch of the U.S. Department of Justice. B.S. Bowling Green State
University, 1965; M.S. Purdue University, 1968; J.D. DePaul University College of
Law, 1975.
** B.A. Trinity University, 1988; J.D. University of Richmond, 1993.
1. The dialogue which inspired this article began in Professor Collins' seminar
"Toxic Waste in Indian Country" at the University of Richmond Law School in the
Spring of 1992. Funded by the law firm of Allen, Allen and Allen in Richmond, Vir-
ginia, the Allen Chair Seminar brought four outstanding Native American scholars,
writers, and activists to co-teach the course with Professor Collins. We were honored
to have W. Richard West, Jr., Cheyenne-Arapho, and Founding Director of the Na-
tional Museum of the American Indian at the Smithsonian Institution; Robert A.
Williams, Jr., Lumbee, and Professor of Law and American Indian Studies, Univer-
sity of Arizona; Paula Gunn Allen, Laguna Pueblo and Sioux, author, poet, critic,
and Professor of English at University of California - Los Angeles; and David Harri-
son, Osage, former Associate Director of the Council of Energy Resource Tribes. Our
ideas have been influenced by these caring scholars and teachers and by the seminar
students. Professor Collins also thanks Professors Jonathan Stubbs, Mary Church-
ill, and Okianer Christian Dark, and Muriel Pascal, Randy Janey, and members of
the Black Law Student Association and the Multi-Ethnic Law Student Association
who cherish with her the dream that the law will begin to speak to (not about) people
of color and listen to and serve their values and needs.
2. EDUARDO GAExANo, THE OPEN VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA: FIVE CENTURIES OF
THE PILLAGE OF A CONTINENT 12-13 (1973), quoted in Ward Churchill & Winona La-
Duke, Radioactive Colonization and the Native American, 15 SocuLwST REV., Mar./
June 1985, at 95. In this article we have italicized the words of Native Americans
involved in the nuclear debate in order to highlight individuals speaking in their
own voices.
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ends with the disposal of radioactive waste. 3 For over fifty years
the United States has mined, milled, and used radioactive material,
creating and stockpiling waste at every step in the process. 4 Yet
until the 1980s, neither the United States government nor private
utilities had a strategy for the long-term storage or permanent dis-
posal of nuclear waste.5
Now, the nation's 111 operating commercial nuclear reactors
are running out of storage space for high-level nuclear waste,6
while permanent nuclear storage facilities are still a generation
away from completion. 7 Consequently, the federal government is
frantically searching for temporary high-level nuclear waste stor-
age facilities. Indian nations are among the primary candidates.
Indian nations have been and continue to be inextricably
bound up with the United States' nuclear development. The United
States, like other nations, exploits the uranium resources found on
lands retained by aboriginal communities.8 The path of nuclear
mining and milling in the United States has led repeatedly across
Indian country,9 leaving a legacy of nuclear waste and contamina-
tion.1O Today, in its quest to rid the nation of stockpiles of highly
3. Peter C. Monson, Comment, Radioactive Air Pollution from Uranium Min-
ing: Regulatory Abdication in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 13 ENVrL. L. 545,
548 (1983) (chart illustrating the stages in the nuclear fuel cycle).
4. The first atomic reactor was built in 1942. See ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF
THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 140 (R. Stobaugh & D. Yer-
gin eds., 1983) [hereinafter ENERGY FUTURE.].
5. See, e.g., Eric Charles Woychik, California's Nuclear Disposal Law Confronts
the Nuclear Waste Management Dilemma: State Power to Regulate Reactors, 14
ENvTL L. 359, 361 n.2 (1984) ("After more than twenty years of commercial nuclear
power, the Federal Government has yet to develop a broadly supported policy for
fulfilling its legal responsibility for the final isolation of high-level radioactive
waste." (quoting OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, MANAGING
COMMERCIAL HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE: SUMMARY 9 (1982))).
6. Bob von Sternberg, NSP Nuclear Waste Needs Called Typical, STAR THIs.
(MINNEAPOLIS), June 17, 1992, at lB.
7. Dunstan McNichol, Doubts on Permanent Nuclear Dump Worry NSP, STAR
TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS), Apr. 1, 1992, at 11A.
8. Wm. Paul Robinson, Uranium Production and Its Effects on Navajo Commu-
nities Along the Rio Puerco in Western New Mexico, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE 153, 154 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul
Mohai eds., 1992) [hereinafter RACE]. Radiological colonization of the lands of indig-
enous peoples is not limited to the United States. A significant proportion of the
world's uranium resources is exploited on land still retained by aboriginal or other
land-based communities. Id.
9. Robinson, in RACE, supra note 8, at 154.
10. See, e.g., Mill Tailings Dam Break at Church Rock, New Mexico: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) (statement of Rep. Udall, Subcom-
mittee Chairman).
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radioactive waste from civilian nuclear power plants, the federal
government once again turns to Indian country."
In 1980, Congress decreed that the federal government would
take title to all the nation's high-level civilian nuclear waste. In the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA),12 Congress developed a strategy
for the ultimate disposal of high-level civilian nuclear waste in one
or more primary repositories.' 3 Over a decade later, Congress has
been unable to select sites, stalling plans for the transportation of
nuclear waste from a multitude of current unsafe resting places.
The Nuclear Waste Negotiator has conducted negotiations to put
the temporary storage site, or Monitored Retrievable Storage
(MRS) facility,14 on the sovereign homelands of Native Americans.
One potential result of the government's policies is that people
of color, having little political power, may bear the burden of an
environmental problem that belongs to the entire nation.i5 While
justice requires an equitable distribution of both the benefits and
the burdens of nuclear power, such distribution is arguably not part
of the current nuclear waste disposal proposals. By removing waste
and its burdens to remote Indian land, benefits will accrue to the
entire nation, relieving other communities of the dangers of nuclear
waste.
11. Bob von Sternberg, U.S. Has Deals for States, Tribes that Will Store Waste,
STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS), Sept. 15, 1991, at A14. A similar phenomenon is docu-
mented in developing countries. Since 1986, the United States and Europe have
exported waste to at least eleven developing countries. Grant L. Krantz, Implement-
ing the Basel Convention into U.S. Law: Will it Help or Hinder Recycling Efforts?, 6
B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 323 (1992). Most developing countries lack regulatory and techni-
cal measures to deal with hazardous waste. Stephen Johnson, The Basel Conven-
tion: The Shape of Things to Come for United States Waste Exports?, 21 ENVTL. L.
299, 300 (1991). Waste exporters may not adequately inform developing countries of
the potential risks associated with the waste. Id. For example, in 1988, a Norwe-
gian shipping company dumped 15,000 tons of waste on an island in Guinea. West
Africa in Toxic Waste Dumping Furor: Foreign Deals Protested. Facts on File,
WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Aug. 12, 1988, at 584. The waste was fraudulently termed
"raw material for bricks," and was later identified as incinerator ash from Philadel-
phia. Id.
12. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10226 (1988 & Supp. IV (1992)) [herein-
after NWPA]. The NWPA includes three additional types of limited, specialized fa-
cilities for high-level civilian nuclear waste: test and evaluation facilities, interim
storage facilities, and demonstration facilities. All are limited-purpose facilities with
narrowly defined functions and have limited durations. They are not intended as an
alternative for long-term storage. Nicholas Kirkpatrick Brown, Monitored Retrieva-
ble Storage Within the Context of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 52 TENN. L.
REV. 739, 745 n.48 (1985).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10131-10145 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10161-10169 (1988); Notice, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,536-37 (1985) (an-
nouncement of proposed candidate sites). For a discussion of the MRS facility, see
infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
15. See generally RACE, supra note 8.
1994]
Law and Inequality
Native American nations must balance the potential economic
benefits of the waste trade against the potential environmental
harm of nuclear waste storage. This balancing requires that they
have accurate information concerning the risks and benefits of ac-
cepting the waste. It also requires that the Indian nations have
viable economic alternatives to participation in the nuclear waste
trade.
It may be to the advantage of the United States to have an
Indian nation take control of its nuclear waste, as some in the pro-
cess have argued. 16 Indians could use their wisdom and knowl-
edge, and principles of "planning for the seventh generation" to
assure safe control of the waste.' 7 However, no proposal would give
Indians the right to exercise actual control over nuclear waste.' 8
Under the current nuclear waste siting law, the federal government
retains control over nuclear waste in Indian country, not Indian na-
tions. The government would essentially use Indian lands as its
long-term parking lot for the nation's nuclear waste on its trip to a
permanent disposal site.' 9
The essence of the proposed waste agreement is land for
money. Since most tribes are land-rich and money-poor, some
tribes may decide to exercise its right to accept the bargain. The
exchange of Indian land for the federal government's money or
promises has defined tribal - U.S. relations since the founding of
this nation.20
16. David Leroy, the former U.S. Nuclear Waste Negotiator, was quoted as
saying:
Because of the Indians' great care and regard for Nature's resources,
Indians are the logical people to care for the nuclear waste. Radioactive
materials have half-lives of thousands of years [and] it is the Native
American culture and perspective that is best designed to correctly con-
sider and balance the benefits and burdens.
Elmer Savilla, The Nuclear Negotiator: Mr. Deep Pockets, NEWS FROM INDIAN COUN-
TRY, Mid-March 1992, at 8.
17. "Planning for the seventh generation" is one of the principles shared by many
Indian nations. The belief is that a people must act not solely for its own present
interests but also in the interests of its future generations. See I HAVE SPOKEN:
AMERICAN HISTORY THROUGH THE VOICES OF THE INDIANS (Virginia Irving Armstrong
ed., 1971).
18. James L. Huffman, An Exploratory Essay on Native Americans and Environ-
mentalism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 901, 912-13 (1992).
19. Rudy Abramson, Seeking a Foster Home for Nuclear Waste, L.A. TIMES, June
9, 1992, at A5.
20. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823);
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST];
Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence [hereinafter
Williams, Algebra], 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219.
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A. Objectives and Organization
In negotiating nuclear waste siting, knowledge can be a tool or
a weapon. 21 This article attempts to clarify the law and its history
of enforcement in order to shed light on the hard decisions facing
Indian peoples considering the nuclear waste trade.22 The history
of nuclear waste buildup and disposal law, as well as the history of
enforcement of treaties and current environmental statutes in In-
dian country, are both relevant. This analysis stresses the crucial
differences between Indian peoples and other communities where
this waste may be disposed of-differences of history, genocide, sov-
ereignty, and law.
This article focuses on the potential siting of the MRS on tribal
lands, the article first considering the paradoxes inherent in this
siting debate. It then briefly describes the development of nuclear
power in the United States and outlines the statutory scheme for
nuclear waste disposal under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The
second part of the article focuses on the history of radioactive colo-
nization of Indian lands. It discusses principles of environmental
equity and tribal sovereignty and how the two areas influence the
siting of nuclear waste. Finally, the article examines whether In-
dian nations will be treated as the equals of states in the nuclear
waste siting process. This question of equal treatment requires ex-
ploring the question of federal and Indian preemption in order to
ascertain whether a tribe will have an enforceable right to host the
MRS over the objections of a contiguous state.
21. "Thorough knowledge was what was always required to live by for Indian
people;... [it] has been kept in some hidden place and has been used as controlling
power." Simon Ortiz, Fight Back: For the Sake of the People for the Sake of the Land,
1 INAD LTEaARY J. 61, 63-64 (1980) (referring to the U.S. government's dissemina-
tion of information concerning the hazards of nuclear testing). Knowledge is essen-
tial if sovereign nations are to make informed environmental decisions. Gerald
Torres, Introduction: Understanding Environmental Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV.
839, 844 (1992). See generally Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Escaping Environ-
mental Paternalism: One Tribe's Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Dis-
posal Project in Indian Country, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 933 (1992) [hereinafter Gover &
Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism].
22. It is the rights of indigenous peoples, not indigenous people, which demand
our concerns. As Indian educator, activist, and Director of the Morningstar Founda-
tion, Susan Harjo, points out "peoples are entitled to group or national rights, such as
sovereignty. People, on the other hand, are entitled to individual and human
rights.... Dropping the 's' is not simply a grammatical matter." Roberto Rodriguez,
Is U.N. 'Year of Indigenous People' a Missed Opportunity?, BLAcK ISSUES IN HIGHER
EDUC., Mar. 11, 1993, at 22.
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B. Paradoxes of Nuclear Waste Disposal in Indian
Country
Three interrelated paradoxes embody the legal, political, and
ethical dilemmas of nuclear waste disposal in Indian country.
First, the paradox of good and evil infuses most discussions of nu-
clear power. Few topics generate as much angry political debate as
nuclear energy. Proponents and opponents of military and civilian
atomic energy are both entrenched and vociferous. Nuclear energy
provides a source of power of indescribable proportions, whether
harnessed for civilian use or unleashed for military deterrence.23
Fear of a nuclear accident dominates the thinking of nuclear oppo-
nents, who argue strongly that both use and disposal of nuclear
materials are fraught with danger. 24 Proponents of nuclear energy,
on the other hand, consider these views alarmist. They argue that
nuclear energy is safe and that nuclear waste disposal will soon be
among the nation's safest industries.25 However, the potential for
disaster from a nuclear waste accident or long-term release is ines-
timable. 26 Nuclear power at its best is positive and transformative.
On the other hand, its production is one of the most dangerous
processes on earth. There are hazards involved in mining, milling,
power production, and waste disposal. 27 The paradox of nuclear en-
ergy is heightened by the absence of any permanent means of dis-
posing of massive amounts of nuclear waste. 28 Perhaps the one
23. The spill of one load of nuclear waste would contain many times the radioac-
tivity released by the bomb at Hiroshima. SAFE ENERGY COMMUNICATION COUNCIL,
MYTH BUSTERS #2: NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL (Winter 1988) [hereinafter MYTH
BUSTERS] (citing Marvin Resnikoff, COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, THE NEXT Nu-
CLEAR GAMBLE: TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WASTE 19 (1983)). Pro-
ponents of nuclear power assert that the nuclear power industry is safe. See OFFICE
OF THE NUCLEAR WASTE NEGOTIATOR, AN INVITATION FOR DIALOGUE AND PARTICIPA-
TION (1991) [hereinafter INVITATION FOR DIALOGUE]. Information can be obtained
from the Office by writing or calling: P.O. Box 777, Boise, Idaho 83777; (208) 334-
9876; FAX (208) 334-9880.
24. See, e.g., Jorge Contreras, In the Village Square: Risk Misperception and
Decisionmaking in the Regulation of Low-Level Radioactive Waste, 19 ECOL. L.Q.
481, 507 (1992) (discussing the perception that radioactive waste is "somehow
unique, more dreadful than other industrial dangers"). Moreover, the incident at the
Three Mile Island nuclear power reactor located near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,
which resulted in a partial meltdown of the reactor core, generated substantial pub-
lic concern. See ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 4, at 135.
25. See INVITATION FOR DIALOGUE, supra note 23.
26. See MYTH BUSTERS, supra note 23.
27. "Mine waste remains the largest category [of nuclear waste] as well as poten-
tially the greatest problem, but it is essentially unaddressed by federal regulatory
programs." Charles H. Montange, Federal Nuclear Waste Disposal Policy, 27 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 309, 310 (1987). See id. at 313-57 (discussing mine waste and ura-
nium mill tailings).
28. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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thing nuclear opponents and proponents can agree on is that we
need a safe, permanent storage space for the waste. Despite the
consensus, after over a decade of searching, the federal government
still has not found anyone willing to accept this civilian nuclear
waste.
The second paradox involves the complex status of Indian
tribes as sovereign nations within the United States. Native Amer-
ican nations are both sovereign 29 and dependent,30 both governors
and governed, and both free of state control31 and subject to it.32
Recognized as sovereigns under Article I of the Constitution, tribes
today retain their sovereignty. Indian nations, however, are consid-
ered "dependant sovereigns" and wards of the United States.33
Congress has plenary power to limit tribal sovereignty and treaties
made pursuant to it.34 Congress also has the right to grant states
power over aspects of Indian life. 35 When considering political deci-
29. Indian tribes are sovereigns predating the U.S. Constitution so they retain
common-law sovereign immunity from suit absent a clear waiver by the tribe or ex-
press congressional abrogation. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58
(1978) ("[tribes are] long recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from
suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers").
30. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 541 (1832) (referring to Native
American nations as "domestic dependant" nations); Walter E. Stern, Environmental
Compliance Considerations for Developers of Indian Land, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV.
77, 87 (1993).
31. Generally, there exist "two independent but related barriers to the assertion
of state regulatory authority over tribal reservations and members": preemption by
operation of federal law, and impermissible infringement "on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
220 (1959)).
32. For example, in 1953 Congress enacted Public Law 280 which transferred
criminal jurisdiction and certain civil jurisdiction over Indian country to the state
government in five states. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat.
588. Later, states were authorized to assume jurisdiction over Indian territories at
their option. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1325 (1988 & Supp IV 1992). In 1988, Alaska
also received jurisdiction over the Indian territories located within its boundaries.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988). Section 4
of the Act provides "those civil laws of such State that are of general application to
private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such
Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State." 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988).
33. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); Worcester, 31 U.S.
at 541.
34. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989)
("the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with
Plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs"); Irene Harvey, Note, Consti-
tutional Law: Congressional Plenary Power Over Indian Affairs--a Doctrine Rooted
in Prejudice?, 10 Am. INDrAN L. REV. 117 (1982); Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court,
Indian Tribes, Am. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1, 46-57; Williams, Algebra, supra note 20, at
260-65.
35. Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over
Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975); see infra notes 449-72 (discussing
state/tribal sovereignty issues); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823);
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sions on Indian land, one must look at the complex relations of
three separate sovereigns: federal, tribal, and state.3 6
Third, the nuclear waste trade presents a pivotal paradox for
Native American peoples: the clash between the nuclear waste
trade's potential for economic development and self-determination,
and its antithetical potential for destruction of Indian land, har-
mony, values, and even tribal existence. The essence of a tribe's
sovereignty is land-based. 37 By contrast, dominant American soci-
ety is essentially nomadic. If land is destroyed or devalued, or if the
economy of an area is weakened, other Americans simply move to
greener pastures. For non-Indians, legal rights are not dependant
upon the existence of a homeland. For a tribe to survive, many of
its members must remain on the reservation and the tribe must
maintain enough jobs to employ the next generation on the reserva-
tion. 38 If Indian land is rendered uninhabitable or economically
unproductive, the tribe becomes homeless.39 The land-based sover-
eignty of Indian nations is the key to both the need for economic
development from the waste trade and the countervailing potential
for the destruction of sovereign lands and peoples.
Compensation for accepting nuclear waste could provide an
Indian nation with economic strength, income for education and
health-care, and jobs for the next generation.40 These are tools for
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
36. On the issue of intergovernmental sovereignty issues, see Frank Pommer-
sheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future? 36 S.D. L. REV. 239 (1991) [here-
inafter Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations].
37. A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Protection: The Potential Misfit Between Eq-
uity and Efficiency, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 871, 871-83 (1992); see, e.g., Improvement of
the American Indian Religious Freedom Act: Hearings on S 2250 before the United
States Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 231 (1988) (affi-
davit of Kee Shay, member of Navajo tribe of Arizona, testifying as to the spiritual
ties Navajo (Dineh) have to their land) ("We cannot make prayers at any spring or
rock, only the ones where we know the spiritual beings. These places are sacred to us.
We cannot practice our religion anywhere else.").
38. Miller Hudson, Mescalero MRS Project Information Director, The Mescalero
Apache Tribe's Approach to MRS Benefits Negotiation, Address before the National
Conference of State Legislatures' Legislative Working Group on Monitored Retrieva-
ble Storage, in Williamsburg, Virginia 3-4 (Nov. 19, 1992) (press release available
from Mescalero Apache Tribe, Mescalero, NM 88340); Personal Communication
with Robert Williams, Allen Chair Professor, T.C. Williams School of Law (Apr. 10,
1992).
39. Nancy Hovis, Tribal Involvement Under The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982: Education by Participation, 3 J. ENVTL. L. & LIT. 45, 49, 55 (1988) (recognizing
that "a major release of nuclear materials on the reservation would leave them
homeless").
40. See generally Gover & Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism, supra
note 21 (discussing potential benefits for Indian reservations of waste disposal on
Indian lands).
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self-determination and are necessary for tribes to escape economic
domination by the U.S. government, to regain tribal power, and to
preserve the tribe for future generations. Many see the nuclear
waste trade as a basis for attracting industry and for strengthening
the tribal infrastructure. 4 1 Moreover, the government promises
that the waste will be safe; 4 2 and promises that it will be removed
in 40 years.43
Yet locating a nuclear storage facility on or near an Indian res-
ervation can have grave potential consequences to the viability of
its culture.44 Accidents, releases, or sabotage could turn the reser-
vation into a vast wasteland and could threaten tribal destruction
or genocide.45 Ultimately, the issue turns on economic develop-
ment: without income and jobs, the survival of the tribe is at risk.
However, the economically rich crop of nuclear waste carries with it
a remote but real risk of annihilation of the tribe. In the end, some
believe that even the economic benefits will prove to be illusory.
Many Native Americans are extremely skeptical that accepting
waste in Indian country will actually result in real economic
advantage.
Many projects come and go, all accompanied by big promises,
but few Indians have gotten richer from them. That history is a
powerful argument for Indian environmentalists. The reason-
ing goes like this: not only is the project in question ecologically
disastrous, but everyone knows we won't ever see a dime from
it. 46
The paradoxical nature of the debate divides Native Ameri-
cans. Within Indian country there are voices, like those of some
Mescalero Apache leaders, calling out to the nation to send waste
trade onto their lands.47 At the same time other voices within the
41. Gover & Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism, supra note 21, at
935-36.
42. See OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF EN-
ERGY, A MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE FACILITY: TECHNICAL BACKGROUND INFOR-
MATION 11 (1991), in INVITATION FOR DIALOGUE, supra note 23.
43. See infra § 3b (discussing MRS).
44. See Hovis, supra note 39, at 49.
45. See Williamson B.C. Chang, The "Wasteland" in the Western Exploitation of
"Race" and the Environment, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 849 (1992) (discussing the poten-
tial of slow genocide resulting from environmental decisions).
46. Margaret L. Knox, Their Mother's Keepers, SIERRA, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 57.
47. In a letter to the members of the Mescalero Apache tribe, Wendell Chino,
tribal president for the past three decades, said the tribal council believed that in-
come from the repository "could provide an opportunity for long-term independence
and prosperity for our tribe that we would be negligent to ignore or reject." Matthew
L. Wald, Tribe on Path to Nuclear Waste Site, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1993, at A12. See
also Richard A. Du Bey et al., Protection of the Reservation Environment: Hazardous
Waste Management on Indian Lands, 18 ENVTL. L. 449 (1988); Keith Schneider,
Grants Open Doors for Nuclear Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1992, at A14.
1994]
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Mescalero-traditionalists, environmentalists, and nuclear skep-
tics-denounce these efforts as an affront to Indian values, religion,
and self-interest.48
C. History of Nuclear Power in Two Nations: Euro-
American and Native American
The possibility of storing high-level nuclear waste on Indian
land can only be understood by looking at the history of nuclear
power and nuclear waste within two very different yet interdepen-
dent sovereigns: the United States as a whole and Indian nations
within its borders. The questions raised by waste-siting in Indian
country are legal, political, and ethical. As with all issues in Indian
country, these questions require an examination of the historical
roots of the controversy.
History of Regulation of Nuclear Energy in the United
States
Until 1954, the federal government had exclusive use, control,
and ownership of all nuclear technology. 49 The Atomic Energy Act
of 1946 (1946 Act),50 gave control to the newly created civilian
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, the forerunner of today's Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission (NRC)), but this was merely a formal-
ity.5 1 The federal government in fact retained actual ownership of
all nuclear material and facilities; civilian participation was limited
to contract work performed for the government. 52
48. "W]e are once again.., put in that position of being guinea pigs for the U.S.
government and I don't like it.... If it was so safe, why don't they put it in their
backyard instead of trying to shove it off on us?" said one Mescalero tribal member in
a recent interview. All Things Considered: New Mexico Considers Nuclear Waste
Site Nearby (NAT'L PUB. RADIo broadcast, Aug. 29, 1993) (quoting tribal member
Donna Lynn Torres). Among those against the project is Harlan Geronimo, great
grandson of the last great warrior to surrender to the U.S. Cavalry in the Southwest.
Opposition to the proposed MRS is not looked upon favorably within the tribe. Id.
People are afraid of opposing a decision by the tribal council due to its reputation for
violent threats and scare tactics. "I feel the pressure," says Harlan. "They shot my
horse and my dog. And someone left a pile of dead rattlesnakes in my driveway." Id.
Tribal leaders agreed to hold a referendum within the tribe before signing any agree-
ment with the government, something that has not been done in the two years since
the Mescalero Apaches began to negotiate the waste siting. Id.
49. Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 499 U.S.
906 (1991).
50. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
51. David P. Crocker, Federal Nuclear Policy and the 1987 Maine Nuclear Refer-
endum: Viable Initiative or Legal Cul-De-Sac?, 41 MAINE L. REV. 65, 67 (1989).
52. Id.
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After 1946, the federal government began to promote more
"positive" (nonmilitary) aspects of nuclear technology.53 Eight
years later, Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (1954
Act),54 which laid out the structure through which the nuclear in-
dustry operates today.55 The 1954 Act encouraged civilian owner-
ship of "both energy production and utilization facilities."5 6 The
goal of the Act was to "promote world peace, improve the general
welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free compe-
tition in private enterprise."57 The AEC initially planned to
reprocess waste5 8 and promised utilities that nuclear waste would
be transferred from utilities shortly after its removal from reac-
tors.5 9 In response to this federal initiative, many utilities built nu-
clear power plants.6 0
53. See In re Northern States Power Co., No. E-002/CN-91-19, 1992 WL 348063
(Minn. P.U.C., Aug. 10, 1992) (order granting NSP temporary certificate to build
nuclear waste storage facility near Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Community
in Southeastern Minnesota).
54. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
55. See Crocker, supra note 51, at 68.
56. See Crocker, supra note 51, at 68. In 1954, the government allowed the pri-
vate ownership of nuclear reactors, but Congress continued the mandatory govern-
ment ownership of special nuclear materials. Jeanne A. Russell, Atomic Energy
Statutory Construction-Political Concerns Blanket the Supreme Court from Using
its Traditional Tools of Statutory Construction, Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc.,
108 S.Ct. 2087 (1988), 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 317, 319 (1989). There was no
shift in the government's position until 1964, when it was speculated that private
ownership of special nuclear materials would be vital to commerce and the United
States' increasing energy demands. Id. The Private Ownership of Special Nuclear
Materials Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-489, 78 stat. 602 (as codified in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.), gave owners of nuclear facilities the right to own the fuel for the
first time. Id.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2011(b) (1988). See also Crocker, supra note 51, at 68.
58. Spent fuel rods are containers of nuclear fuel that have been used by nuclear
reactors to generate energy. See Woychik, supra note 5, at 361. In nuclear reactors,
light water fission reactors use uranium fuel rods to provide most of the atomically
generated energy in the United States. Id. at 405. The rods are composed of Ura-
nium-235, which is processed from mined uranium ore and then enriched to sustain
a nuclear reaction. Id. Within the reactor core, the enriched Uranium-235 under-
goes a controlled atomic chain reaction, producing heat, Uranium-2 38, plutonium
and other radioactive by-products. Id. at 406. The core is immersed in water which
acts as a coolant. Id.
Reprocessing is a chemical process originally developed to obtain plutonium for
nuclear weapons. Id. at 361. Uranium-238, residual U-235, and plutonium in spent
fuel rods can be extracted by reprocessing and reused in light water fission and
breeder reactors. Id. However, reprocessing strategy proved unworkable for eco-
nomic, health, and security reasons. Reprocessed wastes have high concentrations
of radioactive transuranic elements. Id. The liquid residue must be resolidified
before safe disposal is possible. Id. Reprocessing also exposes workers to high radia-
tion levels. Id.
59. In re Northern States Power Co., E-002/CN-91-19, 1992 WL 348063, at *8




In 1974, Congress enacted the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974.61 This Act, which dealt with all areas of energy production,
abolished the AEC and transferred research and development re-
sponsibilities to the Energy Research and Development Adminis-
tration (ERDA),62 with regulatory and licensing functions
delegated to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).63
Congress first delegated some control of nuclear environmen-
tal issues to the Environmental Protection Agency in the Clean Air
Act Amendments in 1977.64 Under the amendments, the EPA is
required to assign responsibility for commercial nuclear facilities to
states which have established guidelines approved by the EPA.65
Once this is done, states can assume regulatory responsibility over
nuclear facilities and materials.66
A. History of the U.S. Nuclear Waste Build Up
We have to have reverence for its nature and learn to live in har-
mony with it. 67
The fifty-year period of nuclear energy processing has left us
with a staggering amount of nuclear waste. 68 As it entered the nu-
clear age, the United States cavalierly mined, milled, and used ura-
nium with no pre-planning for the safe disposal of the inevitable
waste. 69 The government's emphasis was on the production of
power, both civilian and military. The buildup of uncontrolled nu-
61. Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5801-5851 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5811-5821 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5841-5851 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
64. Clean Air Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(d)(1), 7422 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The states must im-
plement regulations which are at least as strict as those of the EPA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7416 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(dX1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
67. In these words Native American author Marilou Awiakta described an In-
dian perspective on the relationship between humans and nuclear power. Marilou
Awiakta, Baring the Atom's Mother Heart, in HOMEWORDS: A BOOK OF TENNESSEE
WRITERS 182, 184 (Douglas Paschall & Alice Swanson eds., 1986).
68. In 1990, the DOE calculated that between the years 1990 and 2040, power
utilities will need to store 25,036 metric tons of civilian generated nuclear waste.
Bob von Sternberg, Activists Fight Plan to Store Nuclear Fuel, STAR TRIB. (MIiNsNE"-
OLIS), Apr. 18, 1991, at Al, AS. A national study on power utilities companies con-
cluded that by the year 2003, 78 of the nation's 111 nuclear reactors will have no
space to store nuclear waste. Id.
69. See generally Richard W. England & Eric P. Mitchell, Federal Regulation
and Environmental Impact of the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry, 1974-1984, 30 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 537, 537-43 (1990). The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 mandated
that the NRC was to actively promote nuclear development. Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88
Stat. 1233 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5851 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992)). See also Crocker, supra note 51, at 78.
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clear waste resulted from a deliberate policy of the United States
government, until the late 1970s, of emphasizing rapid expansion of
nuclear power and de-emphasizing nuclear safety and health.70
Scholars conclude that politicians and administrative agencies
sought very minimal control of safety and health in order to provide
an impetus for the developing nuclear industry.71
The radioactive waste which has accumulated at facilities
across the country has been characterized as "the most potentially
serious environmental hazard... fac[ing] the health and safety of
the people of this planet.., for the next 10,000 years."72 A govern-
ment study concluded that even without any new nuclear plant ap-
provals "by the year 2000, there will be an estimated 41,000 metric
tons [of high level nuclear waste] awaiting permanent storage."73
Much of this accumulated nuclear waste is highly radioactive spent
fuel. A study by the National Academy of Sciences determined that
"it would take three million years for this spent fuel to decay to the
point of posing the same level of risk as the uranium ore from which
it came."74
In the late 1970s, attitudes among the American electorate be-
gan to change with respect to nuclear power. 75 Although the dan-
gers of nuclear materials had been known for decades, it was not
until Congress began to confront the nuclear waste problem in this
new atmosphere of public hostility and skepticism that the govern-
ment articulated the dangers. Congressional hearings began in
1977, and the legislative history is laden with tales of the instabil-
ity of on-site storage.76
70. England & Mitchell, supra note 69, at 539-40.
71. England & Mitchell, supra note 69, at 539-40. "[E]ncouragement of a new
industrial technology, and not regulation of its environmental impact, seems to have
been the primary concern of the AEC during the infancy of nuclear power in the
United States." Id. at 540.
72. Hovis, supra note 39, at 55-56 n.62 (quoting 128 Cong. Rec. 26,302 (1982)
(statement of Rep. Markey)).
73. MYTH BUSTERS, supra note 23 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OAK RIDGE NA-
TIONAL LABORATORIES, SPENT FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE INVENTORIES, PROJEC-
TIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS 29 (1986)).
74. MYTH BUSTERS, supra note 23 (citing NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, A
STUDY OF THE ISOLATION SYSTEM FOR GEOLOGIC DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES
(1983)).
75. After the Three Mile Island accident, public opinion shifted from nearly two-
to-one in favor of nuclear power to approximately half opposing its use. Even after
the federal government began stricter control of nuclear hazards, opposition has in-
creased and by the mid-1980s was about two-to-one against. England & Mitchell,
supra note 69, at 543 n.23 (citing Freudenburg & Baxter, Nuclear Reactions: Public
Attitudes and Policies Toward Nuclear Power, 5 Poi'Y STUD. REV. 97-98 (1985)).
76. Bob Carr, a representative from Michigan, stated that,
Nuclear wastes are the inevitable byproduct of the generation of
electricity from nuclear fuel. Nuclear wastes represent a long-term po-
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At the time of these hearings, the accumulation of spent fuel
at power plants was already massive. 77 Congress, beginning to
grapple with the inadequacy of its knowledge of the subject,78 fre-
quently expressed frustration with the lack of progress. 79
Finally, in 1982, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982 (NWPA) to "establish a federal program for the develop-
ment of disposal sites for high-level nuclear waste and spent fuel
assemblies."80 The Act authorizes "permanent geologic repositories
tential danger to human health and the environment. Our techniques
for management and storage must be certain to isolate these wastes for
time periods longer than man's total experience on this planet. Hence
the nuclear waste problem presents unique institutional and technical
challenges.
Nuclear Waste Management: Oversight Hearings before the Subcomm. on Energy and
the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1977).
Senators and Congressmembers agreed that this waste could "not be put just
anywhere. It is highly radioactive and must be kept isolated from the human envi-
ronment in carefully constructed and maintained facilities." Nuclear Waste Manage-
ment and Disposal: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Rep. Santini).
77. "One of this Nation's 65 [then] operating commercial reactors, the H.B.
Robinson No. 2 facility in South Carolina, [had] already exhausted its spent fuel
storage capacity. Its manager [stated] that he [would] be required to shut down
early [the following] year if he [had] no place to put the spent fuel." Hearings, supra
note 76, at 1.
78. "An additional factor which is becoming a source of grave concern and con-
tributing to the uncertainties . - . is the growing awareness that there are serious
gaps in our knowledge with respect to the permanent disposal of nuclear wastes."
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services
of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (statement of
Sen. Glenn).
"Our failure thus far to develop a clear, comprehensible, and convincing pro-
gram for dealing with nuclear wastes has so badly eroded public confidence in our
ability to cope with this problem that the continued use of nuclear power in this
country may well be threatened." Hearings before the Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear
Proliferation and Federal Services of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (statement of Sen. Glenn).
79. "I think the Government has got to bear the responsibility for seeing to it
that this problem is under control and the things that aren't done are credibly under-
way." Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (statement of Rep.
Santini).
"With each passing year, the storage becomes greater in magnitude because of
the continued delays in the startup of spent fuel reprocessing facilities." Id. at 118
(Statement of Mr. John Cagnetta, Ph.D., Chairman, Subcommittee on Spent Fuel
Storage, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Services Committee, Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.).
80. Crocker, supra note 51, at 83. Section 10131(a) of the NWPA states:
Congress finds that - (1) radioactive waste creates potential risks
and requires safe and environmentally acceptable methods of disposal;
(2) a national problem has been created by the accumulation of (A)
spent nuclear fuel from nuclear reactors; and (B) radioactive waste
from (i) reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel; (ii) activities related to medi-
cal research, diagnosis, and treatment; and (iii)other sources; (3) fed-
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for disposal of such materials, provides for licensing and expansion
of interim storage, authorizes research and development, and pro-
vides a new scheme for financing."81 This was the first proposal
ever made for a comprehensive solution to the mounting civilian
nuclear waste problem.8 2
B. Statutory Scheme for Nuclear Waste Disposal
Congress mandated a disposal scheme under which all nuclear
waste is divided into two very broad categories: military and civil-
ian.8 3 The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New
Mexico will be the single permanent repository for all military
transuranic waste.8 4 Civilian waste is further classified into two
different types of waste: low-level and high-level waste, each regu-
lated under different legal criteria and disposed of differently.85
1. Low-Level Nuclear Waste
Low-level nuclear waste is defined as all radioactive waste
which is not high-level radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, or by-
product material.8 6 The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act87
eral attempts during the past 30 years to devise a permanent solution
to the problems of civilian radioactive waste disposal have not been
adequate.
42 U.S.C. § 10131(a) (1988).
81. Crocker, supra note 51, at 83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10131-10145 (repositories),
10151-10157 (interim storage), 10191-10203 (research regarding disposal), 10222-
10223 (other provisions) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
82. While this article focuses on civilian nuclear waste, the enormity of the waste
crisis is not reflected in civilian waste alone. Production of nuclear weapons ac-
counts for at least 340,000 cubic meters of high-level defense waste currently stored
at the Savannah River Plant in South Carolina, the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, and the Hanford Reservation in Washington state. See U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, OFFICE OF CMLIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, CHARACTERISTICS
AND INVENTORIES OF NUCLEAR WASTE 2 (1987), cited in MYTH BUSTERS, supra note
23.
83. Montange, supra note 27, at 105.
84. Tony Davis, Trucking and Testing WIPP Waste, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Oct. 18,
1991, at 1D. Transuranic (TRU) waste, nuclear waste that contains radioactive ele-
ments heavier than uranium, is a byproduct of nuclear military facilities. Id.
85. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 24 (discussing regulation of low-level nuclear
waste).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b(9) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Typically, low-level waste is generated by secondary, nonradioactive
materials coming in close contact with more radioactive materials.
This includes water from the primary loop of the reactor, tools, clothing
or machinery used to handle nuclear products. Such items are either
contaminated by the products they contact, or become radioactive
through neutron bombardment.
Crocker, supra note 51, at 82 n.84.
87. Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021b-2021j (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
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gives primary responsibility for the management of low-level nu-
clear waste to the states.8 8 Much of the low-level waste will actu-
ally be stored at a number of commercially operated multi-state
regional disposal facilities.8 9 Many scholars and scientists argue
that low-level nuclear waste is actually very dangerous and that
the current act seriously underestimates and underregulates these
hazards. 90
2. High-Level Nuclear Waste
Pursuant to the NWPA, the federal government is responsible
for housing all of the nation's high-level waste in a single perma-
nent repository. 9 1 The most likely site for ultimate disposal of civil-
ian high-level waste is Yucca Mountain in Nevada. 92 However,
under the provisions of the NWPA the waste will first be shipped to
a single Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility, where it will
be monitored and temporarily stored for forty years or more.9 3 The
site for the MRS and even the need for such a temporary storage
site are currently the subject of heated debate on a national scale.
88. "Each state is now responsible for developing repositories for all low-level
wastes [except those from military or federal research] produced within the state."
Crocker, supra note 51, at 82. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
89. See Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021b-2021j (1988)), especially Ti-
tle II of this Act, known as the Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate
Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1859, which creates seven inter-
state regional radioactive disposal compacts, each with a "host" state. This scheme
has decentralized the low-level siting process, leaving the waste scattered through-
out the country.
"[While] the United States needs only a few low-level radioactive waste reposi-
tory" sites, under this disposal scheme "it is likely to end up with eight to ten sites."
See Montange, supra note 27, at 373. Whether or not a state chooses to enter into an
interstate compact is a separate issue from whether it is an Agreement state or a
non-Agreement state. States which have not entered into approved compacts will
have to build their own waste depositories. Id. at 370-75.
90. See Montange, supra note 27, at 357-76 (thoroughly describing low-level
waste disposal). See id. at 360-63, which shows the less stringent controls for low-
level civilian waste. For example, low-level wastes are regulated for only 100 years,
while comparable classes of mill tailings under EPA regulations are controlled for
1,000 years. 40 C.F.R. § 192.32(b)(1)(i) (1993). In the years preceding the adoption of
the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, most facilities for the disposal of low-
level radioactive waste had closed due to accidents or other problems. Montange,
supra note 27, at 367-68.
"The only general statement which can be made concerning low-level radioactive
waste is that it is composed of many different kinds of waste material presenting
fundamentally different kinds and degrees of hazards." Id. at 358-59.
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10133-10136.
92. See infra notes 103-22 and accompanying text.
93. INVITATION FOR DIALOGUE, supra note 23.
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The main goal of the NWPA today is the selection of a site for
the MRS, with most eyes turned to Indian country. While the focus
of this article is on the MRS, it is necessary to understand the fate
of the permanent repository siting in order to evaluate the manner
in which the MRS is being sited.
a. Permanent Repository
The NWPA creates a timetable for construction of a perma-
nent facility for the disposal of nuclear waste. This facility was
scheduled to be in operation by the year 2000, although many now
believe that this is an unrealistic goal. 94 Moreover, "[n]o ... opera-
tional high-level nuclear waste disposal facility exists anywhere in
the world."95 Not only must engineers design a facility that will
ensure the utmost safety, but a suitable location must also be
found. The Act originally provided that the Department of Energy
(DOE) nominate five possible repository sites. From these five
sites, the Secretary of Energy was to recommend three to the Presi-
dent for site characterization. 96 After the completion of these three
characterizations, the Secretary was to recommend a single site to
the President for development as a national high-level nuclear
waste repository.97 Before any site was recommended to the Presi-
dent, open hearings in the community were to be held and public
comments solicited. The right of the host state to refuse to permit
94. An earthquake near Yucca Mountain in June of 1992 raised new questions
about the feasibility of the site. James Coates, Quake Jars Nuclear Dump Plan, CHI.
TRiB., July 12, 1992, § 1 at 12. The earthquake registered 5.6 on the Richter scale.
Id. It "caused $1 million in damage to a [DOE] office building [located] six miles
from where the [DOE] plans to bury . . . radioactive waste from civilian nuclear
power plants." Id. See also 138 CONG. REC. S17,566 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992)
Over the past decade, the projected cost of site characterization has
climbed from $60 million in 1982, to over $1 billion in 1987 . . . to ap-
proximately $2 billion in 1991, to approximately $6 billion in 1992....
Over $1 billion has been spent on studying Yucca Mountain. There is
almost nothing to show for this.
Id. at S17,569 (statement of Rep. Graham).
95. Woychik, supra note 5, at 362.
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 10132(b)(1)(B) (1988). Site characterization is a comprehen-
sive study of "potential host rock formations and other geologic and hydrologic char-
acteristics." See INVITATION FOR DIALOGUE, supra note 23, at no. 7. The packet of
information explains that a study of the rock formation also includes "examination of
surface features as well as the study of groundwater movement and the potential for
earthquake and volcanic activity. Other factors used in site characterization include
geologic history and formation, public safety and health, environmental considera-
tions, local socioeconomic impacts, and the feasibility and cost of facility construction
and operation." Id.
Section 10132(b)(1)(D) of the NWPA states that each site nomination must be
accompanied by an environmental assessment. 42 U.S.C. § 10132(b)(1)(D) (1988).
97. Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1990).
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the site within its boundaries was integral to the Act.9s Pursuant
to these regulations, the Secretary issued draft environmental as-
sessments for nine potential sites in six states.99
As the selection process narrowed the potential site, political
upheaval, anger, and a myriad of lawsuits over nuclear siting en-
sued. To circumvent this growing opposition, the 1987 NWPA
amendments made sweeping changes in the siting of civilian nu-
clear waste facilities.100 As the amendment process began, two
very different proposals to end the repository impasse were offered
by Representative Morris Udall of Arizona and Senator Bennett
Johnston of Louisiana. Representative Udall's approach sought to
base the site selection on scientific rather than political grounds by
appointing a scientific panel to search for a new site. 101 In order to
overcome political objections to the scientifically selected sites,
Udall proposed appointing a special negotiator charged with con-
vincing some state to accept the repository voluntarily, providing
financial incentives to any state willing to do so.1 0 2
Senator Johnston's proposal, which was later enacted in the
1987 NWPA amendments, limited DOE site characterization to a
98. "Though the Act assumes ultimate federal responsibility for a comprehensive
solution to a complex problem, it also contemplates a state veto that can only be
overridden by explicit Congressional action." Crocker, supra note 51, at 84 (refer-
ring to a state veto of site selection) (footnotes omitted). Section 10136(b)(1) of the
Act states: "Unless otherwise provided by State law, the Governor or legislature of
each State shall have authority to submit a notice of disapproval to the Congress
under paragraph (2)." 42 U.S.C. § 10136(b)(1) (1988).
Paragraph (2) states "Such Governor or legislature may submit such a notice of
disapproval to the Congress not later than the 60 days after the date that the Presi-
dent recommends such site to the Congress." 42 U.S.C. § 10136(b)(2) (1988).
The legislative history of the Act states: "A state or tribal rejection can only be
overridden by a joint resolution of the Congress." H.R. REP. No. 491, Part 1, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3813.
99. The DOE initially recommended three sites in the western United States for
a permanent repository. A Nuclear Burial Ground, NEWSWEEK, June 16, 1986, at 31.
Those sites were in Hanford, Washington, Deaf Smith, Texas, and Yucca Mountain,
Nevada. Id. The DOE also considered twelve sites located in the central and east-
ern United States for a possible second repository. Id. These included three possible
sites in Minnesota, one in Wisconsin, two in North Carolina, one in Georgia, two in
Virginia, two in Maine, and one in New Hampshire. Maynard, The Story of a Town,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 20. In May of 1986, only four months
later, the DOE abandoned its plans to evaluate the eastern and central sites.
Montange, supra note 27, at 398.
100. David H. Topol, Rethinking Who is Left Holding the Nation's Nuclear Gar-
bage Bag: The Legal and Policy Implications of Nevada v. Watkins, 1991 UTAH L.
REv. 791, 793 (discussing siting opposition); Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-257 (1987) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
101. Rochelle L. Stanfield, How Nevada Was Dealt a Losing Hand, NATL L. J.,
Jan. 16, 1988, at 146.
102. Id.
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single potential repository site, Yucca Mountain, Nevada.10 3 John-
ston's original proposal would have paid Nevada $100 million to ac-
cept the repository.l0 4 Instead, Congress authorized only $20
million for DOE payments, and then only on the condition that Ne-
vada waive its right to disapprove the recommendation of a site for
a repository. 10 5 The decision to limit the search to Yucca Mountain
was neither scientific nor economic. It was in the very clearest
terms a politically expedient solution.l0 6 Congress acted strongly
and decisively to deprive Nevada of its right under the 1982 Act to
veto the siting of the repository within its borders, in part because
Yucca Mountain is federal land.lo7 Nevada was also deprived of
any meaningful participation in the site selection process since
Congress provided only that Nevada could submit comments, but
failed to require DOE to consider and act upon those comments.' 0 8
Site characterization was scheduled to begin at Yucca Moun-
tain in 1991.109 Pursuant to Nevada law, the Secretary of Energy
applied for the necessary environmental permits from the state of
Nevada to study Yucca Mountain.110 The Nevada legislature in
turn enacted a law stating that "[ilt is unlawful for any person or
governmental entity to store high-level radioactive waste in Ne-
vada."111 The Secretary ignored the Nevada statute and stated
that plans would continue at the site.112 The state of Nevada filed
suit, challenging the Secretary's decision.113
Neither the state of Nevada nor the Secretary of Energy con-
tended that Congress expressly preempted the field of nuclear
waste disposal,114 and the Ninth Circuit stated that the Supreme
Court "has not yet confronted the issue whether the NWPA 'occu-
pies the field' of nuclear waste disposal."15 But, according to the
Ninth Circuit, "any state legislation which frustrates the full effec-
tiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy
103. Id. at 149.
104. Topol, supra note 100, at 801 n.55.
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 10173a(b)(2) (1988).
106. See Topol, supra note 100, at 799-801. Washington state and Texas congres-
sional delegations, far more powerful than Nevada, foreclosed any consideration of
the sites in their states unless Yucca Mountain somehow failed to meet DOE site
characterization standards. Id. at 799.
107. Topol, supra note 100, at 791 (citing Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1549, 1553
(9th Cir. 1990)).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 10136 (1988).
109. Nevada, 914 F.2d at 1553.
110. Id.
111. NEV. REV. STAT. § 459.910 (1989).
112. Nevada, 914 F.2d at 1551.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1560.
115. Id. at 1561.
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Clause."116 The Ninth Circuit thus held that "Nevada's attempted
legislative veto of the Secretary's site characterization activities is
preempted by the NWPA."117
This exercise in congressional power, which withstood years of
litigation, demonstrates the limits of state sovereignty in the face of
concerted congressional action by sister states. It also signaled the
illusory nature of congressional promises to recognize rights of host
jurisdictions to veto federal nuclear waste siting. The 1987 amend-
ments dramatically undercut the voluntary nature of nuclear waste
siting which had been hallmark of the 1982 NWPA:
I think the first step we have to take here is to acknowledge
that we will not construct waste management repositories any-
where in this country unless the citizens of the area feel the
repository will be safe and that the risks and benefits of waste
management are balanced, and distributed among the different
regions of the country."l 8
In 1987, seventy-five percent of Nevada residents opposed the
location of the repository in Nevada.I19 The 1987 amendments also
removed any pretense of balancing risks and benefits when it elimi-
nated all other regions of the nation as possible repositories.120
The fate of the 1982 "voluntary" solution, and the 1987 NWPA
amendments which changed it, may foreshadow great problems for
Indian tribes attempting to exercise sovereign decisionmaking pow-
ers in the nuclear site selection arena. The MRS plan for compen-
sated siting is clearly patterned after Representative Udall's failed
solution for repository siting: scientific consideration of potential
sites, promised financial rewards to the MRS host government, and
appointment of a nuclear negotiator to induce the tribe or state to
accept the site voluntarily.121 Nevada's reliance upon these con-
gressional promises was, however, misplaced.122
116. Id. (citing Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971)).
117. Nevada, 914 F.2d at 1561.
118. Public Participation and Equity in Nuclear Waste Facility Siting: Oversight
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) (statement of Rep.
Udall).
119. Topol, supra note 100, at 800.
120. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the WIPP, the military nuclear
waste storage site, is located in the same region. See Davis, supra note 84; see also
infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
121. Stanfield, supra note 101, at 146.
122. See Stanfield, supra note 101, at 146. Although the litigation is over, it does
not appear that Nevada's battles to defeat siting are over. The efforts to defeat this
siting continue and questions remain whether the repository will ever come to rest in
Nevada. Conversation with Brad Hoaglun, Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator,
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 27, 1993) [hereinafter Oct. 27 Conversation with Brad
Hoaglun].
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b. Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility
An MRS facility is an operation in which spent nuclear fuel
and high-level waste is consolidated, packaged, handled, and tem-
porarily stored prior to disposal in deep geological repositories.12 3
It is intended to accommodate spent nuclear fuel and high-level ra-
dioactive waste resulting from civilian nuclear activities for renew-
able periods of forty years. 124
The facility must meet two important requirements: (1) "to
permit continuous monitoring, management and maintenance" of
the stored material1 25 and (2) to "provide for the ready retrieval of
such spent fuel and waste."12 6 The risk of release or accident is
inherent in the very idea of monitored retrievable storage. 12 7 Moni-
toring also serves dual purposes of detecting a failure and of provid-
ing information on status and degradation of the waste.
The requirements for siting the MRS also reflect the danger
inherent in nuclear waste. In 1982, Representative Udall explained
that a site would be disqualified if located in any metropolitan sta-
tistical area, county, urbanized area, or place, having both (1) a
population of not less than 2,500 individuals; and (2) a population
density of not less than 1,000 individuals per square mile.128
Monitored retrievable storage has dramatically reduced proce-
dural and substantive protections when compared with permanent
repository storage.
123. 50 Fed. Reg. 16536-37 (1985). See also 42 U.S.C. § 10161 (1988); Richard
Mauro, Note, Tennessee v. Herrington: An End Run Around State Participation in
Nuclear Waste Siting Decisions, 9 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 113 (1988). A Monitored
Retrievable Storage Facility (MRS) is a temporary facility for nuclear waste eventu-
ally destined for Yucca Mountain. It is "an above-ground storage facility for spent
nuclear fuel. The spent nuclear fuel from commercial reactors will be shipped to the
MRS by truck or train in specially designed and tested casks, where it will be moni-
tored and stored." INVITATION FOR DIALOGUE, supra note 23, at no. 6. An MRS would
cover about 450 acres and would resemble a low-rise industrial park. While at the
MRS, the casks would be monitored to ensure that they remain sealed. The MRS
will be licensed to operate for renewable periods of 40 years. Id.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 10161(a)(1) (1988). Critics of the MRS argue that policymakers
have now proposed to address the storage crisis "by gathering the industry's most
lethal waste at a single 450-acre parking lot." Paul Salopek, Descendants of Famed
Apaches Split Over Nuke Waste Project, EL PAso TIMES, May 8, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis library, CURNWS file (also appearing as Mescalero Apaches Wrestle
with Notion of Nuclear Reservation, EL PASo TIMES, Apr. 26, 1992, at Al).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 10161(b)(1)(B) (1988).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 10161(b)(1)(C) (1988).
127. "Retrievability of high-level nuclear waste might be desired for one or both of
two reasons. It might be desired for purposes of reprocessing the waste or it might
be required to remedy a failure of either an engineered or natural means of contain-
ment." Brown, supra note 12, at 744.




In contrast to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act procedural provi-
sions for siting and construction of repositories, the provisions
for monitored retrievable storage are streamlined in several re-
spects: The site characterization process required for a reposi-
tory is not required for a[n] [MRS] facility. Neither presidential
review nor recommendation is required for a[n] [MRS] facility.
While the general provisions for congressional review of reposi-
tory site selection after consultation with the affected state or
Indian tribes apply to the site selection process for a[n] [MRS]
facility, the provisions for financial assistance do not. There are
no specific provisions in the [NWPA] for judicial review of ac-
tions concerning a[n] [MRS] facility as there are for reposito-
ries. The Administrator of the [EPA] is not empowered ... to
promulgate specific regulations concerning monitored retrieva-
ble storage facilities. The Administrator has that power over
repositories. The [NRC] is not to promulgate specific regula-
tions and standards prior to the construction of a[n] [MRS]
facility.129
The anticipated cost of the MRS compared to the permanent
repository further suggests that the MRS, which is far less costly,
lacks the safety protection required for the permanent facility.130
In 1985, the DOE estimated that the MRS would cost $1 billion to
build, while the permanent repository would cost in excess of $32
billion.131
The MRS facility is commonly described as a temporary facil-
ity, in contrast with the permanent character of the repository. Yet
nothing in the brief, vague MRS provisions in NWPA limit the du-
ration of waste storage in the MRS facility.132 Nothing in the stat-
ute forbids the use of the MRS as a permanent storage facility, and
the statute itself implies that MRS storage may be either very long
129. Brown, supra note 12, at 744-45 (footnotes omitted). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10131-
10145, 10161 (1988 § Supp. IV 1992).
130. Brown, supra note 12, at 745. These are construction costs and do not in-
clude costs of compensated siting. See infra notes 327-30 and accompanying text.
Since the Yucca Mountain site is on federal land, compensated siting costs may not
be incurred. Since MRS siting contemplates economic incentives to overcome local
objections and speed siting, those costs will need to be added to the construction
costs mentioned above. It is difficult to imagine, however, that the Congress would
ever authorize compensation that would even approach the geologic depository costs.
The costs of construction and operation of the MRS facility are to be "borne by the
generators and owners of the high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel to
be stored" at the facility. 42 U.S.C. § 10161(b)(2)(B) (1988).
131. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, MISSION PLAN FOR THE OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOAC-
TIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT (1985).
132. The current regulations specify that the MRS will house waste for a period of
40 years, after which the license must be renewed. See INVITATION FOR DIALOGUE,
supra note 23, at no. 6; see also Brown, supra note 12, at 746 (citing 128 CONG. REC.
S15,639-42 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1982)). Brown hypothesizes that the sketchy nature of
MRS provisions is due to disagreement between the houses of Congress with respect
to MRS facilities. Id.
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term or permanent. Congress specifically found that "long-term
storage of high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel in
monitored retrievable storage facilities is an option for providing
safe and reliable management of such waste or spent fuel."'133 And
scientists, including the National Academy of Science study group
on spent nuclear fuel, consider monitored retrievable storage a pos-
sible alternative to long-term storage of high-level nuclear
waste.' 3 4 The Act requires that the MRS be designed "to safely
store such spent fuel and waste as long as may be necessary by
maintaining such facility through appropriate means, including
any required replacement of such facility."135 Further, there is no
requirement that waste be removed from the MRS at a certain date,
as is required with respect to interim storage facilities under the
Act.13 6 By 1987 there was growing public belief that the lax re-
quirements for siting the MRS, coupled with lower construction
costs, would result in the MRS becoming the de facto permanent
repository. 13 7
In an attempt to allay fears that the MRS site would, in effect,
become the permanent repository, the 1987 amendments to the Act
adopted what is referred to as the "MRS-repository linkage." This
provision prohibits siting the MRS until the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has authorized the construction of the permanent re-
pository.13 8 Even after the NRC has authorized the construction of
the repository, thereby clearing the way for the construction for the
MRS, Nevada may still prevent the construction of the permanent
repository at Yucca Mountain.13 9 In addition, at any time in the
future, Congress may rescind the linkage provision to the Act and
make MRS storage permanent.' 40
Under the NWPA, the locations of both the repository and the
MRS sites have been determined by a series of political, rather than
133. Brown, supra note 12, at 741 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10161(a)(1) (1982)).
134. Brown, supra note 12, at 748.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 10161(b)(1)(D) (1988) (emphasis added).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 10155(e) (1988). Interim storage is limited to three years after
either a repository or a monitored retrievable storage facility is constructed. Id.
137. Brown, supra note 12, at 748.
138. Melinda Kassen, Siting the MRS-A Lesson in How Even Bribes Don't Work,
7 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT 16, 17 (1993).
139. See discussion of Nevada v. Watkins, infra text accompanying note 426.
"[Allthough the Act clearly states that construction of a repository should proceed
regardless of construction of a monitored retrievable storage facility, monitored re-
trievable storage is clearly an alternative for managing high-level waste." Brown,
supra note 12, at 746.
140. DOE regulations can likewise be amended to use the MRS for long-term or
permanent storage. Oct. 27 Conversation with Brad Hoaglun, supra note 122.
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scientific, decisions.141 While the political process has built-in sci-
entific considerations, science has been largely limited to eliminat-
ing geographically inappropriate sites, rather than used as a basis
to choose the best and safest land for nuclear disposal. "Indeed, it
arguably does not require the selection of even an obviously supe-
rior site. It is aimed solely at the selection of an adequate site-one
that meets applicable standards and does not present insurmounta-
ble political or legal obstacles."142
3. Nuclear Waste Negotiator
It is ironic. The American Indians, who for so long have been
maligned, mistreated and overlooked are emerging as the single
largest private owners of energy resources (uranium, coal, oil,
gas and geothermal) in this country. Certainly, when white men
put Indians on reservations, they could not, in their wildest
dreams have foreseen what this would mean to the Indian
Nations.14 3
With the 1987 amendments, Congress created a new office,
separate from the Department of Energy, to undertake a new
search for a permanent repository and MRS sites: the Office of the
Nuclear Waste Negotiator. 144 The Negotiator was charged with
141. Montange, supra note 27, at 311-12.
Congress' solution to the problem of nuclear waste has taken the form
of searching for political accommodation through the diffusion of deci-
sionmaking authority rather than of the selection of objective rules of
decision. As a result, the nuclear waste disposal program, although
largely federal in its inception and controlled by a single agency [the
AEC], has become increasingly de-centralized and de-federalized.
Moreover, Congress has supplied no significant additional guidance
with respect to standards either for disposal or for siting repositories.
Because the approach which Congress has evolved is more political
than scientific, the regime for siting facilities for the various categories
of nuclear waste differs dramatically, and in a fashion which has only a
limited relationship to the hazards involved.
Id. at 311.
142. Montagne, supra note 27, at 396 (footnote omitted).
143. Robert S. Siegal, from Ray A. Young Bear, A Drive to Lone Ranger, Mes-
quakie (excerpt from materials submitted by Paula Gunn Allen for use in Prof. Col-
lins' seminar, "Toxic Waste in Indian Country," at the University of Richmond Law
School).
144. David Leroy was appointed the first Negotiator in June 1990 and was con-
firmed by the Senate on August 4, 1990. 136 CONG. REC. S12,339 (daily ed. Aug. 3,
1990). Ten months later the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator published its
first operating procedures in the Federal Register. Notice, 56 Fed. Reg. 25,703
(1991). Under the regulations the Negotiator sought only an MRS site and took no
action under its congressional delegation to seek a voluntary host for the permanent
repository. Id. This notice made feasibility grants available to potential MRS hosts.
Id. During the summer of 1993, the Clinton Administration accepted David Leroy's
resignation and appointed Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary as interim negotiator.
Carol Bradley, Former Congressman is New Nuclear Waste Negotiator, GANNErr
NEWS SERVICE, June 4, 1993 (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS file). On
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finding an Indian tribe or state willing to voluntarily accept either
the permanent repository or the MRS and to negotiate an agree-
ment for siting the facilities. 14 5 Economic incentives were provided
for states or tribes which would accept the waste voluntarily.146 Af-
ter an agreement is negotiated, it must be approved by Congress
and the President before it becomes effective. 147
The Negotiator's Office was initially established for a period of
five years.148 The 1987 amendments authorized payments of $10
million dollars to any state or tribe which accepted the permanent
repository and $5 million dollars to any state or tribe which ac-
cepted the MRS, but all payments are specifically premised upon
the waiver of objections to the siting.149 The Negotiator created a
three-tiered structure of grant applications for the MRS negotiation
process. Phase I grants pay a potential host community up to
$100,000 for initial consideration of the waste facility. Phase II-A
awards grant up to $200,000 to conduct public information hearings
and to reach agreement that the local government is willing to ne-
gotiate. 150 Phase II-B authorizes grants up to $2.8 million to study
the feasibility of accepting the MRS site, and allows a tribe or state
to discontinue the process at any time throughout Phase 11.151
Only when Congress has approved the MRS agreement and it is
signed by the President is the host committed to permitting the
MRS in its community.15 2 Although the Negotiator is still actively
promoting the benefits of nuclear waste repository acceptance, even
David Leroy himself admitted that the prospects of finding a host
are constantly growing dimmer, and, prior to resigning, had given
November 11, 1993 the Senate confirmed Richard Stallings, a former representative
from Idaho, the Administration's choice for Leroy's permanent replacement. 139
CONG. REc. S15,654 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993).
145. Rudy Abramson, Seeking a Foster Home for Nuclear Waste, L.A. TIMES, June
9, 1992, at 5.
146. See id.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 10132(c) (1988) (Presidential review); 42 U.S.C. § 10135(c) (1988)
(Congressional review).
148. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10241-10251 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Section 10250 states
that the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator "shall cease to exist not later than 30
days after the date 5 years after December 22, 1987." 42 U.S.C. § 10250 (referring to
January 22, 1993). The Office was later extended for two years until January 1995.
Pub. L. No. 102-486, 42 U.S.C.A. § 10250 (West Supp. 1994). See generally Stan-
field, supra note 101.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 10173a(b)(2). See also DAVID H. LEROY, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES NucLEAR WASTE NEGOTIATOR 1992 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS (Jan. 1993) [here-
inafter 1992 ANN. REP.].
150. 1992 ANN. REP., supra note 149, at 5.
151. 1992 ANN. REP., supra note 149, at 6-7.




himself until the end of 1993 to show tangible progress.' 5 3 In De-
cember 1992, DOE announced that it no longer believes that the
Negotiator's process will lead to the construction of an MRS by
1998.154 Furthermore, it now appears that all Phase II-B funding
will be cut. In the fall of 1993, a three-line amendment was added
to an energy appropriations bill. It stated that no Phase II-B funds
will be made available to study the feasibility of an MRS.155
In 1994, twelve years after the passage of the NWPA, the na-
tion is no closer to having a permanent repository or an MRS facil-
ity than it was in 1977 when the hearings on civilian nuclear waste
stockpiling began. 156 The federal government has spent well over
$1 billion in site selection and characterization, to no avail.15 7 By
law, the DOE is obligated to take title to all spent fuel "after the
commencement of the facility (the repository or MRS) operations,
not later than January 31, 1998."158 However, it does not seem pos-
sible that Yucca Mountain will be open by then, since the Nevada
litigation and technical problems have delayed site characteriza-
tion.15 9 The current DOE date for the opening of a repository at
Yucca Mountain is 2010, and "[m]ost groups interested in DOE's
nuclear waste disposal efforts characterize this projection as wildly
optimistic."160 In the meantime, the nuclear waste remains scat-
tered throughout the country in dangerous and deteriorating
condition.
II. History of Radioactive Colonization of Indian Lands161
They will have to be willing to identify capitalism for what it is,
that it is destructive and uncompassionate and deceptive. They
will have to be willing to do so or they will never understand
why the Four Corners power plants in northwestern New Mexico
continue to spew poisons into the air, destroying plant, animal,
and human life in the area.... Only when this understanding
is attained and decisions are reached and actions started to
153. Elaine Hiruo, Nuclear Waste Reality Could Open Door for Alternatives to
1998 Contract Date, 17 NUCLEARFUEL, Dec. 7, 1992, at 8.
154. Lira Behrens, Leroy Chides DOE on Waste Disposal, INSIDE ENERGY, Jan. 4,
1993, at 1.
155. See infra text accompanying note 396 (discussing amendment added in En-
ergy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-126, 107
Stat. 1327 (1993)).
156. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
157. See Civilian Nuclear Waste Program: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Energy and Natural Resources, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. 1 (1990).
158. Kassen, supra note 138, at 19.
159. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text. See also Coates, supra note
94 (discussing earthquake at Yucca Mountain).
160. Kassen, supra note 138, at 19.
161. This term is derived from Churchill & LaDuke, supra note 2, at 95.
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overcome economic and political oppression imposed upon all of
us will there be no longer a national sacrifice area in the
Southwest. 16 2
The nuclear history of the United States imprinted a parallel
course of nuclear history upon Indian country. 163 This occurred for
several reasons. A combination of treaties, congressional actions,
and court decisions over a two hundred year period removed Native
Americans from their ancestral lands to lands considered waste-
lands by the American government.164 Native Americans were
never given sole control over "Indian Country."' 6 5 Rather, it was
162. Ortiz, supra note 21, at 71-72.
163. 'As with many other extractive operations on native lands, resource extrac-
tion for raw materials export-a 'raw materials colony' relationship-has a devas-
tating effect on the health, economic conditions, and cultural viability of the native
community." Robinson, in RACE, supra note 8, at 154.
This article focuses primarily on the proposals for disposal of high-level civilian
nuclear waste on Indian lands. The history of mining and milling uranium, and of
military testing, are beyond the scope of this article. It is, however, crucial to under-
stand the role Indian lands and Indian peoples have played in the nation's nuclear
revolution in order to fully comprehend the legal significance of today's disposal
schemes and the potential for cross-media contamination. See infra notes 166-85
and accompanying text.
164. See Amanda K. Wilson, Note, Hazardous and Solid Waste Dumping Grounds
Under RCRA's Indian Law Loophole, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1043 (1990). Federal
Policy toward Native Americans has fluctuated considerably through U.S. history.
Id. at 1046. As described in this Note, those fluctuations can be characterized as six
distinct periods of federal policy toward Native Americans:
1) 1820-1850: tribes removed from populated to unpopulated, usu-
ally undesirable, areas;
2) 1850-1880: tribes removed to permanent reservations, a process
accompanied by extensive treaty-making;
3) 1871-1928: a period of allotment and assimilation when reserva-
tion land was converted from communally owned land into land allot-
ments for individual Indian ownership plus "surplus land" for non-
Indian homesteaders. The goal of allotment and assimilation was to
"mainstream7 Native Americans. Tribal land holdings diminished from
138 million acres to 48 million acres during this period;
4) 1928-1943: Indian Reorganization Act implemented with the
goal of preserving remaining tribal entities;
5) 1943-1961: tribal termination pursued, a policy which ended
federal recognition and the federal relationship between the U.S. and
109 tribes and bands;
6) 1961-present: a policy of tribal self-determination, encouraging
tribal self-government and establishing government-to-government re-
lations between the U.S. and federally recognized tribes.
Id. at 1047 n.23 (citation omitted).
165. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS
109 (3rd ed. 1991). Indian country is a term of art defined in 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151
(1984).
The term "Indian country" means (a) all lands within the limits of
any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States gov-
ernment, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within
the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
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held in trust for them by the federal government, which exercised
extensive domain over the use and development of Indian land and
resources. 16 6 Manuel Pino, a Pueblo Indian, perhaps summarized
it best: "The government was very careful to set aside the land for
Indians that held little value. Little did they know that because of
uranium ... they would have to come back for it."167 While Ameri-
cans are extremely afraid of nuclear reactor accidents, most fail to
realize that uranium mining and milling have an equal, if not more
detrimental, effect on the environment and on the people who mine
it.168
In order to gain nuclear superiority in the world, the federal
government needed a domestic source of uranium. It found that
uranium in the wastelands to which Native Americans were ban-
ished.169 Just as the federal government had little difficulty justi-
fying removal of Native Americans from their lands and into the
wasteland in the nineteenth century,1 70 it found little difficulty in
"plundering" their natural resources in the interest of national
security.
Virtually all uranium mining occurred on Indian lands.'71
Native American uranium miners were subjected to high levels of
radiation during the mining process, yet they were given almost no
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights of
way running through the same.
The term "Indian reservation" describes territory reserved for In-
dian occupancy by treaty, statute, or executive order. "Reservation"
does not include Indian communities located outside reservation
boundaries.
Id.
166. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Applicability of Federal Laws of General Application
to Indian Tribes and Reservation Indians, 25 U.C. DAvs L. REv. 85, 87-93 (1991).
The "trust obligation" the federal government owes to tribes is based on dicta found
in early U.S. Supreme Court opinions. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) ("Indian tribes are domestic dependant nations" whose relation to
the federal government "resembles that of a ward to its guardian"). Only Congress
can terminate the trust relationship. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v.
Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 380 (1st Cir. 1975).
167. Bill Lambrecht, Broken Trust: Poisoned Land, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Nov. 19, 1991, at 6A (part 3 of a 5-part series, Nov. 17-21, discussing disposal of
waste, including nuclear mining and spent-fuel, on Indian land).
168. See generally Robinson, in RACE, supra note 8.
169. Tribes within the United States have large mineral holdings: 10% of the na-
tion's coal, 10% of its oil, and a minimum of 16% of the nation's uranium. Charles
Wilkinson, Shall the Islands be Preserved?, 16 AM. WEST 32-34 (May-June 1979),
quoted in Rennard Strickland, Indian Law and the Miner's Canary: the Signs of
Poison Gas. The Fiftieth Cleveland-Marshall Lecture, 39 CL. ST. L. REv. 483, 489
(1991).
170. Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We
Ever Be Saved? The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice, 97 YALE L.J. 923, 939 (1988).
171. See Churchill & LaDuke, supra note 2, at 96.
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protection against the known health hazards of radiation.' 7 2 Nu-
merous studies demonstrate that Indian uranium miners suffered
from cancer and other uranium-related illnesses.173
Uranium milling, the processing of uranium ore, extracts usa-
ble uranium concentrate called yellowcake.174 Since usable ura-
nium ore represents only 0.10 to 1.0 percent of the mined material,
waste tailings 100 to 1,000 times the amount of ore are gener-
ated.175 The federal government allowed these highly radioactive
mill tailings, which retain 85 percent of the original radioactivity of
the ore, to accumulate in piles at the mines.176 Radiological devas-
tation is felt throughout Indian country in the southwest where
uranium was mined and milled. It is estimated that there are over
one thousand old mines and waste piles located on Navajo (Dineh)
land alone, yet the federal government allotted only $750,000 over a
three year period to clean up all these sites-less than one percent
of the actual estimated cost of an effective cleanup.177
Hazards were not limited to the miners and millers, however.
Uranium mine waste pollutes groundwater, streams, and air.' 78
Massive amounts of water used in the mining process also became
contaminated with high levels of waste.179 Indian lands show the
devastation of nuclear mining and milling in the form of air and
water pollution and in excessive cancer deaths.180
172. See House Passes Compensation Bill For Victims of Radiation Exposure,
BNA DAILY REP. FOR ExEcutrvEs, Sept. 28, 1990, at A18; see also Valerie Tailman,
Native Americans: U.S. Government's Guinea Pigs, SUN SENTINEL, Jan. 9, 1994, at
F2.
173. See Charlotte-Anne Lucas, 'Toxin Defense' Successful, NAT. L.J., May 1,
1989, at 9; Lung Cancer Rising Among Navajos in Uranium Areas of Ariz. -N.M.,
NUCLEARFUEL, June 18, 1984, at 14.
174. Monson, supra note 3, at 548 n.7.
175. Robinson, in RACE, supra note 8, at 153.
176. Robinson, in RACE, supra note 8, at 153. One particularly egregious example
of the devastation caused by mill tailing is Monument Valley mine on the Navajo
reservation in northern Arizona. The pile of contaminated uranium mining waste at
Monument is sixty-five feet high and covers seventeen acres. Lambrecht, supra note
167.
177. Lambrecht, supra note 167.
178. See Churchill & LaDuke, supra note 2, at 103.
179. See Churchill & LaDuke, supra note 2, at 103.
180. Navajo Indians (Dineh) were the primary workforce for mining uranium ore,
resulting in high lung cancer mortality rates. Pamela Duncan, Environmental Ra-
cism: Recognition, Litigation, and Alleviation, 6 TUL. ENVrL. L. J. 317, 383 (1993).
As of October, 1993, the DOJ had rejected more than half the compensation requests
filed by uranium victims under the 1990 Radiation Exposure Compensation Act. 13
DOJ ALExr 11, Oct. 18, 1993. The DOJ rejected 1,265 applications from miners and
others who were exposed to high-level radiation between the 1940s and the 1960s
when uranium production received high priority. Id. The DOJ approved 1,256 ap-
plications and an additional 708 applications are pending. Id. DOJ requirements
often impose barriers by requiring victims to produce chest x-rays from 30 to 40
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Native American literature expresses the sense of devaluation
felt by many Native Americans in relation to the location of the
atomic experiments and nuclear hazards. Simon Ortiz writes that
"[i]t was no exceptional decision that Los Alamos Laboratories were
located where they were nor where the atomic bomb would be ex-
ploded. This was the remote barren west afterall, and only a few
Indians were there."181
Because of the nuclear devastation wrought by mining, mill-
ing and testing, this section of Indian country has come to be known
as the "National Sacrifice Area."182 In 1972, the Nixon administra-
tion sought to officially designate the Four Corners region and the
impacted region of the Dakotas, Wyoming, and Montana as such. 183
The region is "literally uninhabitable through the... proliferation
of nuclear contamination."' 8 4 Leslie Marmon Silko, in Ceremony,
tells the story of an Indian living in New Mexico in the 1940s,
amidst nuclear testing:
From the jungles of his dreaming he recognized why the Japa-
nese voices merged with the Laguna voices .... From that time
on, human beings were one clan again, united by the fate the
destroyers had planned for all of them, for all living things;
united by a circle of death that devoured people in cities twelve-
thousand miles away, victims who had never known these me-
sas, never seen the delicate colors of the rocks that had boiled up
their slaughter. 185
In considering Indian involvement in federal nuclear waste
disposal programs, it is important to remember that nearly all of
the nuclear devastation of Indian lands was committed either di-
rectly by the federal government, as in the case of weapons testing,
or pursuant to uranium mining and milling activities which are
part of the federal government's nuclear development scheme and
performed pursuant to leases entered into by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. 186 The affected Indian lands were under the trusteeship of
the United States, which was responsible for protecting those lands
years ago. Id. However, Indian health services routinely purge such records after
25 years, thus impeding the large number of requests made by Native Americans.
Id.
181. Ortiz, supra note 21, at 64.
182. Churchill & LaDuke, supra note 2, at 108.
183. Churchill & LaDuke, supra note 2, at 108.
184. Churchill & LaDuke, supra note 2, at 108.
185. Churchill & LaDuke, supra note 2, at 110 (quoting LESLIS MARMON SIKO,
CEREMoNY (1977)).
186. See supra note 27 (discussing mine waste); supra notes 49-60 and accompa-
nying text (discussing U.S. nuclear monopoly and subsequent relationship to private
power plants); infra note 344 and accompanying text; and infra notes 426-45 and
accompanying text (discussing exclusive federal control of nuclear safety).
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and Indian peoples.18 7 In exchange for the income generated by the
tribe's natural resources, Native Americans received a legacy of
cancer, death, and pollution.
There is another paradox hidden in this gloom. Laguna
Pueblo poet Paula Gunn Allen reminds us that the Laguna Pueblo
in New Mexico is among the best-educated tribes, producing doc-
tors, lawyers, poets, writers, and intellectuals.1SS The people of her
tribe were educated from the profits of Jackpile Uranium Mine.i89
Gunn raises the intriguing question of whether the intellectual
power of the Laguna Pueblo people may not be due in part to living
in proximity to the power of nuclear energy.190 At the very least,
the mining and milling income, even if inadequate to compensate
for the hazards, nonetheless provided a valuable source of income
for the tribes.191
A. Tribal Involvement Under NWPA
Ironically, Native Americans originally sought coverage under
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in order to protect themselves from
nuclear hazards on non-Indian lands which had serious impact on
reservations.192 Native Americans lobbied hard for inclusion in the
NWPA decisionmaking process, and the Act ultimately did include
Indian tribes. 193
Under the provisions of the Act, Indian tribes are, in many
respects, granted the same rights as states in the repository siting
process. 19 4 States and tribes are entitled to the same rights to host
a nuclear waste facility, to receive payment if they agree to host the
facility, to disapprove siting in their own jurisdiction, and to consul-
187. CLHNrON ET AL., supra note 165.
188. Personal Communication with Paula Gunn Allen, T.C. Williams School of




192. Hovis, supra note 39, at 47, 49.
193. Hovis, supra note 39, at 56. Under the provisions of the Act, the term "af-
fected Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe:
(A) within whose reservation boundaries a monitored retrievable stor-
age facility, test and evaluation facility, or a repository for high-level
radioactive waste or spent fuel is proposed to be located; (B) whose fed-
erally defined possessory or usage rights to other lands outside the res-
ervation's boundaries arising out of congressionally ratified treaties
may be substantially and adversely affected by the locating of such a
facility: Provided, That the Secretary of the Interior finds, upon the pe-
tition of the appropriate governmental officials of the tribe, that such
effects are both substantial and adverse to the tribe.
42 U.S.C. § 10101(2)(A)-(B) (1988).
194. But see § IV infra notes 377-412 and accompanying text (discussing equal
treatment of tribes and states).
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tation and cooperation if the proposed site is in a jurisdiction that
may affect them.19 5
The Yakima tribe of Washington state was deeply involved in
the struggle to include Native Americans in the NWPA.196 The
Yakima Indian nation's reservation is located near the Hanford nu-
clear plant.197 The Hanford plant, which is also the site of one of
the nation's five major military nuclear waste facilities,198 still op-
erates, causing numerous radiation problems for the Indian nations
surrounding it. For example, the Hanford nuclear weapons facility
has generated substantial nuclear waste soil contamination over
the past forty years.19 9
In an attempt to end further expansion of the Hanford facility,
in 1979, the Tribal Council of the Yakima Nation enacted a ban on
importation and transportation of nuclear waste across or within
the Yakima Nation.20 0 In order to obtain standing to object to the
continuing nuclear problems at Hanford, the Yakima actively lob-
bied Congress to include Indian tribes in the NWPA siting provi-
sions. After receiving status as an "affected tribe," the Yakima
worked to prevent siting the permanent repository at Hanford.201
The state of Washington, which historically opposed the sover-
eign nations of the Yakima, Umatilla, and Nez Perce Indians, allied
with the tribes in the fight against locating the NWPA repository at
195. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10136-10222 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
196. See Hovis, supra note 39, at 51-52. The Yakima's story helps to make clear
both the role nuclear power plays in the lives of Native Americans and the impor-
tance of considering Native American interests in nuclear legislation. Yakima tradi-
tion teaches that the Creator took the soil to make the first Yakima Indian from a
location very near the Hanford Nuclear Reservation and that Yakimas walked their
first steps on this land and have been there since the beginning of time. Id.
The location of the soil that created the first Yakima presents ironies
that are not lost on the Yakima people. The same area that marks the
creation of man also marks the development of man's potential destruc-
tion. In 1943, as part of the federal government's Manhattan Project to
develop the atom bomb, the Hanford area was selected as a suitable
nuclear reactor site for plutonium production. This plutonium was
used in the bomb that devastated Nagasaki and helped end World War
II.
Id. at 52 (footnotes omitted).
197. Hovis, supra note 39, at 52.
198. Montange, supra note 27, at 375-76.
199. Topol, supra note 100, at 794-95.
200. The ordinance prohibits "nuclear wastes, residues, fuels, products and by-
products from nuclear material" being moved across or stored within the Yakima
Indian Nation. Hovis, supra note 39, at 54 (quoting Yakima Tribal Council Resolu-
tion No. T-72-79 (June 6, 1979) (banning nuclear wastes from the reservation)).
201. Hovis, supra note 39, at 60.
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Hanford.202 This tribal coalition and the state of Washington even-
tually defeated the siting of the permanent repository at
Hanford.203
B. Indian Nations and the MRS
What good is the dump's money going to do if we're all dead of
cancer.... We're supposed to be caretakers of the land and trees.
What a joke. 20 4
After many years of vainly searching for a nuclear waste site,
Congress and the newly created Office of the Nuclear Waste Negoti-
ator turned to Indian nations. The response of Indian nations to
the Nuclear Waste Negotiator's offer was, in many respects, over-
whelming. There are 293 federally recognized tribes in the United
States outside Alaska.205 More than two million Native Americans
live in the United States. 20 6 According to the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs, approximately half that number live on or near Indian reser-
vations, trust land or Alaskan Native villages.20 7 Indians control
just over three percent of the nation's land mass,208 yet Indian
202. Hovis, supra note 39, at 60. Hanford was one of three sites on DOE's list of
choices for the NWPA permanent repository prior to the 1987 NWPA Amendments.
See supra note 99 (discussing early site selection candidates).
203. See Washington Demanding 'Valid" Study as Basis for Nuclear Waste Siting,
INSIDE ENERGY, May 30, 1983. In an ironic turn of events, the Yakima nation ap-
plied for a Feasibility Grant pursuant to the 1987 NWPA amendments to study the
possibility of hosting the MRS facility. Elouise Shumacher, Native Americans and
Nuclear Waste-Yakimas Take First Step Toward Allowing Dump on Reservation,
SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 3, 1992, at D-1 (Northwest). Many tribal members argued that
radiation will inevitably affect the Yakima nation, and that they would much rather
have the funding associated with the MRS and the possibility of some voice in how
the facility was controlled. Id. Not all Yakima Indians were supportive of the action
but the Yakima Indian nation's leader argued that the MRS might have helped the
tribe achieve its ultimate goal: cleaning up the Hanford site and reopening the area
for traditional and religious uses. Id. The leader also stated that the Yakima have
lived with the Hartford nuclear waste since World War II and could provide solu-
tions based on their experience. Keith Schneider, Grants Open Doors for Nuclear
Waste, N.Y. TImEs, Jan. 9, 1992, at A14. In the end, the tribal council withdrew its
application and returned the grant funds. Tribe Complies with Government Orders,
Returns Grant, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 5, 1993, at B4.
204. Salopek, supra note 124 (quoting Joseph Geronimo, Apache, and grandson of
the last major leader to surrender to the U.S. Cavalry in the Southwest).
205. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIAL ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 8-10
(3d ed. 1993).
206. Dirk Johnson, Census Finds Many Claiming New Identity: Indians, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 5, 1991, at Al, A16.
207. Id.
208. Du Bey et al., supra note 47, at 454. The 60 million acres of Indian country
are not a single land mass. Kelly Michele Colquette & Elizabeth A- Henry Robert-
son, Environmental Racism: The Causes, Consequences, and Commendations, 5 Tu-
LANE ENVTL. L.J. 153, 181 (1991). The 280 reservations and approximately 220
Indian villages are scattered checkerboard style across the United States. Id.
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tribes applied for sixteen of the twenty Phase I MRS grants.20 9
Every one of the Phase II applicants was an Indian tribe.210
Tribal applications stand in stark contrast to the virtual ab-
sence of offers from states and non-Indian communities. Non-Indi-
ans, who comprise over 99 percent of the population and occupy an
overwhelming percentage of non-federally owned land, accounted
for only four Phase I applications and no Phase II applications.211
No state offered to host the MRS and two of the four non-Indian
communities withdrew their applications after the governors of
both of the affected states objected.212 Why would Native Ameri-
cans, long overburdened with nuclear hazards, voluntarily consider
siting the MRS on their lands?
In order to understand and evaluate tribal willingness to con-
sider storing nuclear waste which the rest of the nation finds unde-
sirable, we must examine the legal situation of Native Americans
and developing concepts of environmental racism. Indian involve-
ment in the nuclear waste trade is a direct legacy of legal policies
that created a system of remote reservations, and restricted re-
source development. These policies rendered Indian tribes legally
and economically dependent upon government programs, and swept
Indians into a cycle of poverty. Indians are among the poorest per-
sons in the nation on almost every economic and social welfare indi-
cator, including an unemployment rate on reservations averaging
sixty-five percent.2 13 These problems, coupled with geographic iso-
lation and systemic economic development problems, compel some
tribes to consider the waste trade as one of the few realistic alterna-
tives for economic development.
209. MRS Grant Applicant List, Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, (Aug. 25,
1993) [hereinafter MRS Grant Applicant List]. Two Oklahoma tribes withdrew their
Phase I applications after tribal members voiced strong opposition to the tribal coun-
cil's consideration of storing nuclear waste. Kassen, supra note 138, at 19.
210. MRS Grant Applicant List, supra note 209. The Mescalero Apache of New
Mexico received a Phase II-A grant and applied for II-B funding, as have the Skull
Valley Band of the Goshute Tribe of Utah. Tribes Want Closer Look at MRS Possi-
bility, 17 NUCLEARFUEL, Nov. 9, 1992, at 7. The Mescalero Apache Tribe was the
first group to receive a second stage grant. Id.; see also DOE Awards Phase II MRS
Grant to Utah Tribe, ENERGY DAILY, Nov. 3, 1992.
211. MRS Grant Applicant List, supra note 209.
212. Kassen, supra note 138, at 19.
213. Churchill & LaDuke, supra note 2, at 99. Economics alone are not an ade-
quate indicator of the quality of life within any community. Many Native Americans
have deliberately foregone economic gain in favor of remaining active tribal mem-
bers and living on the reservation. In many cases, "the material poverty of native
indigenous persons is a reflection of defiance against assimilation." Chang, supra
note 45, at 863.
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III. Environmental Equity
While the voluntary siting program of the Nuclear Waste Ne-
gotiator was initially intended for all Americans, it has essentially
become an Indian program. Consequently, it presents a unique op-
portunity to examine the concerns raised by siting noxious land
uses in communities of color. Emerging concepts of environmental
equity provide important analytical tools in this discussion. Be-
cause Indians in America are defined both by race and nation, eq-
uity concerns encompass issues of race and sovereignty. What
makes this analysis particularly difficult is that racism is influ-
enced both with the doctrine of limited Indian sovereignty and with
environmental decisionmaking. These concepts affect our analysis
of equitable considerations of nuclear waste storage in Indian coun-
try. In this section we examine the strands of racism, 2 14 tribal sov-
ereignty, and environmental equity in order to clarify the issues
involved.
When discussions of Indian tribes arise in our nation, ques-
tions of self-determination and intergovernmental relations lurk
just beneath the surface. 2 15 The nuclear debate centers on the
right of Indian nations, exercising their sovereign powers, to make
decisions with important consequences for the citizens of contigu-
ous states and the United States as a whole. However, the relation-
ship of Indian nations to their sister sovereigns cannot be separated
from issues of racism and stereotypical views of Native Americans.
History, culture, sovereignty, equity, racism, and power sound the
baffling drumbeat of the current nuclear debate.
A. Principles of Environmental Equity
In the metaphor of a rapidly sinking ship, we're all in the same
boat, and people of color are closest to the hole. 2 16
In 1983, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that
hazardous waste landfills are disproportionately sited in predomi-
nantly African-American communities, most of which are quite
214. We use the term racism to include "those activities which support or justify
the superiority of one racial group over another." Torres, supra note 21, at 840.
215. "On the reservations, you can't talk long about... radiation sickness without
running into the issue of sovereignty.... To Native Americans, sovereignty is...
the wellspring of their political will and the ultimate weapon of resistance.
Knox, supra note 46, at 57.
216. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: Racial Divide in En-




poor.2 17 Soon thereafter, the United Church of Christ completed a
study which found a national pattern of disproportionate siting of
hazardous waste facilities in communities of people of color, and
that race is the single best predictor of the location of such facili-
ties.218 Data generated in the study revealed that the proportion of
minorities residing in communities with a commercial hazardous
waste facility was about double that of communities without such
facilities; where two or more such facilities were located in the same
community, the proportion of residents of color was more than
triple.219 The probability that the racial biases in the location of
the waste sites could have occurred as a result of chance are virtu-
ally zero.220 The predominant race of a community, apart from its
social and economic status, thus has significant impact on the dis-
tribution of environmental hazards. 221
These two studies engendered serious questions concerning
the equity of the nation's environmental programs. In January
1990, the Michigan Conference on Race and the Incidence of Envi-
ronmental Hazards brought together scholars working in the area
of environmental racism to advance knowledge on the issues and to
raise public awareness. As a result of that meeting activists and
scholars met with the EPA to demand action.222 The EPA formed
an internal workgroup to study environmental injustice and to
draft a policy statement on the matter. In January 1992 the EPA
issued its draft report on environmental equity which inspired
heated public debate. 223 The final EPA study found that (1) low-
income and communities of color appear to have a greater than av-
erage observed and potential exposure to hazardous pollutants; (2)
multiple sources of pollution can play a significant role in certain
low-income and communities of colors' exposure to environmental
217. Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and
Class As Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U. COLO. L. REV.
921, 921 (1992) [hereinafter Mohai & Bryant, Environmental Injustice].
218. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, Toxic WASTES
AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 15
(1987) [hereinafter UNITED CHURCH].
219. UNITED CHURCH, supra note 218, at 13, 15-16.
220. Mohai & Bryant, Environmental Injustice, supra note 217, at 922.
221. Paul Mohai & Bunyon Bryant, Race, Poverty, and the Environment: The Dis-
advantaged Face Greater Risks, 18 EPA J. 8 (Mar./Apr. 1992) [hereinafter Mohai &
Bryant, Race, Poverty].
222. Mohai & Bryant, Environmental Injustice, supra note 217, at 923. While as
far back as 1971 the Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality had
documented racial injustices in the distribution of environmental hazards, public
awareness and agency action awaited the events described herein. Mohai & Bryant,
Race, Poverty, supra note 221, at 8.
223. Mohai and Bryant, Environmental Injustice, supra note 217, at 923.
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pollutants, and (3) the EPA does not calculate the human health
risks posed by exposure to all sources of pollutants, or the cumula-
tive and synergistic effects of such exposure. 22 4
In the wake of these events the concept of environmental eq-
uity has become one of the fastest growing areas of legal scholar-
ship. A virtual explosion of legal, sociological, and scientific
scholarly publications occurred over the past two years on the
emerging concept of environmental racism. 2 25 Federal and state
lawmakers have proposed legislation to deal with the issues, and
litigation of the issue continues. 2 26
1. Definitions of Environmental Racism and
Environmental Equity
Since Dr. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr. first called racial bias in the
location of hazardous waste sites "environmental racism,"227 schol-
ars have reached some agreement on the meaning of the term. En-
vironmental racism includes "practices that place African-
Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans at greater health and
environmental risks than the rest of the society."228 The phenome-
non encompasses "the disproportionate placement of toxic hazards
in minority areas, the exclusion of people of color from environmen-
224. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ENVIRONMENTAL
EQUITY-REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, VOLUME 1: WORKGROUP REPORT TO
THE ADMINISTRATOR (1992) [hereinafter REDUCING RISK].
225. Environmental racism is a term used to call attention to the fact that envi-
ronmental hazards fall disproportionately on communities of color. The term de-
scribes both intentional and unintentional impact on communities of color. Rachel
Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394, 395 (1991). This
usage is somewhat controversial as the Supreme Court requires proof of purposeful
and invidious discrimination to constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. Disparate impact on minorities is insufficient. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 242 (1976). However, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits use of
any employment criterion that disparately affects employees on the basis of race.
Godsil, supra. See also Robert D. Bullard, Race and Environmental Justice in the
United States, 18 YALE J. IiNL L. 319 (1993); Robert W. Collin, Environmental Eq-
uity: A Law and Planning Approach to Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
495 (1992); Jane Perkins, Recognizing and Attacking Environmental Racism, 26
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 389 (1992); Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of
Environmental Race Discrimination, 41 U. KA. L. REV. 271 (1992); Naikang Tsao,
Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizen's Guide to Combatting the Discrimi.
natory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 366 (1992).
226. See Collin, supra note 225, at 518-37, for an excellent summary of the litiga-
tion to date.
227. Matthew S. Scott, Chavis to Lead NAACP into New Era, BLACK ENTERPRISE,
July 17, 1993, at 17. Rev. Chavis, who issued the landmark report Toxic Wastes and
Race in the United States in 1987 for the United Church of Christ and its Commis-
sion for Racial Justice, was appointed Executive Director of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1993. Id.
228. Bullard, supra note 225, at 319.
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tal planning, and the destruction of many traditional communi-
ties."22 9 As a form of institutional racism, 2 30 it is necessary to
consider both the distributional impact of environmental policies
and "the substantive blindness in the production of rules that lead
to racially subordinating activities."23 x The environmental equity
movement challenges some of the fundamental precepts of existing
environmental law.232 Environmental equity has altered environ-
mental law to require consideration of the equitable distribution of
environmental benefits and burdens.233 Studies virtually unani-
mously conclude that race is the "single best predictor of the loca-
tion" of hazardous waste sites.23 4 The finding that communities of
color bear a disproportionate share of the environmental burdens is
repeatedly affirmed.235
Additional underlying factors related to race also play a role in
the siting of waste facilities23 6 including, inter alia: (1) the availa-
bility of cheap land in communities of color;23 7 (2) fewer economic
and professional resources to organize, object to and to litigate sit-
ing decisions;238 (3) less resistance to siting decisions which often
results from the hope for jobs or the lack of political resources, rep-
resentation, and organization.2 3 9 Thus, a crucial reason for the in-
229. Reich, supra note 225, at 272.
230. Bullard, supra note 225, at 321.
231. Torres, supra note 21, at 840. The act need not be done with intent to
achieve an oppressive or discriminatory result. It is sufficient that the impact and
result be achieved in the face of willful or negligent blindness to its results. Id.
232. Traditionally, environmental law has focused on efficiency rather than on
equity concerns affecting human communities. Tarlock, supra note 37, at 871-83.
Environmentalists' twin goals have been preservation of ecosystem integrity and bio-
diversity. Id. at 879. Since the 1970s, these efforts expanded to include the elimina-
tion of involuntary exposure to toxic substances. Most environmental regulation is
based upon determining the amount of pollution considered tolerable or achievable,
then choosing the most economically efficient means of achieving that pollutant
level. Hazardous waste disposal siting was determined based on economic efficiency
as well. See generally id. Programatic results were measured largely in terms of
bio-diversity and natural resources, with no systematic effort to insure that the costs
and benefits of environmental programs were fairly distributed among differing
human communities. See generally Mohai & Bryant, Environmental Injustice,
supra note 217. The concern for the effects on human beings was limited to whether
the total human U.S. population would benefit-without regard to the benefit/bur-
den calculus respecting racial or economic minorities. Id.
233. See generally Mohai and Bryant, Environmental Injustice, supra note 217.
234. Mohai & Bryant, Race, Poverty, supra note 221, at 44.
235. See, e.g., Bullard, supra note 225, at 320-27.
236. Mohai & Bryant, Race, Poverty, supra note 221, at 8.
237. Mohai & Bryant, Environmental Injustice, supra note 217, at 922 (citing
UNITED CHURCH, supra note 218, at 23).
238. UNITED CHURCH, supra note 218, at 16.
239. See generally Robert Bullard & Beverly Hendrix Wright, Environmentalism
and the Politics of Equity: Emergent Trends in the Black Community, 12 MID-AMER.
REV. OF Soc. 21 (1987).
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equity in environmental benefits and burdens is the lack of political
power on the part of minority communities at every level of local,
state, and federal government. 240 This factor also affects the siting
of nuclear waste in Indian country.
Effective application of the principles of environmental equity
to Indian nations requires considering the complex interaction of
environmental racism2 41-treatment based primarily upon the
race of Native Americans-and environmental imperialism-treat-
ment based upon the sovereign authority of Indian tribes.242 For
purposes of this article we include considerations of racism and im-
perialism under the language of "environmental equity."2 43
2. Unequal Enforcement of Environmental Laws
The problems of disproportionate siting of hazardous waste
sites in minority communities are seriously compounded by a pat-
tern of discriminatory environmental enforcement. An important
study conducted by the National Law Journal in 1992 revealed that
enforcement is related to race rather than to the economic status of
240. Anthony R. Chase, Assessing and Addressing Problems Posed by Environ-
mental Racism, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 335, 346 (1993) "The resulting deficiency in
political power encourages hazardous site developers and polluting industries to
seek locations in minority areas, thereby avoiding the opposition and delays occur-
ring in communities with greater political connections and power." Id. at 346 (citing
Godsil, supra note 225, at 399).
241. Williamson B. C. Chang suggests that using the term "environmental ra-
cism" already abandons the struggle over imperialism. See Chang, supra note 45, at
866-67.
242. Williams uses the term "cultural racism" to include these two concepts. See
Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: The Rehnquist Court's Perpetuation of
European Cultural Racism Against American Indian Tribes, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J.
358 (1992) [hereinafter Williams, Columbus's Legacy]. In this article we do not
adopt the phrase "cultural racism" because in some circumstances in the context of
environmental law, race may predominate (as in the case of urban Indians), and in
others, sovereignty may predominate (as in waste disposal on the reservation). In
all cases cultural racism plays a part. In the cases where race predominates, how-
ever, the principles of environmental racism applied so effectively to African Ameri-
cans and Hispanics can be applied directly. In situations dominated by sovereignty
concerns, unique principles based upon nationhood are required.
243. The term "environmental equity" is often used by persons who wish to raise
issues of inequitable distribution of environmental benefits and burdens without an-
swering the question of whether these inequities are based upon race. The authors'
use of the term "equity" rather than "racism" is not in any way meant to avoid the
issue of racism. We have chosen to use the term "equity" to reflect the dual concerns
of racism and sovereignty essential to any discussion of Indian environmental is-
sues. It is also crucial to our analysis that "equity" be defined based upon the goal of
achieving a fair and just result for oppressed people relative to their actual social
and political conditions, as opposed to a system which would simply treat all differ-
ent groups identically. Our model of "equity" is an asymmetrical model, not the
"sameness" model of equality. See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual




the community. 24 4 White communities, rich or poor, get faster ac-
tion, better results, and stiffer penalties than communities of Afri-
can Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans and other people of
color. 24 5 At toxic waste sites, the treatment selected, the speed of
remedy selection, frequency of site listing, fines, and decisions to
pursue permanent solutions versus "containment," were all more
protective of whites than of other races. 24 6 The study found, for
example, that of the 1,177 Superfund toxic waste sites with penal-
ties assessed since 1980, penalties at sites with the greatest white
population were 500 percent higher than penalties at sites with
high minority populations. 247 For all federal laws aimed at protect-
ing citizens from pollution, penalties in white communities were 46
percent higher than in communities of color.2 48 In multi-media
cases, where violations result in the contamination of more than
one environmental medium, disparity was greatest. The average
fine in white areas was $335,566; it was $55,318 in communities of
color.249 Penalties in multi-media cases in high income areas were
1,650 percent higher than in low income areas.250
3. Environmental Degradation in Indian Country
The situation on Indian lands is consistent with findings
showing that toxic waste sitings are closely tied to the race and eco-
nomic standing of the community. The nation's 287 Indian reserva-
tions are among the most exploited and environmentally degraded
lands anywhere in rural America.251 Indian tribes bear the burden
of hazardous waste storage and disposal sites in part "because they
are far removed from populated areas."252 In 1985, the Council of
Energy Resource Tribes performed a survey of twenty-five reserva-
tions and found that 1,200 hazardous waste generators or other
hazardous waste activities sites were located on or near the reser-





249. Id. at S4.
250. Marianne Lavelle, The Minority Equation, NAT'L L. J. Sept. 21, 1992, at S2.
251. Knox, supra note 46, at 52. For an excellent discussion of both past and pres-
ent dumping of hazards on Indian lands, focusing especially on the Choctaw nation,
see Scott Morrison & LeAnne Howe, The Sewage of Foreigners: An Examination of
the Historical Precedent for Modern Waste Disposal on Indian Lands, 39 FED. B.
NEws & J. 370 (1992). See also Robert Tomsho, Dumping Grounds: Indians Contend
with Some of America's Worst Pollution, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1990, at Al (focusing
on the St. Regis Indian Reservation, a Mohawk reservation).
252. Du Bey et al., supra note 47, at 454.
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vations. 25 3 About half of all Native Americans live in communities
with uncontrolled toxic waste sites.25 4 Of the 108 landfills on In-
dian lands in existence at the time RCRA became effective, only two
are now in compliance with RCRA.255
There are several reasons for this condition.2 56 For many
years, non-Indians illegally dumped waste on Indian lands or pol-
luted non-Indian lands near reservations, leaving the waste to be
carried by air, surface water, and ground water onto Indian
lands.2 57 In addition, like all poor communities, Indian tribes'
needs far exceed their resources. Environmental control was often
put on a back burner or considered one of the myriad of community
needs which would have to await greater resources. 2 58 Most on-
reservation waste disposal, legal or illegal, occurs through open
dumping.2 59
Concerns about inequality in environmental enforcement in
communities of color apply, of course, to Indian communities as
well. Inequitable EPA enforcement is of special importance since
the federal government is often directly responsible for environ-
mental enforcement on Indian lands, and there are very particular
and idiosyncratic environmental enforcement issues in Indian
country. State or local regulation generally does not apply to In-
dian lands.260 When the rash of federal environmental legislation
253. Du Bey et al., supra note 47, at 459 n.35.
254. UNITED CHURCH, supra note 218, at xiv.
255. Have Minorities Benefited... ? A Forum, 18 EPA J., Mar.-Apr., 1992, 32, 35
(quoting Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii), Chairman of the Select Comm. on Indian
Affairs).
256. For more information on the issues of waste in Indian country, see Leslie
Allen, Who Should Control Hazardous Waste on Native American Lands? Looking
Beyond Washington Dept. of Ecology v. E.P.A., 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69 (1987); Steven
M. Christenson, Regulatory Jurisdiction over Non-Indian Hazardous Waste in In-
dian Country, 72 IowA L. REV. 1091 (1986-87); Du Bey et al., supra note 47, at 449;
Craighton Goeppele, Solutions for Uneasy Neighbors: Regulating the Reservation
Environment After Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Na-
tion, 65 WASH. L. REV. 417 (1990); Ruth L. Kovnat, Solid Waste Regulation in Indian
Country, 21 N.M. L. REV. 121 (1990); Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett,
Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the
Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REv. 581 (1989).
257. Jack Anderson, Companies Want to use Indian Lands as Dumps, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 22, 1991, at A25 ("Indian land appeals to the waste merchants because
the environmental regulations are less rigid").
258. Charles Lee, Toxic Waste and Race in the United States, in RACE, supra note
8, at 10, 16 (discussing disposal of hazardous wastes in poor communities in
general).
259. See Gover & Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism, supra note 21,
at 934.
260. See Jana L. Walker & Kevin Cover, Commercial Solid and Hazardous Waste
Disposal Projects on Indian Lands, 10 YALE J. REG., 229, 235-36 (1993) [hereinafter
Walker & Cover, Commercial].
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was passed, including the Clean Water Act,261 the Clean Air Act,262
the Solid Waste Disposal Act263 and later the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act,264 CERCLA,265 and the Safe Drinking
Water Act,266 Congress failed to include the term "Indian coun-
try."2 6 7 Consequently, states lacked environmental enforcement
authority in Indian Country. 2 68 Some of these acts have since been
amended,2 69 but Indian reservations are still in limbo, often not
clearly governed by federal, state, or local environmental legisla-
tion.2 70 Despite the prominent role of nature, Earth, and wildlife in
Indian life, Indian nations rarely have environmental regulations
comparable to those of state and federal governments, in part be-
cause of the extreme poverty of many Indian communities.2 7 1 In
this atmosphere of federal neglect, Indian tribes struggle with
wastes already on their lands-some left by mining and other BIA
sponsored efforts, some wastes from reservation life-and large
amounts of waste dumped by strangers from outside the
reservation.2 72
261. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1377 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
262. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
263. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
264. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6981-6987 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
265. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (also known as
"Superfund").
266. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
267. See Walker & Gover, Commercial, supra note 260, at 236 ("Until 1986 none
of the major federal regulatory statutes provided for delegation [of enforcement au-
thority] to tribal governments.").
268. B. Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Tribal Environmental Regulation, 36 FED.
B. NEWS & J. 438, 443 (Nov. 1989) [hereinafter Gover & Walker, Tribal].
269. In November of 1984, EPA issued the Policy for the Administration of Envi-
ronmental Programs on Indian Reservations. EPA POLICY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS, Nov. 8, 1984 [hereinafter
EPA POLIcY REPORT]. See Walker & Gover, Commercial, supra note 260, at 236.
The policy
sets forth nine principles by which EPA will pursue its objectives, in-
cluding but not limited to EPA's commitment to work with tribes on a
government-to-government basis, recognize tribes as primary decision-
makers for environmental matters on reservation land, help tribes as-
sume program responsibility, remove existing legal and procedural im-
pediments to tribal environmental programs, and encourage tribal,
state and local government cooperation in areas of mutual concern.
Id.
270. Current EPA policy on jurisdiction of reservation environments is set forth in
Regulatory Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes: Legal Analysis of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, published in the Preamble of the Indian Reservation Water Qual-
ity Standards Regulation, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876 (1991) [hereinafter EPA Legal Analy-
sis]. For discussions of the complex interplay of tribal, state, and federal
jurisdictions, see generally (over & Walker, Tribal, supra note 268; Royster &
Fausett, supra note 256, at 619.
271. Churchill & LaDuke, supra note 2, at 99.
272. See, e.g., Lambrecht, supra note 167; Anderson, supra note 257.
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While Indian country is virtually devoid of environmental pro-
tection laws, the United States presents an increasingly regulated
and expensive market, causing American industry to seek economi-
cal ways to dispose of waste. 278 Indian lands offer low cost, often
remote waste lands for developers, while waste disposal opportuni-
ties offer income to tribes struggling for economic self-sufficiency.
Recently, Indian nations have begun passing their own environ-
mental regulations which do much more than "mimic the dominant
society."274
4. Environmental Equity: Synergistic Effects
American environmental law is pieced together from a series
of federal statutes. The statutes regulate the environment medium
by medium, treating air, water, and land pollution separately. In
addition, wastes are regulated under a series of statutes which de-
pend upon the manner in which the waste was generated, the sub-
stance controlled, and the manner in which the pollution is
generated.2 7 5 Under each statute or regulation, a separate level of
pollutant or waste is permitted. Only under the most unusual cir-
cumstances will EPA work with other agencies who regulate the
environment. Unregulated synergistic effects of toxic substances
occur when exposures satisfy applicable medium by medium stan-
dards, but total exposure from the sum of all sources exceeds ac-
ceptable limits. 2 76 In a relatively closed society, such as the
reservation, these cross-medium exposures assume special signifi-
cance. As isolated and land-based cultures, Indian reservations are
uniquely at risk from the aggregation and interaction of nuclear
and toxic hazards. Poor health and inadequate healthcare exacer-
bate the problems of environmental exposure to toxins. 27 7
273. Anderson, supra note 257.
274. Knox, supra note 46, at 55. The Indigenous Environmental Network in Por-
cupine, South Dakota is involved in drafting such model codes. Id. at 54. Ironically,
because Native Americans are currently exempted from many state and federal en-
vironmental laws, the tribes have broad authority to promulgate tribal environmen-
tal law; see also REDUCING RIsK, supra note 224.
275. Take lead, for example. If the lead comes from workplace exposure it is con-
trolled under OSHA. REDUCING RISK, supra note 224. If it is in paint, it may be
controlled only under local housing codes, Id. Lead in pipes may be covered by local
housing ordinances and/or under the Clean Water Act or the Safe Drinking Water
Act. Id.
276. REDUCING RIsK, supra note 224. For example, the lead in pipes in the home
and school, lead exposure in the workplace and lead in waste sites added together to
determine the entire level of pollutants to which any given community or person
within that community is exposed. Id.




The synergistic effects of toxic or nuclear disposal may have a
potentially devastating effect on an Indian community. Indian res-
ervations are uniquely at risk from the aggregation and interaction
of nuclear and toxic waste hazards on the reservation. Uranium
tailings and water pollution from the mining of deep ore cause the
most concern. 278 The synergistic effect of multiple exposures and
multiple pathways is also of great concern. Multiple paths of nu-
clear exposure could include: occupational exposure to workers in
nuclear waste facilities or in hauling or handling nuclear waste, air
pollution, water pollution, eating contaminated food, contaminated
waste and waste facilities, and contaminated homes and schools.279
Cattle on the reservation may graze on contaminated land, and
fish, wildlife or crops may be affected by pollution as well.280 In-
fants will drink the breast milk of women who eat contaminated
food. The heritage of nuclear pollution on many reservations, such
as radioactive mill tailings contributes to the potential of cross-me-
dia exposure. Native Americans, impacted by poverty, poor health
care, pollution, and toxic waste, are in a poor position to combat the
increased risks created by nuclear waste.2 1
[C]onsideration of the racial and socio-economic status of a community
when dealing with the issue of hazardous wastes is critical from a pub-
lic health perspective. Many reports, such as the recent Report of the
Secretary's Task Force on Black and Minority Health, issued by the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [1985], have docu-
mented the lower health status of"minority" populations .... This sta-
tus needs to be considered when priorities are set for the cleanup of
hazardous wastes. Furthermore, consideration of existing health sta-
tus needs to be incorporated into the decision-making process for the
location of new facilities. Lacking this, there is the risk of compounding
the serious preexisting health problems in [these] communities.
Id.
278. See generally Robinson, in RACE, supra note 8.
279. Robinson, in RACE, supra note 8, at 158-59; see also REDUCING RISK, supra
note 224.
280. See, e.g., Tomsho, supra note 251, at Al.
In the 1960s, Mohawk ranchers started complaining that cattle
grazing upwind from the Reynolds [Metals Co.] stacks were developing
loose teeth, brittle bones and other problems. Farmer Earnest Bene-
dict's Herefords started dying while giving birth. Mohawk hunters dis-
covered strange markings on the hides of small game. Others reeled in
bass and muskellunge with skin ulcers and deformed spines.
In 1978, studies by scientists from Cornell and other universities
indicated that the sickly cattle were suffering from fluoride poisoning.
They also found high levels of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and
other toxins in the flora and fauna.
Id. The 9,000 residents of Akwesasne, the St. Regis Indian reservation, can no
longer eat the fish from its waters, and fluoride poisoning has annihilated their cat-
tle herds. Id. at Al, A6.
281. For an excellent discussion of such effects in the Navajo Nation see Robinson,
in RACE, supra note 8.
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5. Calculus of Benefits and Burdens in Indian Country
Applying the principles of distributional justice to Indian
lands further elucidates the current environmental inequities
which undergird the debate over nuclear waste in Indian country.
Principles of distributional justice raise two different issues: 1) Are
the benefits of environmental laws and programs distributed
equally among citizens?; 2) are the risks of environmental harms
distributed fairly among all communities? Native Americans and
their lands have received little benefit from the nuclear power in-
dustry which created radioactive hazards across Indian country
through mining and milling, and which generates nuclear waste.
At operations near native communities, uranium was extracted for
commercial nuclear power operations or weapons applications vir-
tually irrelevant to the
direct economic or social needs of the residents of the mining
regions. For the mine or mill operators, the political, environ-
mental, economic and health impacts of uranium extraction on
native and traditional communities have been of far lesser im-
portance than the short-term economic value of the production
of a strategic raw material like uranium. 28 2
Indian reservations are removed both geographically and eco-
nomically from those who benefit from nuclear power. Initial DOE
studies recommended that the MRS facility "be located somewhere
in the east-central United States, where ninety percent of all spent
nuclear fuel in the United States is produced."28 3 All tribes consid-
ered by the Nuclear Waste Negotiator are in the west of the United
States, while over eighty percent of the spent fuel, and the reactors
that generate radioactive wastes, are east of the Mississippi.28 4 All
proposed permanent repository and MRS sites are close to Indian
lands, so the nation's radioactive waste will cross the borders of In-
dian country.
B. Native American Sovereignty
While much of the current analysis of environmental equity
applies equally to Native Americans, African Americans, and other
persons of color alike, crucial differences exist.28 5 The source of
282. Robinson, in RACE, supra note 8, at 154.
283. Mauro, supra note 123, at 120 (citing generally to U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE
NEED FOR AND FEASIBILITY OF MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE A PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS 3-4 (1985)).
284. Kassen, supra note 138, at 50.
285. The importance of reforming the relationship between Indian rights and en-
vironmental protection is discussed insightfully in Armstrong Wiggins, Indian




these differences lies primarily within the structure of race which
has been, since before the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, a fun-
damental building block of American jurisprudence. 2 86
At the time of the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, there
were nearly 600 independent and confederated indigenous nations,
with different cultures, languages, and laws, in America. 28 7 Using
a race-based designation, all of these disparate nations were la-
beled "Indians" and were given separate constitutional treatment
under Article I of the Constitution.288 Indians were exempted from
the "people of the United States" due to their status as nations with
whom treaties were made and with whom commerce could be car-
ried on.28 9 Constitutional law ultimately determined that these In-
dian nations had only limited sovereignty, dependent upon the
sovereignty of the United States.290
African Americans were also categorized separately under the
Constitution. Not only were African Americans excluded from the
entire concept of "people," they were treated not as nations but as
chattel.291 The Constitution and laws of the nation declared per-
286. Chang, supra note 45, at 851 n.14, 860-65. Racial categorization has dra-
matic and disastrous consequences for the individuals classified as members of a
stigmatized race. See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF
COLOR, RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978); KEN-
NETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA (1989); WILLIAMS, DiscouRsEs OF CONQUEST,
supra note 20; Louis F. Claiborne, Black Men, Red Men, and the Constitution of
1787: A Bicentennial Apology From a Middle Templar, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269
(1988). Yet race is merely a social construct, deliberately used to exercise power and
justify oppression over certain individuals and cultures since the time of the Euro-
pean colonization. Williams, Columbus's Legacy, supra note 242, at 359.
287. John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Indian Reservations and the Preservation of Tribal
Culture: Beyond Wardship to Stewardship, 58 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 503, 506 (1991) (cit-
ing C. SNIPP, AMERICAN INDIANS 10 (1989)).
288. The complex inter-relationship of race and sovereignty is dealt with in an
intriguing and important manner in Chang, supra note 45, at 851 n.14, 860-65.
289. The U.S. Constitution mentions Indians three times. Phillip P. Frickey, Con-
gressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian
Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1138 n.8 (1990). Two references specify that "Indians not
taxed" are to be ignored in apportioning the House of Representatives. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The third mention is the "Indian Com-
merce Clause." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Indian Commerce Clause autho-
rizes Congress to 'regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian Tribes." Id. See also Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) ("the central function of the Indian Commerce
Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian
affairs").
290. See generally William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American
Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1987); Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own
Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government,
33 STAN. L. REV. 979 (1981) [hereinafter Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country].
291. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be appor-
tioned among the several states ... adding the whole number of free Persons... and
.. three fifths of all other Persons.").
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sons of African American ancestry a different "race," subject to the
white race and subject to treatment different from the Indian
"race." 2 9 2 Most Native Americans, African Americans, and many
Hispanics share the historical status of "coerced," as opposed to
"consenting" Americans. 293 Because of their history of having be-
come part of the United States by force, they share oppression
based upon both race and the deprivation of sovereign rights.294
In order to understand the position of Native Americans in en-
vironmental law, the twin issues of racism and sovereignty must be
understood. Federal Indian law emerged from constitutional lan-
guage, treaty, and statute.295 The process involved the conversion
of all indigenous peoples into one "race" ("Indians"),29 6 whom the
law declared "savages,"2 97 whom the colonists had "discovered"298
and simultaneously "conquered," rendering them "dependent"299
upon the United States' sovereignty. 30 0 Congress claims the ple-
nary power to impose its laws on Indian nations. 30 1 This virtually
unlimited plenary power of Congress over Indian tribes means that
even during the nuclear debate concerning uses of Indian lands, the
Congress of the United States has almost complete power to over-
rule any decisions made by tribes.302 The Supreme Court held that
Congress has the legal authority to unilaterally abrogate treaties
292. See generally HmGxN BOTHA, supra note 286.
293. Chang, supra note 45, at 863-64.
294. Id. at 860-69.
295. See Skibine, supra note 166, at 87 n.3.
296. See generally JACK D. FORBES, AFRICANS AND NATIVE AMERICANS: THE LAN-
GUAGE OF RACE AND THE EVOLUTION OF RED-BLACK PEOPLES (2d ed. 1993) (discussing
the complex and often forgotten origins and usages of racial terminology).
297. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story said, "As infidels, heathens, and
savages, Native Americans were not allowed to possess the prerogatives belonging to
absolute, sovereign, and independent nations." J. STORY, COMMENTARIES, § 152, re-
printed in M. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKwARD TERRITORY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 29 (1926), quoted in Williams, Columbus's Legacy, supra note
242, at 368 n.34.
298. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823). The Doctrine of Discovery
is discussed and explained in Williams, Columbus's Legacy, supra note 242, at 368
n.3.
299. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831) (holding that,
based on the "habits and usages" of Indian tribes, they were rendered pupils of the
U.S. and were "domestic dependent nations"); see also Judith Resnik, Dependant
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671
(1989).
300. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823); see generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 207-57 (1982).
301. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989); see also
supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' plenary power over In-
dian tribes).
302. 490 U.S. at 239.
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with Indian nations.303 Racism toward Native Americans played a
central role in the creation of U.S. Indian policy and land owner-
ship.304 The trust doctrine influenced the right of the U.S. to ac-
quire Indian land for its white citizens; and to control Indian
economic and natural resource development, and intergovernmen-
tal relations.305 The current economic conditions of Native Ameri-
cans today derive in large part from this web of legal doctrines
which define Native Americans' legal status. The resulting limita-
tions on economic development are a major force behind tribal con-
sideration of the nuclear waste trade. It is important to keep in
mind that all of these legal and economic issues have their roots, at
least in part, in the very definition of Indians as a "race" in federal
law and in the minds of dominant Americans.306
The analysis of environmental equity in Indian country raises
two issues. First, the federal government may force tribes, by the
power of law or economics, to accept nuclear waste. Freedom from
coerced or forced siting of hazardous wastes is a central tenant of
environmental equity. Second, the government may deny Native
Americans the right to make their own decisions concerning the ac-
ceptance of nuclear waste or the hosting of the MRS facility, based
303. Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1173 (1979) (Nich-
ols, J., concurring), aff'd, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). See also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
Lonewolf [sic] transmogrified the guardian-ward concept, originally
conceived for the benefit of the tribes, into a Dickensian relationship
granting the guardian extraordinary power, absolving him of any
wrongdoing, and leaving the ward essentially powerless. What John
Marshall envisioned as a relationship binding the government to the
Indians according to "moral obligations of the highest responsibility
and trust," the Lonewolf court refashioned to suit the convenience of a
conquering people imposing its will.
EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS, WHITE JUSTICE: THE Sioux NATiON VERSUS THE
UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT 170 (1991).
304. See generally WILLIAMS, supra notes 20 and 242; Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the
Terms of Indigenous People's Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660 [hereinafter
Williams, Encounters].
305. John C. Mohawk, Indian Economic Development: An Evolving Concept of
Sovereignty, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 495 (1991); Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country,
supra note 290, at 1001-04 (1981). One author described the Indian trust doctrine
as "racial discrimination and unfettered United States power disguised as moral
legal duty." INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER, UNITED STATES DENIAL OF INDIAN PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS: A STUDY IN LAWLESS POWER AND RACE DISCRIMINATION 15, 19 (National
Lawyers Guild, Rethinking Indian Law IV, 1982).
306. Nancy Carol Carter, Race and Power Politics as Aspects of Federal Guardian-
ship over American Indians: Land-Related Cases: 1887-1924, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
197,225-29 (1976); Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United
States Maintain a Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1482-86 (1991);
David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples,
38 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1991).
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upon stereotypes or objectification of Indians. To determine
whether siting or refusing to site nuclear waste in Indian country
constitutes environmental racism, we must make one pivotal query:
Does the act contribute to the structure of racial and national sub-
ordination and domination of Native American peoples?
1. Differences From Other Communities of Color
Understanding the differences in legal doctrines of race and
their modem day effects upon the rights of Indian and non-Indian
persons of color is essential to any meaningful application of the
principles of environmental equity. The law governing Native
Americans is different from that governing African Americans and
members of other stigmatized races. While both the title "Indian"
and the severely limited sovereignty of Native Americans derive
from racism, 30 7 Native Americans were nonetheless granted crucial
status under the Constitution which was denied other persons of
color. Once African Americans became recognized as full persons
under the Constitution, they and other non-Indian persons of color
did not attain sovereignty, but only individual and human
rights.308 The concept of "race" permitted the colonists to get
needed land from tribes made up of the "Indian race" and free labor
from the "African race" to establish the new nation.3 09
Second, Indian tribes have sovereign rights to their own lands,
and at least limited protection over what federal and state govern-
ments can do to and on their lands.310 Indian tribes have a "land-
based heritage" which provides for community-based property
rights.311 This is the major exception in U.S. law to the primacy of
private property rights.3 12 Once waste or other environmental
hazards contaminate their land, Native Americans cannot simply
307. See generally WILLIAMS, supra notes 20, 242, and 304.
308. Rodriguez, supra note 22, at 22.
309. See generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PER-
MANENCE OF RACISM (1992); Williams, Columbus's Legacy, supra note 242, at 358.
310. See generally CLINTON ET AL., supra note 165; Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not
"Strictly" Racial: A Response to "Indians as Peoples," 39 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 169 (1991);
Frank Pommersheim, Making All the Difference: Native American Testimony and the
Black Hills (A Review Essay), 69 N.D. L. REv. 337 (1993) [hereinafter Pommersheim,
Making All the Difference].
311. Tarlock, supra note 37, at 871-73; See generally Frank Pommersheim, The
Reservation as Place: A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D. L. REV. 246 (1989) [hereinafter
Pommersheim, Reservation as Place].
312. "[Tlhe framework remains restricted to conquered peoples who have survived
efforts to exterminate or assimilate them." Tarlock, supra note 37, at 890 (citing
WILLIAMS, DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST, supra note 20). While the concept described by
Tarlock is useful in distinguishing Native Americans from Euro-Americans and
others who have voluntarily emigrated to the United States, his comment seems to
imply that all persons who were conquered and exposed to genocide have community
1994]
Law and Inequality
move away from toxic waste and still retain their sovereignty. 3 13
The nature and extent of protection for Native Americans depends
very largely upon the membership of Indian people in federally rec-
ognized Indian tribes and, in addition, their residence on or near
the reservation in what is legally recognized as Indian country. In-
dian nations, therefore, must generate enough new jobs for their
young on the reservation each generation. Finally, for many Native
American nations, land is far more than a commodity or a space, it
is sacred. 3 14
One of the main dangers of dealing with the environmental
racism is that we tend to essentialize the persons, communities,
and nations to whom we apply the doctrine.3 15 It is not sufficient to
treat all discrimination as a unitary phenomenon, assuming that
racism affects all persons-African American, Latino, and Native
American-in the same manner. When we essentialize, the impor-
tance of difference is lost, and the resultant analysis will misstate
the problem and lead to erroneous "solutions."3 16 Tribes are often
affected by environmental equity issues in many of the same ways
as other communities of color. As the ensuing discussion points out,
all are affected by disproportionate hazardous siting, unfair distri-
bution of environmental benefits and burdens, inequitable environ-
mental enforcement, lack of political power, and synergistic effects
of hazardous materials. Yet there are special concerns with respect
to Native Americans that do not affect other persons of color.
Most of the currently proposed solutions to environmental eq-
uity problems would compound rather than resolve these issues for
Native Americans where sovereignty and race are intertwined.
Much of the literature conceives of environmental racism as a civil
rights issue without considering that for Indian nations it is also, or
property rights. This is misleading since the descendants of African persons con-
quered and subjected to slavery have no such rights.
313. Nor are they likely to move to toxic waste sites because land is devalued by
waste operations, a factor a number of scholars believe plays a role in the high per-
centages of persons of color near toxic waste sites. See generally Vicki Been, What's
Fairness Got To Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Unde-
sirable Land Uses, 6 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993).
314. Pommersheim, Making All the Difference, supra note 310, at 352-53; Pom-
mersheim, Reservation as Place, supra note 311, at 269. For a different view of the
sacred nature of the Black Hills, see DAVID WORSTER, UNDER WESTERN SKIES: NA-
TURE AND HISTORY IN THE AMERICAN WEST 116-20 (1992); see also supra note 37
(describing Navajo (Dineh) conception of nature).
315. See infra note 361 (discussing "essentialism").
316. We can accomplish the most "simply by identifying the right questions,
which are so often missed, and in turn, preclud[e] any reasonable expectation of ob-
taining the right answers." Pommersheim, Making All the Difference, supra note
310, at 356.
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even primarily, an issue of sovereign rights.317 In many cases, In-
dians are being denied the right of self-determination. In addition,
the remedies proposed are, in most cases, based on state law.
3 18
Such remedies may be effective for other communities of color, but
they offer nothing to Indian tribes. Proposed state and federal leg-
islation which would bar additional siting of toxic or hazardous
waste in communities of color may have a salutary effect for other
stigmatized communities but they are an affront to Indian nations.
First, they deprive the tribe of its sovereign right to determine its
own environmental policy. Second, Indian communities are cur-
rently in a position to establish their own terms in the hazardous
waste trade and consequently profit from it. This is an opportunity
rarely available to communities of color. In short, the issue of
choice is essential to the exercise of sovereign powers by Native
Americans. Where absolute prohibitions and mandatory legislation
may be useful in obviating racial discrimination, they may be an
anathema to self-rule.
The question for Indian nations is first, who decides? Only af-
ter that query is answered in favor of Indian sovereignty can we
turn our attention to the second question, what shall be done? Be-
cause of the differences imposed by the history of Indian law in the
United States, different solutions may be necessary to provide envi-
ronmental equity to both Indians and other persons of color.
1. Government-to-Government Relations
From the earliest constitutional cases during the infancy of
the United States, through the current term of the U.S. Supreme
Court, the scope and extent of Indian tribal sovereignty has been
one of the battlegrounds upon which the nature of power in this
land has been fought out. The pendulum of U.S. policy toward In-
dian tribes has swung between isolation and assimilation.3 19 The
current era is heralded by many as the time of Indian self-determi-
nation, with Presidents, including Reagan and Bush, announcing
self-determination as the new policy of the nation. Characterized
as "government-to-government relations," current policy dictates
that the federal and tribal sovereigns are to work together.320
317. Chang, supra note 45, at 863, 865-67; Bullard, supra note 225, at 327. See
generally Collin, supra note 225.
318. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 225, at 314; Tsao, supra note 225, at 379-405.
319. See Wilson, supra note 164 (describing trends in Indian policy).
320. This policy was adopted by President Reagan and reiterated by President
Bush. President's Statement on Indian Policy, PUB. PAPERS 96-100 (Jan. 24, 1983)
(stating that the Reagan administration's policy is to "reaffirm dealing with Indian
tribes on a government-to-government basis").
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However, these policies of self-determination bring Indian nations
into conflict with the states in which reservations are situated. 32 1
In keeping with government-to-government relations with In-
dian tribes, congressional and administrative policies in recent
years focused on the rights of Indian nations to develop their own
environmental policies and to control the environment on their res-
ervations. 3 22 This policy was apparent in a resolution accompany-
ing the 1991 amendments to the Clean Air Act.323 EPA policy
recognizes the importance of treating the reservation as a place,
governed by one sovereign, either federal or Indian.3 24 The EPA
recognizes the right of tribes, under appropriate circumstances, to
control the reservation environment for all land and citizens on the
reservation, without regard to the type of land title or
demographics of reservation residents. 325 If fully executed, tribal
environmental management will become a model for effectuating
self-determination as one of the primary rights of a sovereign
nation.
The NWPA treatment of tribes and states as equals is a clear
reflection of current federal Indian policy based on government-to-
government relations. EPA's current environmental policy is en-
tirely consistent with permitting Indian nations to make independ-
ent determinations concerning the location of nuclear waste sites on
tribal lands. Environmental policy underscores the right and im-
portance of permitting federal and tribal sovereigns to work to-
gether to assure tribal safety and health rather than permitting
state governments or local communities to control these issues. It
also highlights the importance of Indian involvement in structuring
and enforcing environmental controls over waste on reservation
lands.
3. Compensated Siting
Apparently Leroy believes in the law of averages and that of a
shotgun approach. Talk to many tribes and you may bag one.
P.T. Barnum once said, "there's a sucker born every day." But
Mr. Leroy is quick to point out that the "issue isn't money." He
321. See generally Steven M. Feldman, The Developing Test for State Regulatory
Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Application in the Context of Environmental Law, 61
OR. L. REV. 561 (1982); Sidney L. Harring, Crazy Snake and the Creek Struggle for
Sovereignty: The Native American Legal Culture and American Law, 34 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 365 (1990); Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations, supra note 36; Res-
nik, supra note 299; Jane M. Smith, Republicanism, Imperialism, and Sovereignty:
A History of the Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 527 (1988-89).
322. Gover & Walker, Tribal, supra note 268, at 440.
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says that as "a prospective host [the tribe] is entitled to an equity
for helping to solve a national problem." Does he mean it is pa-
triotic to store the radioactive material in your back yard?...
But if the issue is not money, what pays for the enticements?
And could this process be called bribery?3
26
The 1987 amendments to the NWPA created a compensated
siting program for high-level nuclear waste.3 27 Under the NWPA
provisions, the state or tribe voluntarily agrees to accept the facility
and receives payment in exchange for the agreement. 3 28 Participa-
tion in the compensated siting program is conditioned upon the
state or tribe waiving its right of disapproval for nuclear waste sit-
ing under the NWPA.329 The host may receive up to five million
dollars for each year preceding the arrival of the nuclear waste and
up to ten million dollars for each year after the waste arrives until
closure of the facility.330
One of the three principle findings of the influential United
Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice report involved
compensated siting.3 3 1
The hazardous waste issue ... has become very much linked to
the state of the economy in a given community. These commu-
nities have been, and continue to be, beset by poverty, unem-
ployment and problems related to poor housing, education and
health. These communities cannot afford the luxury of being
primarily concerned about the state of their environment when
confronted by a plethora of pressing problems related to their
day-to-day survival. Within this context, racial minority com-
munities become particularly vulnerable to those who advocate
the siting of a hazardous facility as an avenue for employment
and economic development. Thus, proposals that economic in-
centives be offered to mitigate local opposition to the establish-
ment of new hazardous facilities raise disturbing social policy
questions.332
Nuclear siting in Indian country exemplifies this disturbing
situation. Does compensation ameliorate or exacerbate the envi-
ronmental equity concerns raised by nuclear waste siting in Indian
326. Savilla, supra note 16, at 8.
327. NWPA §§ 170-171 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10172-10173).
328. Id.
329. NWPA § 171(b)(2) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10173(a)).
330. NWPA § 171(a)(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10173(a)). These pay-
ments are in lieu of funding under Sec. 118(b), the funds to be used to offset "any
potential economic, social, public health and safety, and environmental impacts" of
siting which is not done pursuant to a voluntary agreement. NWPA § 118(b) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10138); see also NWPA § 171(b)(5) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10173(a)).
331. UNITED CHURCH, supra note 218, at 7.




country? On one hand, compensation may be viewed as ameliorat-
ing the unfair consequences of siting, providing much needed eco-
nomic growth, and therefore as resolving concerns over
environmental racism. On the other, it can be seen as deliberately
exploiting the special status of these land-rich, economically poor,
and isolated sovereigns in order to secure a dumping ground where
the community is in a poor position to object to the infusion of eco-
nomic incentives.
There are a number of strong arguments for the use of com-
pensated siting to infuse much needed economic stimulus into In-
dian tribes who have long suffered from legally imposed barriers to
economic development. Some commentators suggest that the ineq-
uities created by the siting of toxic waste in communities of color
can be overcome by providing subsidies or what has been termed
"equitable mitigation for the costs of environmentalism." 33 3
Scholars endorse the compensated siting approach as a means
of finding a willing host for nuclear waste and of avoiding the acri-
mony, litigation delay, and obstructions attendant upon siting nu-
clear waste in an unwilling jurisdiction.334 Several states adopted
compensated siting statutes in an effort to garner community coop-
eration in hazardous waste siting.335
Looking at the waste industry as a form of economic develop-
ment ... it can be a good match for tribal communities. The
industry is usually willing to pay the costs of developing new
projects without requiring a tribe to put any cash up front.
Since most tribes just do not have the money to independently
fund large-scale economic development, this makes the industry
attractive to Indian communities desperate for development.
The waste industry needs isolation and an abundance of land,
and, again, because of the overall lack of tribal economic devel-
opment, undeveloped land is a resource that many tribes
have.3 36
333. Tarlock, supra note 37, at 898. Four solutions to the problems are sketched
out by Tarlock: "respect for legitimate property entitlement, cultural sensitivity, sus-
tainable development, and subsidy." Id. at 900; see id. at 883-900 for a more thor-
ough discussion.
334. Topol, supra note 100, at 830-36.
335. Statutes in Massachusetts and Connecticut provide compensation to local
communities that receive hazardous waste facilities. See Com. GEN. STAT. § 22a-
128(c) (1991); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 21D, § 14 (Law. Co-op. 1988 & Supp. 1991). See
also Topol, supra note 100, at 833.
336. Gover & Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism, supra note 21, at
935-36. It is important to note that the cited article does not discuss nuclear waste
or even the acceptance of hazardous waste, yet in many respects the model applies
here.
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In essence, tribes searching for potential sources of economic devel-
opment see an opportunity to exchange the use of part of their land
in return for some level of economic self-sufficiency.3 37
For example, the Mescalero Apache Tribe, the first tribe to
come forward for a feasibility grant, has 3,500 members. 3 38 Its res-
ervation encompasses 460,000 acres, and it suffers from thirty-five
percent unemployment. 33 9 These statistics exist despite the fact
that the Mescaleros are self-sufficient and dubbed by some as a
"commercially savvy" tribe,3 40 who operate a $30 million ski resort,
a $20 million luxury resort complex, and other tribal businesses.341
Half of the tribe is under the age of 18; therefore, providing jobs for
the next generation is a priority.342
While it is true that Indian lands and the lands surrounding
them have long been over-burdened with environmental hazards, it
is important to analyze the equities of this situation accurately
before stating simply that it would be unfair for Indians to have
more nuclear hazards on their lands. Many of the existing nuclear
hazards are from facilities on federal land, such as the Hanford Nu-
clear Facility near the Yakima, Nez Perce and Umatilla Indians,
the WIPP site near the Mescalero Apaches or the test sites in the
Four Corners region.34 3 The tribes receive little or no benefit from
these federal facilities. While mining and milling on reservations
produced some profit for the tribes involved, early BIA leases
yielded very low levels of financial return in exchange for the
hazards of the leases. Nevertheless, these uranium lease royalties
are essential to some tribal economies.3 44 In addition, tribes gener-
ally receive no compensation for their exposure to years of nuclear
testing and other contamination of their lands.3 45 The Mescalero,
for example, received no benefit from the nuclear hazards in New
337. Some have suggested that compensation be given to indigenous peoples who
agree to retain an environment free of environmentally detrimental uses. See
Huffman, supra note 18, at 916.
338. Michael Haederle, Nuclear Dump Study Triggers Tribal Fears, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 1991, at A5.
339. Sandra Sanchez, NM Reservation Sees N-Waste Dump as Gold Mine, USA
TODAY, Nov. 21, 1991, at 8A.
340. Bill Workman, U.S. Hopes Indians Take A-Waste, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 5, 1991,
at All.
341. Ski Apache, near Ruidoso, New Mexico, and a resort complex, the Inn of the
Mountain Gods. Sanchez, supra note 339, at 8A; see also Hudson, supra note 38.
342. All Things Considered, supra note 48.
343. Churchill & LaDuke, supra note 2, at 402.
344. Becky J. Miles Viers, Environmental Law: Uranium Mining on the Navajo
Reservation, 7 Am. INmAIN L. REV. 115, 116 (1979) (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS REPORT, THE NAVAJO NATION: AN AMERICAN COLONY 24 (1975)).
345. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing DOJ denial of com-
pensation claims of miners exposed to radiation).
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Mexico. 34 6 Yet the existence of these hazards is often used as the
primary argument to block the Mescalero's bid for the MRS
agreement.
The MRS process is strikingly different in concept and in po-
tential economic outcome: the tribes are seeking the nuclear waste
trade and stand to gain economically, through economic improve-
ments and other incentives. It may be a very good bargain indeed if
the waste trade is as safe as the Nuclear Waste Negotiator
promises.
The success of the compensated siting approach of the NWPA,
however, is limited by the amount of money that Congress is willing
to appropriate to secure voluntary agreement from the host. At
some point, the amount demanded by a potential host will exceed
Congress' willingness to pay. Overly high host demands could lead
the government to consider other methods. Not only does Congress
possess plenary power to force siting on Indians, but the Supreme
Court supports the federal government's right to override state at-
tempts to exclude foreign wastes. 34 7 If the cost of voluntary siting
is too high, Congress can also turn to federal land, as it did for the
Yucca Mountain repository site. While there are currently no defin-
itive Congressional limits on MRS funding, recent discussions have
turned from compensated siting to placing the waste on federal
lands.
In theory, compensated siting pays for the externalities cre-
ated by noxious siting and requires other communities to pay for
these costs; consequently, other communities do not receive a wind-
fall and the host community is paid fairly for its efforts. There are,
however, very strong arguments supporting the position that the
essence of compensated siting is to take advantage of economic
desperation in order to secure a waste site. First, when the govern-
ment offers to pay a community to accept nuclear waste, issues of
placing a value on human life and safety are inherent in the calcu-
lation. Tribes are subjected to the risk, however remote, of whole
scale genocide. Moreover, there is no accurate means of ascertain-
ing either the detriment to the host community or the benefit to the
rest of the nation in order to establish a fair compensation pack-
age. 348 Instead, the statute offers a compensation limit and invites
346. Hudson, supra note 38.
347. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S.Ct. 2009 (1992);
Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Mich. Dept. of Nat. Resources, 112 S.Ct. 2019 (1992); New
York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617 (1978).
348. See generally R. George Wright, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the Problems
of Stigmatic and Racial Injury, 23 ARiz. ST. L. J. 777 (1991). In addition to many
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communities to bid for it. While tribes may hope for additional jobs
and tax income, "[h]azardous-waste management facilities are capi-
tal-intensive rather than labor-intensive and generally do not offer
much of a tax bonanza to local communities."3 49
Minority communities may also be more vulnerable to in-
centives or compensation ... [and] sometimes solicit the loca-
tion of hazardous waste facilities in order to boost their local
economy and provide jobs. Opposition to a hazardous waste
site ... is impeded when the economic benefits, such as jobs or
other incentives, create divergent community interests and
fragment community goals.35 0
Even if it were possible to accurately ascertain and pay for all
obvious externalities created by nuclear siting, this would not re-
solve concerns about environmental inequity surrounding the
placement of yet another offensive and potentially dangerous waste
site within a community of color. The very state of economic
desperation in these communities often makes them the only will-
ing hosts. The history of attempts to establish compensated siting
programs for hazardous waste suggests that most citizens do not
consider the potential safety costs, health effects and stigmatization
resulting from proximity to hazardous waste facilities compensable.
Communities repeatedly decline to "explicitly surrender part of
their safety or tranquility in return for compensation."35 1 Many In-
dian communities demonstrate this same unwillingness to accept
hazardous waste even in the face of substantial economic incen-
tives. 35 2 Ultimately, there is no guarantee that any tribe will ac-
cept the nuclear waste voluntarily, even if substantial payment is
promised.35 3
other injuries difficult to calculate, the author discusses the stigmatic and dignitary
injuries, and associated economic costs, of becoming the "dumping ground for.., the
entire nation." Id. at 784.
349. A. Dan Tarlock, Anywhere but Here: An Introduction to State Control of Haz-
ardous-Waste Facility Location, 14 LAND USE & ENV'T L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) [here-
inafter Tarlock, Anywhere but Here]. Indian tribes are permitted to recover an
amount equal to the commercial tax on the development and operation of the MRS
pursuant to NWPA § 118(b)(4) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 10138(b)(4)).
350. Chase, supra note 240, at 346; see also Robert Bullard, Environmental Black-
mail in Minority Communities, in RACE, supra note 8, at 82, 82-84; Book Note, Envi-
ronmental Activism and the Collective Action Problem, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1705, 1709
(1991) (reviewing PHIL BROWN & EDWIN J. MIKKELSEN, No SAFE PLAcE: Toxic
WASTE, LEUKEMIA, AND COMMUNITY AcTION (1990)).
351. Lawrence S. Bacow & James R. Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Haz-
ardous Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARv. ENWL L. REV. 265,
276 (1982).
352. In 1991, members of the Hualapai tribe in Arizona, under the leadership of
elder Lena Bravo, turned back an effort by Energy Fuels Nuclear, a corporation
which sought to strip-mine uranium on tribal land. Knox, supra note 46, at 54.
353. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 351, at 276.
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Moreover, no matter how much compensation is paid each
year, once the MRS closes, all funding ends. The danger, however,
may remain. Any leakage from the facility will be in the air,
ground, and water essentially forever.
In other words, long-term consequences foreclose short-term ad-
vantages where uranium production is concerned. Of course,
the "right" Indian negotiator might be able to bargain the roy-
alty rates to a higher, more "acceptable" level. But, to what
avail? This short-run "gain" is a mirage. No matter how much
cash comes from resource sales by tribal managerial elites, it
can only be "invested' in a homeland which is seen to be unin-
habitable, a people soon to be extinguished.3 5 4
In the end one fact stands out. The compensation offered
under the NWPA was insufficient to induce a single state to agree
to study hosting the MRS.
C. Bias as a Factor in Nuclear Waste Siting in Indian
Country
In the future, laws and democratic processes must replace the
myths and arbitrary governmental power that now deny Indian
rights and threaten Indian environments. 355
Federal power over tribal sovereignty is founded upon the
roots of racism, but limits upon Indian sovereignty alone are insuf-
ficient to explain the full extent of environmental inequities visited
upon Native Americans. Deeply imbedded racist stereotypes also
contribute to the position of Indians today. Stereotypical notions
render Indians second class citizens in their own lands. Aspects of
America's stereotypical view of Native Americans, often incorpo-
rated in law and public policy, preclude or impede equitable treat-
ment of tribes in environmental matters.
1. Stereotypes of Indians Which Cause Siting Problems
American law, literature, and mass media contribute to the
dominant culture's view of Native Americans as historical artifacts,
frozen in prehistory. Indians are imbued with society's romantic
notions.356 Modern "New Age" ideas contribute to these romanti-
cized ideas of Indian culture, environmental values, wisdom, and
religion. While many of these ideas may represent long overdue re-
spect for Native Americans from members of the dominant soci-
354. Churchill & LaDuke, supra note 2, at 111.
355. Wiggins, supra note 285, at 351.
356. Two recent historical Indian films, Dances With Wolves and Geronimo,
center on tribes who are today caught up in modem battles over toxic waste siting:
the Mescalero's over nuclear waste and the Rosebud Sioux whose Good Road Coali-
tion just defeated a profitable waste dump on its reservation.
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ety, 3 5 7 the ideas also essentialize and homogenize widely diverse
peoples into one single entity. The vision of Indians that emerges is
that they are shrouded in history and in need of the dominant cul-
ture's protection.
These ideas have developed into a "malignant romanti-
cism"358 which infests our notions of what Indian peoples should do
with their lands. Environmentalists, in pursuit of "Indian's best in-
terests" may engage in stereotypical thinking, characterized by ro-
manticism, which effectively deprives Native Americans of the right
to make their own decisions about accepting waste on their lands.
It is important to break down this malignant romanticism into its
major component stereotypes so that we recognize them and strip
them from our law and policy. Some of these stereotypes include
viewing "real Indians" as historical, primitive, unsophisticated, and
rapidly on their way to extinction; essentializing the hundreds of
Indian tribes into one group; assigning Indians the role of guardian
of our environment as well as theirs; failing to recognize Native
American tribes as modern, twentieth century sovereign nations
within the United States; and viewing Indians as dependent and in
need of our protection and guidance. Each of these stereotypes in-
terferes with equitable environmental treatment of tribes and will
be discussed individually.
First, the dominant society often embraces the view that In-
dian nations are historical, and that Indians are primitive crea-
tures of some past age.3 5 9 In this view, Indians will soon disappear
from the nation, through either death or assimilation. 3 60 This ster-
eotype is utterly inconsistent with Indian nations' decision to enter
into sophisticated, twenty-first century ventures like nuclear waste
disposal.
Second, American culture tends to essentialize vastly diverse
Native American cultures, treating them all as uniformly "In-
dian."3s1 Indian tribes represent diverse and distinct peoples with
357. Huffman, supra note 18, at 901-02.
358. Torres, supra note 21, at 844. Torres is currently the Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral for the Environmental Division of the United States Department of Justice,
placing him in a unique position to influence and litigate national policy from the
perspective of environmental equity; see also Wiggins, supra note 285, at 349-5 1.
359. "[Pjrimitive precursors of their modern, highly Westernized counterparts."
Chang, supra note 45, at 868 n.62.
360. Wiggins, supra note 285, at 346-47 (quoting Justice John Marshall Harlan,
Lecture at George Washington University Law School 12 (Jan. 8, 1898) (unpublished
manuscript, on file at Library of Congress Manuscript Room)).
361. See, e.g., Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (discussing "gender essentialism," the notion that a
unitary "women's experience can be isolated and described independently of race,
class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience").
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their own languages, traditions, governments, religions, and val-
ues. They vary enormously in socio-economic status and in busi-
ness development. To accommodate these different nations with
their different approaches to environmental regulation, environ-
mental law must adopt a flexible approach that incorporates a vari-
ety of negotiable rights, capable of adapting to the unique
circumstances of each tribe.3 62
Third, environmentalists repeatedly treat Indian tribes as the
guardians of nature, imposing upon them a special responsibility to
preserve our environment. Many environmentalists homogenize
and romanticize all Native Americans as environmentalists who de-
sire to keep their land free of all economic development. 36 3 Domi-
nant society feels entitled to deny Indians the right to engage in the
waste trade on the assumption that this is what Indians want. En-
vironmentalists are willing to deny Indian autonomy in the name of
enforcing so-called "Indian values." 3 64 Indian self-determination
requires that Indians decide their degree of participation in the nu-
clear waste trade.
Fourth, the sovereign status of Indian nations is recognized
by law but is repeatedly and steadfastly ignored by communities
surrounding Indian reservations. 3 65
Fifth, the dependent status of Indian tribes is a matter not
only of legal doctrine, but also of deeply imbedded racist ideas about
Indians. One over-riding theme of Indian/white relations in the
United States is the notion that Indians, like children, need the pro-
tection and guidance of the "Great White Father." They are un-
fairly perceived as unsophisticated, uneducated people who must be
protected from making wrong decisions. These notions underlie the
paternalistic "trust" doctrine,3 6 6 which forms the basis of the domi-
nant society's control over Indian land. Repeatedly, authors assert
that they revere the ancient values of Indians and consider them
models for our modern, technological society. Yet they do not trust
these same tribes to exercise their own values wisely. They seek to
impose limitations on Indian rights to accept nuclear waste on In-
dian lands in order to "protect" Indians. Such solutions substitute
362. See Elizabeth Pearce, Self-Determination for Native Americans: Land Rights
and the Utility of Domestic and International Law, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv.
361, 362 (1991).
363. Huffman, supra note 18, at 901.
364. Huffman, supra note 18, at 912, 913.
365. See supra notes 260-67 and accompanying text (discussing congressional
failure to include Indians in environmental and nuclear regulatory legislation).
366. See supra note 305 (referring to trust doctrine).
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white paternalism for Indian power.3 67 Yet Native Americans,
without such "protectionist" intervention in their tribal environ-
mental affairs, repeatedly make the difficult and costly choice of re-
fusing to bring waste onto their land. Although many private
companies and the government target Indian country for waste
dumps, tribal governments refuse these "attacks" almost without
exception.368
If we are to create equitable law and policy relating to nuclear
waste in Indian country, we must make deliberate and concerted
efforts to overcome the stereotypical thinking which characterizes
so much of American legal history regarding Native Americans.
The solution to our nuclear waste problem is not to be found by
imposing our values and visions, already clouded by racism, upon
Native Americans.369
2. Racism and the Refusal to Site the MRS in Indian
Country
The primary impediment to siting the MRS may not be
an environmental one, but instead one of power and racism...
[Many] assume that, if an Indian community decides to accept
such a project, it either does not understand the potential conse-
quences or has been bamboozled ... This is clearly a racist as-
sumption; the same assumption that guided the federal policies
that very nearly eradicated Indian people . . . It is "environmen-
tal racism," and it is ultimately every bit as destructive as the
open hostility to Indian people ... We need the support and un-
derstanding of the environmental community, not its
protection 370
The refusal to site nuclear waste in Indian country may be mo-
tivated by racism. Ancient enmities between tribes and states in-
fect the entire siting process. Stereotypical views of Native
Americans lead many to oppose MRS siting in Indian country, rea-
soning that tribes are not really sovereigns and therefore should
not be allowed to dictate whether nuclear waste will lie on Indian
lands within state boundaries. Indeed, many Native Americans ar-
gue that biased and paternalistic views of Indians consistently in-
367. Torres, supra note 21, at 842; Gover & Walker, Escaping Environmental Pa-
ternalism, supra note 21, at 942-43.
368. Gover & Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism, supra note 21, at
934 (citing Kathleen Shaheen & John T. Aquino, Waste Disposal on Indian Lands,
WASTE AGE, Oct. 1991, at 58; and Tribes Resist Tempting Landfill Offers, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 22, 1991, at 4). See also Morrison & Howe, supra note 251, at 370.
369. See generally A. LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES (1984).




terfere with the rights of Indians to accept nuclear waste. 37 1 The
belief that the dominant culture should make decisions for Indians
is termed "Indian law liberalism."37 2 Its effects over time have
been devastating.3 73 But the issue of choice is really a sword of
Damocles. If Indians decline to accept nuclear waste with its ac-
companying economic incentives, it is entirely possible that the gov-
ernment will either site the waste next door to reservation land or
will appropriate reservation land for a waste site. 37 4 Such congres-
sional acts require no Indian consent.3 75 The affected tribe would
have no control over the waste, obtain no profit, yet their level of
exposure will be nearly the same. These possibilities are not far-
fetched. Currently, there are attempts underway to site low-level
storage facilities very near to Indian populations. 376
371. Id. at 933.
372. See discussion and definition of the phenomenon in Pommersheim, Making
All the Difference, supra note 310, at 342-52.
373. Pommersheim, MakingAll the Difference, supra note 310, at 343-44 (discuss-
ing enormous loss of Indian land following the passage of the Dawes Severalty Act in
1887).
374. 128 CONG. REC. 26,310 (1982) (statements of Representatives Synar and
Udall). See infra note 388. The history of the Mescalero tribe with regard to nuclear
energy reflects the right of the federal government to bring waste to the area sur-
rounding the reservation.
Forty-six years ago, the first nuclear explosion took place at the Trinity
site, just 40 miles northwest of our homeland. The event introduced the
era we now know as the Nuclear Age. Today, just 100 or so miles to the
southwest, the controversial WIPP underground radioactive waste dis-
posal facility is being developed. You can see that the Mescalero Apache
Tribe has been 'caught in the middle' of this Nuclear Age. As a result,
we have a unique perspective on nuclear issues and a deep and continu-
ing concern that the wastes of the Nuclear Age are handled safely and
responsibly.
Letter of Mescalero Apache tribe to David H. Leroy, Nuclear Waste Negotiator (Oct.
11, 1991).
375. See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope, and Limitations, 132 U.P. L. REv. 195 (1984); see also infra note 377 and
accompanying text.
376. For example, Northern States Power Co. (NSP) of Minnesota is rapidly run-
ning out of storage space to store fuel rods at its Prairie Island nuclear reactor. In re
Northern States Power Co., No. E-002/CN-91-19, 1992 WL 348063 (Minn. P.U.C.
Aug. 10, 1992). The plant is located 700 meters from the Prairie Island Mdewa-
kanton Sioux Indian Community reservation, a community of about 400 people. Id.
In June of 1992, the Minnesota State Regulatory Commission granted NSP's request
to store high-level nuclear waste in steel casks outside the plant. Id. The Prairie
Island community opposes NSP's nuclear waste storage proposal. Id. After court
and legislative challenges appeared on the verge of failure, the Prairie Island com-
munity applied for and received a preliminary grant to consider hosting an MRS.
Charles Laszewski, Study Finds NSP Nuclear Plant Increases Cancer Risk of Sioux,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 24, 1992, at Al. Tribal leaders say that if their reser-
vation is forced to exist next to NSP's nuclear storage site, the community may as
well accept the entire nation's nuclear waste and use the money to move their com-
munity elsewhere. Id. The matter is currently before the Minnesota legislature. Id.
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IV. State/Tribal Equity in Siting
A tribe's right to effectuate an agreement to host the MRS is
utterly dependant upon the will of the of members of Congress, the
vast majority of whom are white and are sworn to represent the
interests of state and local communities. Native Americans have
little political power. While Congress might permit a tribe to host
nuclear waste that no state is willing to take, reservations are lo-
cated within state boundaries and no state supports the tribes'
right to act.
A. Equality of Treatment of States and Tribes Under
NWPA
An explicit goal of the 1987 Amendments to the Nuclear
Waste Power Act was to create a statutory scheme which treats In-
dian tribes equally with states:
The second principle is that all affected States and Indian
tribes should be treated equally, and that no single State or
tribe should enjoy an advantage over another. The Committee
believes that this equality of treatment is an essential element
in assuring the continued cooperation of all the States that will
be considered as having potentially acceptable sites for these
facilities.3 77
Under both the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980378
and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,379 states and tribes have equal
rights to host a repository, MRS or low level nuclear waste site, and
have equal rights to object to the siting of a nuclear waste facility in
See also GERALD M. SIDER, LUMBEE INDIAN HISToRIEs: RACE, ETHNIciTy, AND
INDIAN IDENTITY IN THE SOUTHERN UNITED STATES 22 (1993); Ellen Church, Meeting
on Nuclear Waste Facility Set For Tuesday, THE ROBESONIAN, Nov. 29, 1992, at I
(discussing proposed low-level nuclear waste site near Lumbee Indians).
377. S. REP. No. 282, 97th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1981). The goal to treat states and
tribes equally was also stressed in other floor debate:
Mr. Synar: Are Indian tribes treated differently from states in this
legislation?
Mr. Udall: No. The governing bodies of affected Indian tribes are
treated the same as state governments. The difference
arises not in this bill but in the existing federal authority
to acquire land.... In the case of Indian trust lands, how-
ever, existing law would not give D.O.E. the express au-
thority to acquire or condemn Indian trust land. Such
action would require either the consent of the tribe whose
land is involved or an explicit act of Congress dealing with
the lands of that specific tribe.
128 CONG. REC. 26,310 (1982) (statements of Rep. Synar and Rep. Udall).
378. Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3374 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021b-2021j (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
379. Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 10101-10226 (1988 & Supp, IV 1992)).
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their jurisdiction. 3 80 The Act grants every sovereign two general
rights of objection: disapproval38 l and consultation.38 2 The distinc-
tion between the two is essential to understanding the rights of sov-
ereigns under the Act. Disapproval is virtually a veto power over
siting on land within the jurisdiction of a sovereign.3 83 Disapproval
can be overridden only by an act of Congress.384 Consultation
grants sovereigns affected by the siting of the facility on another
sovereign's land the right to comment on the siting and to have
their objections considered by a federal administrative agency, but
under consultation the affected sovereign has no right to stop the
process absent congressional action.3 85 The repository siting pro-
cess at Yucca Mountain highlights this difference. Since the pro-
posed Yucca Mountain site is on federal land, the state of Nevada
had no right of disapproval over the process, despite the fact that
the facility will be within the boundaries of Nevada.3 86 If Yucca
Mountain were owned privately or by the state, Nevada could have
exercised the right of disapproval. 38 7 Thus, because Yucca Moun-
tain is federally owned, the Act limits Nevada to consultation.
Under the Act, states and Indian tribes have equal rights of
disapproval. Section 115(b) of the NWPA states that designation of
a permanent site as suitable by the federal government shall be ef-
fective unless the governor and legislature of "the State in which
such site is located, or the governing body of an Indian tribe on
whose reservation such site is located, as the case may be, has sub-
mitted to the Congress a notice of disapproval ... "388 Following a
notice of disapproval by the sovereign whose land is selected, the
site is disapproved unless "Congress passes a resolution of reposi-
tory siting and such resolution thereafter becomes law."38 9 The
same procedures for site disapproval apply to MRS siting.39 0 The
Act also grants states and tribes identical rights to object and be
380. See infra note 388.
381. See, e.g., Participation of States, NWPA § 116 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 10136).
382. See, e.g., Consultation with States and Indian Tribes, NWPA § 117 (codified




386. Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1553 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Topol, supra
note 100, at 805.
387. Nevada, 914 F.2d at 1553.
388. NWPA § 115(b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10135(b)).
389. NWPA § 115(c) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10135(c)) (describing con-
gressional review of petitions).
390. NWPA § 141(h) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10161 (h)) states that
"any facility authorized pursuant to this section shall be subject to the provisions of
[sections 10135 .... ]" of this title.
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heard if siting in a contiguous sovereignty is likely to have adverse
effects upon that state or tribe.391
Objections raised to siting the permanent repository at the
federal Hanford Nuclear Reservation are a good example of tribal
exercise of their consultative status. The State of Washington and
the Yakima Indian Nation, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservation, and the Nez Perce Tribes, all designated as "af-
fected tribes" under the NWPA, worked together to oppose the Han-
ford site. 39 2 Yet none of these sovereigns could exercise the right of
disapproval under the Act because the proposed site was located on
federal land.393
The NWPA specifically declares that the state has no right of
disapproval when the proposed nuclear waste facility site is on In-
dian land.39 4 The same is true under the MRS siting provisions.3 95
Similarly, Indian nations may not disapprove a site located on state
lands surrounding the reservation; they are limited under the Act
to the right of consultation.
The NWPA dictated equal treatment of tribes and states. The
Act seemed to establish government-to-government relations and
the options available to conflicting sovereigns in nuclear waste sit-
ing. States and tribes would compete and object openly and equally
with neither sovereign having the right to veto decisions of the
other.
Whether Indian nations will be treated as equal sovereigns
under the NWPA, with equal rights to accept waste if they are able
and willing to strike a bargain with the Nuclear Waste Negotiator,
was all but answered in an apparently innocuous and meaningless
three line amendment to a recent energy appropriations bill: "None
of the funds provided under this Act shall be made available for
Phase II-B grants to study the feasibility of siting a Monitored Re-
trievable Storage Facility."396
391. Consultation with States and Indian Tribes, NWPA § 117 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10137).
392. See Hovis, supra note 39, at 48-50.
393. Hovis, supra note 39, at 48.
394. "The authority of the Governor or legislature of each State under this subsec-
tion shall not be applicable with respect to any site located on a reservation." NWPA
§ 116(b)(3) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 10136(b)(3)) [emphasis added]. This
provision is rendered applicable to the MRS pursuant to NWPA § 141(h) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10161(h)).
395. NWPA § 146(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10166). The MRS notice
of disapproval is limited to "the governing body of the Indian tribe on whose reserva-
tion such site is located, or, if the site is not on a reservation, the Governor or legisla-
ture of the state in which the site is located." 42 U.S.C. § 10166(a) [emphasis added].
396. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
126, 107 Stat. 1327 (1993).
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The ramifications of this amendment, buried deep in the omni-
bus energy and water legislation, is disguised due to the omission of
several subsequent lines in the Amendment offered by the New
Mexico Congressmen. Deleted were the words immediately follow-
ing "Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility":
unless the Nuclear Waste Negotiator has first certified to the
Secretary of Energy that there is a reasonable likelihood that
agreement can be reached among all of the relevant govern-
mental officials in the vicinity of the proposed site.39 7
Without amending the Act or its purposes, objecting states
shattered the illusion of equal treatment for Indian tribes. The
Amendment effectively blocked any grants from the Nuclear Waste
Negotiator to the Mescalero Apache of New Mexico and the Goshute
tribe of Utah398 to enter advanced study of hosting the MRS unless
and until the Nuclear Waste Negotiator certifies, in advance of the
study grant, that all the relevant officials in the contiguous state,
municipal and county governments would agree to the siting.
While the clarifying words were removed, the effect of the amend-
ment is the same. The Nuclear Waste Negotiator lost the power to
enter into Phase II-B grants, and the tribes who applied for those
grants are foreclosed, at this time, from proceeding. Tribes are not
only indirectly deprived of the right to act independent of state re-
straints, but in effect are subjugated to the will of local municipal
and county politicians.
This amendment resulted because politicians in states sur-
rounding reservations involved in the MRS siting process objected
to tribes within their state borders entering the waste trade.399
Prior to the adoption of the 1993 amendment to the energy and
water legislation, every member of New Mexico's congressional del-
egation and its governor objected to the proposal to site the nuclear
waste facility on the Mescalero Apache reservation. 400 New Mex-
ico's state leaders assert that New Mexico, the site of the country's
first nuclear explosion, has done its part for the nuclear indus-
397. Original amendment offered by Sen. Domenici. The subsequent amendment
passed the House as HR 988 to the energy appropriations act, and passed the Senate
as § 12800 on September 30, 1993, according to Loretta Tuell, Staff Counsel of the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. 139 CONG. REC. H8442-60 (daily ed. Oct. 26,
1993).
398. The Mescalero Apache and Goshute were the only two tribes to have applied
for Phase II-B study grants at this point. Oct. 27 Conversation with Brad Hoaglun,
supra note 122.
399. Id.
400. Thomas W. Lippman, On Apache Homeland, Nuclear Waste Seen as Opportu-
nity, WASH. PosT, June 28, 1992, at A3.
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try.40 1 One survey revealed, however, that citizens of New Mexico
are not nearly as hostile to the efforts of the Mescalero Apache as
are their congressmembers. 40 2 There is also strong dissent from
politicians in Utah, where the Skull Valley Band of the Goshute
tribe has also accepted a second-phase grant.4 03 "This is an over-
my-dead-body issue," said Utah Governor Mike Leavitt. 40 4
With the Nuclear Waste Negotiator's Phase II-B funding elim-
inated by the buried amendment, the fate of all nine Indian tribe
Phase II applications is in doubt. Only the use of discretionary
funding by DOE Secretary Hazel O'Leary, or further congressional
action, will permit continued study of possible siting on Indian
lands. 405 Secretary O'Leary is under extreme political pressure
from Congress and the governors of states where the reservations
are located.
While the goal of the 1987 Amendments to the Nuclear Waste
Power Act was to treat Indian tribes equally with states, state polit-
ical pressure undermined that goal. The message this new amend-
ment sends to Indian tribes is that their much touted rights of
equality, government-to-government relations, and sovereignty in
the area of nuclear waste come down to one issue: whether Con-
gress will use its plenary power to block any exercise of these rights
unless all of the surrounding non-Indian communities agree to al-
low the exercise of sovereignty. The ultimate issue remains the
same. No state wants the waste, and states will do whatever is nec-
essary to block MRS siting in their home state.
Some hypothesize that Congress simply wants to block the
MRS project until the Yucca Mountain site is opened. 40 6 The Act
401. A spokesman for New Mexico Governor Bruce King, John A. McKean, said,
"We always suspect there's an idea the desert Southwest is this great big empty
space, and if you have something unpleasant, you can stash it out there and nobody
will ever object .... But to us it's God's country, and every square inch of it is very
important to us and very fragile." Wald, supra note 47, at 12A.
402. A poll conducted in August 1993 by the Tarrance Group of Alexandria, Vir-
ginia, found that sixty percent of New Mexico voters believe the Mescaleros have the
right to study the MRS, although only 27 percent of state voters indicate "having
seen, read, or heard anything specific about the issue." By contrast, 91 percent of
state voters are aware of WIPP and 53 percent believe it has been a good economic
development project for New Mexico. Poll Finds Most of New Mexico Voters Support
Tribe's Study of MRS, INSIDE ENERGY, Sept. 6, 1993, at 9.
403. 13 NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, Aug. 26, 1993, at 34.
404. Id.
405. Oct. 27 Conversation with Brad Hoaglun, supra note 122. It is interesting to
note that in reaction to recent congressional action the Mescalero Apache entered
into negotiations with various utility companies for the possible construction of a
private nuclear waste facility on the Mescalero reservation. Conversation with Brad
Hoaglun, Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, Washington, D.C. (May 2, 1994)
[hereinafter May 2 Conversation with Brad Hoaglun].
406. May 2 Conversation with Brad Hoaglun, supra note 405.
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could then be amended to move both temporary and permanent
storage to Yucca Mountain thereby obviating the need for any MRS
facility.4 07 From this perspective, perhaps all communities, white
and Indian, are treated similarly. However, this apparent equal
treatment disguises the fundamental legal distinction. Indians are
sovereign nations, not local communities, and under the NWPA
they are entitled to equal consideration with states.
The debate surrounding the siting of the permanent repository
illustrates the struggle of Native Americans to oppose the siting of
nuclear waste on non-Indian land. At least sixteen tribes have a
nexus with Yucca Mountain.408 According to Native American ac-
tivists, even more tribes are influenced by Yucca Mountain because
there may be several bands separated geographically within a sin-
gle tribe.409 To date, at least ten non-Indian communities have re-
ceived funding as an "affected" community, but no tribe has yet
received "affected" status.4 10 Regardless of the impact on tribes,
Congress has the ultimate power to decide where a facility will be
sited.4 11 The Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator is scheduled to
finally dissolve in January of 1995.412 At that point, the entire
decisionmaking process will fall into the hands of Congress.
B. Native American Rights and State Objections
If Congress permits an Indian tribe to voluntarily accept the
MRS site, the tribal/federal agreement must overcome the hurdle of
state intervention. Strong objections and assertions of sovereignty
from the surrounding state(s) are inevitable because states and In-
dian tribes have a long and litigious history where issues of sover-
eignty are concerned.4 13 Indeed, MRS siting on an Indian
reservation has serious consequences for contiguous states. 4 14
407. Id.
408. Conversation with Robert Holden, National Congress of American Indians,
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 29, 1993).
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Regardless of any notice of disapproval, Congress has the ultimate power to
pass a resolution of repository siting approval. 42 U.S.C. § 10135(c).
412. See supra note 148.
413. See Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations, supra note 36, at 240-52. This
article does not consider the unique preemption questions raised by the Mescalero
Apaches' consideration of construction of a private interim nuclear waste storage
facility on tribal land. See May 2 Conversation with Brad Hoaglun, supra note 405.
414. The compensation provisions of the NWPA appear to be sufficiently vague to
permit local governments and states to apply for funding to offset costs incident to
siting on an Indian reservation. See, e.g., NWPA §§ 115, 116, 117, 170(d) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10135-10137, 10173(d)).
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State legal challenges to federal siting of the MRS on an In-
dian reservation will turn on the question of whether states have
the power to exclude out-of-state nuclear waste from being trans-
ported across its state borders4 15 or being stored on a reservation
within its borders. These issues will be played out against a back-
drop of several clearly established limits on state challenges to
MRS siting. First, the statutory scheme of the NWPA provides that
states have no right of disapproval of siting on Indian lands and are
limited to the right to comment.4 16 Second, previous state attempts
to forbid the importation of waste into its borders have been held
constitutionally impermissible under the Commerce Clause.417 In
the case of the transportation and generation of nuclear waste,
which is generated, controlled and disposed of under a federal
scheme, the grounds for refusing to honor state laws excluding
waste are even stronger. 4 18
The most important remaining legal issues involve questions
of federal preemption of nuclear waste disposal and federal law gov-
erning state/tribal relations. Two different doctrines of preemption
are implicated in tribal/state disputes over nuclear waste siting,
federal preemption and Indian law preemption. 4 19 Federal pre-
emption usually arises from the Commerce Clause 4 20 coupled with
the Supremacy Clause4 2 1 of the Constitution. Under the doctrine,
Congress limits the right of a state or tribe to exercise police power
when federal legislation conflicts with state or tribal law or where
federal law pervasively occupies the field.422 Indian law preemp-
tion determines whether the federal, tribal or state government
415. "Studies indicate that by the year 2000, 120 trucks per day will be carrying
nuclear waste on the nation's highways to the temporary and permanent reposito-
ries. Each shipment will contain many times the radioactivity released by the
atomic bomb at Hiroshima." MYTH BUSTERS, supra note 23, at 19.
416. See § IV supra notes 376-412 (section discussing state/tribal equity in
siting).
417. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-29 (1978); National Solid
Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n. v. Alabama Dep't. of Envt'l Mgmt., 910 F.2d 713, 718 (11th Cir.
1990), 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1991), opinion modified on denial of reh'g., cert. de-
nied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct 2800 (1991); see also CELIA CAMPBELL-MOHN, ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAw: FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 823-24 (1993).
418. Washington State Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d
627, 630 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub. noma.; Don't Waste Washington Legal De-
fense Fund v. Washington, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (regulating low-level radioactive
waste disposal is a legitimate federal activity and the states may not prohibit impor-
tation of low-level radioactive waste).
419. GETCHES, supra note 205, at 453-58.
420. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
421. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.




properly has jurisdiction in Indian country.4 23 If Indian preemp-
tion is found, state authority is excluded in favor of federal or tribal
authority.424 Indian preemption protects inherent tribal sover-
eignty from state efforts to assert authority in Indian country. 42 5
The analysis of federal preemption requires turning again to
Nevada v. Watkins,426 in which the state of Nevada attempted to
prohibit the building of the NWPA permanent repository by enact-
ing a statute excluding nuclear waste prior to site characteriza-
tion.4 2 7 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
Nevada lacked legal authority to bar waste storage on federally
owned land within the state's borders.428 Although neither party
asserted that Congress has expressly preempted the field of nuclear
waste disposal, the Court stated that "the Supreme Court has con-
cluded that 'the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of
nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded
to the States.'"429 The Watkins court stated that the Supreme
Court "has not yet confronted the issue whether the NWPA 'occu-
pies the field' of nuclear waste disposal,"430 but concluded that "Ne-
vada's attempted legislative veto of the Secretary's site
characterization activities 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' "431 The court
went on to say that any state law that blocks "the full effectiveness
of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause" of the
Constitution. 4 32
423. See GETCHES, supra note 205, at 454.
424. See GETCHES, supra note 205, at 454.
425. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980) (Ari-
zona's attempt to impose motor-carrier and fuel taxes on corporation performing
work on reservation preempted by federal law); see also Laurence Tribe, The Indian
Commerce Clause, 23 Amiz. L. REv. 203 (1981).
426. 914 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1990).
427. Id. at 1549.
428. Id. at 1559.
429. Id. at 1560 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources & Dev.
Comm'n., 461 U.S. 190, 212 n.25 (1983)).
The court here neglected to mention the fact that both the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977 and the Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 give at least
some regulatory power to the states.
430. Id. at 1561.
431. Id. (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 248 (1984)).
432. Id. (quoting Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971)). Nowhere in the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 is the role of the states defined. The first private nuclear facility
in the United States, the Shippingsport, Pennsylvania power reactor operated by
Duquesne Light Company, was licensed in 1957. England & Mitchell, supra note 69,
at 537. After this, as states attempted to exercise their police powers in the area of
nuclear regulation, there was a growing need for amendments specifying the role of
the states. The Act was amended in 1959 by § 274. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No.
86-373, 73 Stat. 688 (1959) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1988)). This
amendment was entitled "Cooperation with States," but did not define any areas of
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In Watkins, the court relied heavily upon Pacific Gas & Elec.
v. State Energy Resources Conserv., 43 3 which strongly supports the
principle that the federal government has established its domain in
the field of nuclear regulation. In Pacific Gas, California attempted
to enact legislation that would require utility companies seeking to
build any electric power generator, including nuclear plants, to ap-
ply for a state license.43 4 The Warren-Alquist Act,43
5 as it is
known, through its 1976 amendments, mandated a finding that
there would be "adequate capacity" for spent nuclear fuel as a pre-
requisite for plant construction permits. 436 It also sought to impose
a moratorium on new plant construction until the Energy Commis-
sion determined that "there has been developed and that the
United States through its authorized agency has approved and
there exists a demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of
high-level nuclear waste." 437
Under generally accepted principles, preemption can be estab-
lished by explicit language. 4 38 Pacific Gas went a step further by
summing up what other courts had articulated in various forms:
express federal preemption. Crocker, supra note 51, at 69 (citing General Counsel
Interpretation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012(i) & 2013(d) (1988), 10 C.F.R. § 8.4(c) (1988)).
Section 274(b) states that the AEC can "enter into agreements with 'the Gover-
nor of any State' to discontinue the regulatory authority of the Commission over
byproduct materials, source materials, and special nuclear materials 'in quantities
not sufficient to form a critical mass.'" Crocker, supra note 51, at 69-70 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2021 (1982)). For technical definitions of critical mass, source material, or
special nuclear material, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(e), (z), (as) (1988). For a technical
definition of critical mass, see 10 C.F.R. § 150.11 (1988).
These agreements made state control more feasible, subject to safety and health
standards. "[N]o agreement under section 274 will be allowed 'to discontinue the
Commission's authority' over highly technical or dangerous matters, but under such
agreements, less dangerous tasks may be delegated to the states under the ultimate
authority of the Commission. Concurrent responsibility is therefore possible."
Crocker, supra note 51, at 70-71. The exact extent of preemption, if any, was not
articulated by Congress; it was instead left up to the courts, which have interpreted
section 274 both favorably and unfavorably to the states. Id. at 73.
If the court finds that the state regulation falls within the ambit of sub-
section (k) (state regulation of non-radiological hazards), then the stat-
ute survives. If on the other hand, the court determines that the state
statute falls outside the reach of subsection (k), then the state is at-
tempting to regulate a radiation hazard.
Id. at 74. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) states: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to
affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes
other than protection against radiation hazards."
433. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
434. Id.
435. Id.; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25000 - 25986 (West 1986).
436. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 190. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 25524,1(b) (West 1986).
The Court did not review this provision of the Act, holding instead that it was not
ripe for review. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 190.
437. 461 U.S. at 197; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1986).
438. 461 U.S. at 203.
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that in the absence of this explicit language, Congress may preempt
state law with a
'scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make rea-
sonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it,' because the 'Act of Congress may touch a field
in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws
on the same subject,' or because 'the object sought to be ob-
tained by the federal law and the character of obligations im-
posed by it may reveal the same purpose.' 43 9
The Court said that even where Congress "has not entirely
displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is preempted
to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a con-
flict arises when 'compliance with both federal and state regula-
tions is a physical impossibility.' "440
The Court in Pacific Gas held that the legislation at issue in
the case was not preempted by federal law, since it was outside the
field of nuclear safety regulation and was adopted for economic rea-
sons.4 4 1 Despite the fact that the law was upheld, the Court re-
peatedly reiterated that the federal government had preempted
nuclear safety under the Atomic Energy Act.442 "State safety regu-
lation is not preempted only when it conflicts with federal law.
Rather, the federal government has occupied the entire field of nu-
clear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to
the States."443 The Supreme Court has since clarified Pacific Gas,
holding that when a state asserts environmental and economic mo-
tivation for legislation affecting nuclear safety, the Court will ex-
amine the potentially preempted legislation to see if the "state law's
action has the actual effect of frustrating Congress' intent."4 4 4 The
application of the actual effect test resulted in the determination
that the Nevada statute at issue in Nevada v. Watkins was pre-
empted by federal law.445
439. 461 U.S. at 204 (quoting Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)); see also, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947).
440. 461 U.S. at 204 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
441. Id. at 211-15. In so holding, the Court interpreted the Atomic Energy Act to
create two separate spheres of regulation: "the Federal Government maintains com-
plete control of the safety and 'nuclear' aspects of energy generation; the states exer-
cise their traditional authority over the need for additional generating capacity, the
type of generating facilities to be licensed...." Id. at 212.
442. [d. at 211-15.
443. Id. at 212 (footnote omitted).
444. Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1549, 1561 (9th Cir. 1990).
445. Id.
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State challenges to MRS siting on Indian lands based on eco-
nomic or environmental grounds should be preempted by federal
nuclear safety and disposal legislation. The exclusive federal safety
scheme governing nuclear safety clearly extends to disposal of nu-
clear waste generated in facilities subject to the Atomic Energy Act.
For example, Section 2021(c)(4) states that "[t]he Commission shall
retain authority and responsibility with respect to regulation of the
disposal of such ... byproduct, source, or special nuclear material
as the Commission determines... should, because of hazardous or
potential hazards thereof, not be so disposed of without a license
from the Commission."44 6
Furthermore, state efforts to block MRS siting on Indian lands
are preempted because they interfere with achieving the ultimate
goal of the the federal nuclear safety program: the safe disposal of
nuclear waste. Federal preemption theory strongly supports the
proposition that states will not be permitted to block MRS siting
within their states. What other issues are raised when the MRS
site is on Native American land? Indian law preemption tradition-
ally offers strong support for the exercise of tribal sovereignty in the
face of state attempts to assert jurisdiction in Indian country. The
statutory bases for overcoming state objections to nuclear waste on
tribal land is further supported by the historical tradition of the
Supreme Court, which generally permits tribes to exercise their
sovereignty when states attempt to interfere. 4 47 "Tribal authority
to regulate" within its borders "arises from the inherent sovereign
powers of the native nations," and "[a]ny judicial determination of
the sovereign powers of a native nation begins with the doctrine
that tribes retain all inherent powers of national sovereignty that
have not been ceded by treaty, excised by federal legislation, or
divested by the courts as inconsistent with the federal government's
assertion of superior sovereignty."4 48
Tribal jurisdiction over Indians "may be subject to intrusions
of federal regulatory authority, but generally is exclusive of state
jurisdiction."449 In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,450 the
State of Arizona attempted to apply its motor carrier license and
446. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(4) (1988).
447. Royster & Fausett, supra note 256, at 593; see also White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 137-38 (1980). For a discussion of the recent changes
in the doctrine of Indian preemption see Pommersheim, Tribal.State Relations,
supra note 36.
448. Royster & Fausett, supra note 256, at 593-94 (citing U.S. v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313, 323 (1978)).
449. Royster & Fausett, supra note 256, at 595 (citing White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980)).
450. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
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use fuel taxes to non-Indians engaged in logging operations on the
reservation. Holding that the taxes were preempted by federal law,
the Supreme Court explained that the "timber on reservation land
is owned by the United States for the benefit of the Tribe."451 "Long
ago the court departed from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view that
'the laws of [a State] can have no force' within reservation bounda-
ries."452 "At the same time, we have recognized that the Indian
tribes retain 'attributes of sovereignty over both their members and
their territory,' . . . As a result, there is no rigid rule by which to
resolve the question whether a particular state law may be applied
to an Indian reservation or to tribal members."45 3
The Court explained that Congress has broad power to regu-
late tribal affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause 45 4 and that
this in turn has given rise to two barriers to "the assertion of state
regulatory authority over tribal reservations and members."45 5
The first barrier is that the exercise of state authority may be pre-
empted by federal law; the second, that it may not unlawfully in-
fringe "'on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them'."45 6 These limitations are related in that the
tribal right of self-government is dependent upon Congress.4
5 7
"Even so, traditional notions of Indian self-government are so
deeply engrained in our jurisprudence that they have provided an
important 'backdrop'."458 The Court determined that the Federal
Government's regulation of timber harvesting on Indian land was
comprehensive. Therefore, there is no room for state taxes in the
federal regulations.
In State of Washington, Department of Ecology v. United
States Environmental Protection Agency,459 the State of Washing-
ton submitted an application for permission to regulate its own haz-
ardous waste management program pursuant to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The EPA approved the ap-
plication "except as to the Indian lands."460 The "EPA concluded
that the state had not adequately demonstrated461 that it had ju-
451. Id. at 138.
452. Id. at 141 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832)).
453. Id. at 142 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
454. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
455. 448 U.S. at 142.
456. Id. at 142 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
457. Id. at 143.
458. Id. (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 164, 173
(1973)).
459. 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
460. Id. at 1467 (quoting 48 Fed. Reg. 34945 (1983)).
461. Id.
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risdiction over the Indian lands. The court stated that "[v]ague or
ambiguous statutes must be measured against the 'backdrop' of tri-
bal sovereignty, especially when the statute affects an area in
which the tribes historically have exercised their sovereign author-
ity or contemporary federal policy encourages tribal self-
government."46 2
Recent cases have eroded traditional legal protections of Na-
tive Americans from state intervention in reservation life.46
3
United States courts, in analyzing preemption issues involving In-
dians, increasingly focus on federal preemption beginning with a
determination of the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty. 464 This back-
drop inquiry focuses on broad-based concepts of self-government,
rather than any particularized notion of specific tribal powers. In
addition to tribal sovereignty itself, the backdrop inquiry now also
includes an examination of federal policies promoting native self-
government. 465 Against this backdrop, courts balance the federal,
tribal, and state interests implicated by the state regulatory action.
Under this preemption test, state regulatory authority will be
permitted if it does not interfere with federal and tribal inter-
ests, as determined by federal law, or, even if state action does
interfere, if the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify
the intrusion.466
A relatively recent line of cases seems to indicate that in cer-
tain areas, the Supreme Court is willing to let states interfere when
the tribes have no "tradition" of regulation in the field at issue. The
Court is apparently retreating from its position favoring Indian sov-
ereignty within reservation borders, adopting instead an analysis of
the tribes' history and tradition of regulation in the area at issue.
Rice v. Rehner467 concerned a non-Indian who was a licensed
Indian trader selling liquor on a reservation. The state of Califor-
462. Id. at 1470 (citing Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983)); EPA policy is
strongly supportive of Native American control of the reservation environment. See
EPA Legal Analysis, supra note 270.
463. See Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations, supra note 36, at 252 ("Supreme
Court litigation in the area of tribal-state relations has drifted further and further
away from the foundational mooring of Worcester v. Georgia, out past the abandoned
buoys of the infringement and preemption tests and into the uncharted seas of the
doctrinal incoherence of ... recent cases.") (footnotes omitted).
464. Royster & Fausett, supra note 256, at 602-03.
465. Id. at 603.
466. Id. at 603-04. In this analysis, the authors use the arguments in California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). According to Royster and
Fausett, states would have no place in the regulation of nuclear waste bound for an
Indian reservation. The backdrop of tribal sovereignty, along with the possibility of
state interference with federal and tribal interests, would lead one to the conclusion
that states would not be permitted to interfere. Id. at 604.
467. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
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nia sought to require Ms. Rice to obtain a state liquor license in
order to sell liquor for off-premises consumption.468 The Supreme
Court acknowledged that "[t]he decisions of this Court concerning
the principles to be applied in determining whether state regulation
of activities in Indian country is preempted have not been
static."4 69 The Court's "recent cases have established a 'trend...
away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state
jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption'."4 70 The
Court noted that tribal sovereignty exists only through Con-
gress,4 7 1 explaining that the states could not override Federal law
here.4 7
2
According to the Court, the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty in
this case, the licensing and distribution of alcoholic beverages, must
be considered to determine whether a tradition of tribal sovereignty
exists. The Court concluded that there was no tradition of Indian
regulation and licensing of alcoholic beverages on the
reservation.4 73
Applying the notion of tradition to the issue of nuclear waste
disposal, the Court could easily find that Indians have no tradition
of regulating nuclear waste on their land. "The Court's reliance on
tradition could be used to argue that Indian tribes have little tradi-
tion in hazardous [nuclear] waste management."474 The tribes do
have a history of exposure to radiation, however, tribes never actu-
ally regulated the waste. Yet, the situation with nuclear waste is
analytically quite different. The federal government has long held
the exclusive right to regulate nuclear waste safety; neither tribe
nor state, therefore, has a history of regulation in this area.
The other Indian preemption consideration taken up by the
Court in Rice concerns whether or not the item to be regulated has
a "significant impact" beyond the limits of the reservation.475 The
Rice Court concluded that the fact that alcohol does in fact find its
way off the reservation affected the Court's decision to grant state
authority to license alcohol distribution on the reservation.476 Nu-
clear waste could clearly have a "significant impact" beyond the lim-
its of the reservation, especially since the waste must be
468. Id. at 715.
469. Id. at 718.
470. Id. (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172
(1973) (footnote omitted)).
471. Id. at 719.
472. Id. at 719-20.
473. Id. at 719-22.
474. Du Bey et al., supra note 47, at 478.
475. Rice, 463 U.S. at 723-24.
476. Id. at 724.
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transported through the state in order to reach the reservation. In
the context of nuclear waste disposal, however, the impact of the
MRS should not fall to state control but should remain under fed-
eral jurisdiction. Nevada v. Watkins4 77 suggests that a state has
no authority here. If the Supreme Court can prevent Nevada from
trying to stop federal nuclear waste storage, it can certainly pro-
hibit a state from trying to stop nuclear waste importation into the
state on its way to an Indian reservation.478
In most instances, then, state jurisdiction over Indian country
is barred unless there is a specific grant of jurisdiction from Con-
gress.4 79 In sum, "[n]ative nations retain inherent sovereign pow-
ers of regulatory control over the territory and inhabitants of the
reservation, except for specific instances where native governmen-
tal powers have been ceded by treaty or lost through congressional
legislation or judicial divestment.48 o
This examination of the legal theories pursuant to which a
state could challenge a tribe's right to host an MRS reveal that such
efforts are likely to meet with defeat in the courts. Yet some Indian
preemption cases may suffice to permit states to bring costly and
protracted litigation in an effort to obstruct and delay MRS siting.
Further, strong legal support of MRS siting on Indian lands does
not preclude political efforts by the states to achieve the same re-
sult.4 8 1 Congress may, in the end, provide states with the authority
to adopt legislation prohibiting the importation of out-of-state
waste. One potential means of avoiding state/tribal litigation and
political battles surrounding nuclear waste disposal is for tribes
and states to work together to achieve compromises acceptable to
both sovereigns. 48 2 There is great potential for states and tribes to
arrive at agreements establishing joint objections to waste siting or
proposals to offer Indian tribes economic alternatives to accepting
nuclear waste.48 3
477. 914 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1990).
478. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-29 (1978); see also supra
note 417 and accompanying text (states forbidden from refusing to allow waste to
cross state borders).
479. 437 U.S. at 612.
480. Id.
481. See, e.g., Nevada, 941 F.2d at 1553-59.
482. Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations, supra note 36, at 268-76; Walker &
Gover, Commercial, supra note 260, at 240-62.
483. A coalition between cattlemen and the Rosebud Sioux was bulit on the bridge
of environmental protection. Conger Beasley, Jr., Of Landfill Reservations, 3
BuzzwoRm: AN ENVIRONMENTAL JOURNAL, 36 (SeptJOct. 1991). Coalitions between
environmentalists and Native American tribes are possible if non-Indians study and
understand Indian objectives and values. One recommendation is that environmen-
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V. Enforcing Promises of the Government
If the Nuclear Waste Negotiator ultimately reaches agreement
with an Indian tribe willing to accept an MRS, the tribe will face a
number of obstacles to the enforcement of the promises made in the
MRS agreement. There are long-term consequences to the siting of
nuclear waste on Indian lands and agreements entered today may
require enforcement in future generations. It is crucial that the
parties anticipate, to the extent possible, potential future enforce-
ment problems, provide for their solutions and determine how those
solutions will be enforced.a8 a
The first hurdle for Indian tribes will be assuring that the
agreement negotiated with the Nuclear Waste Negotiator will form
the basis of a final agreement siting the MRS on their lands. The
promises of the Negotiator are not binding on Congress or the Pres-
ident until they are adopted and signed into law.485 Any agreement
must await political action which could change, modify or com-
pletely overrule the agreement entered into between the Negotiator
and the tribe.
While the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator still exists, it
has lost much of its political power. Congress nullified the Phase II-
B grants, which were central to the mission of the Office.48 6 Con-
gressional action eroded the tribal relationship which the office
worked to build.487 There is virtual agreement that the Office of
the Negotiator will not be reauthorized, and thus it will go out of
existence in January 1995. It seems almost beyond imagination
that a site will be selected by the Negotiator, an agreement signed
and Congressional and Presidential action completed by that date.
In all likelihood, if an agreement with a tribe is reached, the tribe
will be on its own before a hostile Congress when MRS approval
time arrives. Even the possibility of such action awaits Secretary of
Energy O'Leary taking the politically risky step of authorizing
money for further tribal negotiation by the Office of the Negotiator.
Ironically, the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator was created
because the Department of Energy was perceived to have low credi-
talists interested in keeping toxins off Indian lands "respect tribal sovereignty and
then pressure . the tribal council." Knox, supra note 46, at 83.
484. See Mary Boaz, Note, Retroactive Liability for Clean-Up of Hazardous Waste
in Atlas v. United States: The Nuclear Industry's Failed Attempt to Make the Govern-
ment Pay, 6 J. MIN. L. & PoL'Y 275 (1991) (discussing the enforcement of government
promises with respect to unanticipated consequences).
485. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
486. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
487. See supra note 155 and accompanying text; May 2 Conversation with Brad
Hoaglun, supra note 405 (Mescalero currently negotiating to build private nuclear
waste disposal site).
344 [Vol. 12:267
NUCLEAR WASTE IN INDIAN COUNTRY
bility with the public in matters of nuclear health and safety.488
Soon the DOE will conceivably be the tribes' only ally, yet it is not a
direct party to the negotiations.
If Congress and the President approve an MRS site on tribal
lands the tribe will make an agreement with a sovereign, a fact
with far reaching legal and political consequences. The United
States will have two different and potentially conflicting fiduciary
relationships if it enters an MRS agreement with a tribe. One duty
is as the custodian of the nuclear waste, responsible for maintain-
ing its safety on behalf of all American citizens. The second is the
fiduciary duty owed tribes by the United States government. 48 9
The agreement and its enforcement mechanisms must ade-
quately protect the life, health and safety of Indian people, and the
reservation land and wildlife. It must provide a homeland for the
tribe, should their land be destroyed or should the United States
decide that for nuclear security reasons it must seize the tribal land
by Congressional action. It must make provision to enforce the gov-
ernment's promises which formed the basis of the bargain.
How will the tribe enforce the promises made by the govern-
ment? In the MRS siting agreement the likely provisions which
will require enforcement include: (1) promised payments; (2) health
and safety guarantees; (3) agreements to remove the waste at a
time certain or upon the occurrence of a default on conditions or of
an accident or a release; (4) clean-up after a mishap or removal; (5)
jobs, schools or other promises; and (6) the continued existence of
the tribe, its sovereignty and its land base even if an accident oc-
curs on that land.
The sovereign nature of the United States makes it a difficult
adversary against those who seek to enforce its promises. Legal
doctrines, such as sovereign immunity, limit the legal arsenal of its
opponents. 4 90 Generally, the only means of enforcing governmental
promises is through actions against the sovereign in its own courts;
recovery in these courts for land taken, destroyed or damaged by
488. Hudson, supra note 38, at 6.
489. Reid Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975); Ball, supra note 34, at 61-67; Clinton, Iso-
lated in Their Own Country, supra note 290, at 1001-04. Certain constitutional pro-
tections including equal protection, due process and fifth amendment takings
provisions may apply to protect Indians under an MRS agreement. See, e.g., Nell
Jessup Clinton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HAs-
TINGS L. J. 1215 (1980).
490. See supra note 29 (discussing tribal sovereign immunity).
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the United States is often limited to money damages.4 9 1 The na-
ture and extent of the problems will partially depend upon the legal
nature of the agreement, whether contract, treaty or legislation.
Rights to treaty enforcement, for example, are limited by the ple-
nary power of the United States Congress. 49 2 Economic promises
made by Congress to pay tribal costs, provide benefits, pay fines
and carry out a myriad of promises will last many years after the
agreement becomes final. Yet these obligations normally depend
for their fulfillment upon annual Congressional funding because
the Anti-Deficiency Act 4 93 and other legal limitations prevent these
promises from becoming self-enforcing.
Any Indian nation willing to host the MRS must look at the
United States' history of keeping its promises if it is to protect itself
in case of accident or congressional change of heart.
In the context of Indian law, history looms not just as a colorful
backdrop, but rather as an inescapable shadow. The failure to
adequately confront and comprehend this history inevitably
threatens to blot out understanding and resolution of signifi-
cant Indian law issues involving treaties, tribal sovereignty,
and the commitment to a flourishing tribal life.4 94
The story of federal Indian law is, by any standard, a tale of broken
promises. 49 5 Tribes would be wise to anticipate the worst future
events and to assure protection beyond the mercy of Congress or
damages from the courts.4 96 Among the solutions are congressional
action, included in the agreement between the tribe and Congress
for siting the MRS, to create an escrow account, sufficient to pay all
costs of the program, all health and safety precaution costs, and any
future damages and other financial obligations suffered by the
491. Pommersheim, Making all the Difference, supra note 310, at 348-49. Land
reclamation or substitution are remedies only of Congress. The Lakota await the
return of the Black Hills, just as African Americans await their 40 acres and a mule.
492. Charles F. Wilkinson & John Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Ab-
rogation: "As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long is
That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601 (1975).
493. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
494. Pommersheim, Making All the Difference, supra note 310, at 338.
495. Rennard Strickland, The Langston-Hughes Lectures, Genocide-at-Law (an
Historic and Contemporary View of the Native American Experience), 34 U. KAN. L.
REV. 713, 718-39 (1989) (examples of promises to Native Americans broken by the
United States).
496. While negotiations between tribes and the Nuclear Waste Negotiator are not
matters of public record, the Mescalero Apache made the contours of their approach
to MRS siting public at a meeting of the National Conference of State Legislators in
November 1992 where the author, N.B. Collins, spoke. A copy of the public state-
ment is on file with the author. The Mescalero approach, while still very vague, does
include some of the matters raised herein. For example, the tribe suggests escaping
congressional funding "whims" by means of a self-liquidating annuity fully funded at
the initiation of the project.
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tribe. All funds should come from the Nuclear Waste Fund or other
funds not limited by congressional appropriation. 497 Funds should
be deposited directly into an escrow account for the use in paying
obligations to the tribe. These funds should be administered by a
trustee and contests over the disbursement of funds should be han-
dled by a dispute resolution panel made up of independent persons,
not members of the tribe or the federal government. The panel
should include members of other Indian tribes, members of the
dominant society and members of an international body such as the
United Nations. It should be required to render findings of fact and
binding arbitration of the dispute if mediation and negotiation fail.
Such an escrow account coupled with arbitration, would assist in
enforcing the federal government's financial obligations under the
agreement.
If an Indian tribe elects to accept the MRS, they will be depen-
dent upon the enforcement of environmental standards by the fed-
eral government. It is important to consider the enforcement
record of those agencies. The history of the NWPA reflects the
problems faced by the DOE in its attempt to dispose of nuclear
waste.498 The studies on environmental equity also reveal a sad
tale about toxic waste sites in communities of color.
It is essential that an agreement between a tribe and the fed-
eral government require strict enforcement of federal and tribal en-
vironmental laws, including tribal input in that enforcement. 499
Since the area of nuclear safety and health has for so long been
preempted by federal law, Congress must stipulate to permit en-
forcement or oversight by the tribal sovereign.
To assure government compliance with its safety, health, and
waste removal provisions the agreement should provide for very
high stipulated penalties for each day of non-compliance. The pen-
alties should come from an escrow account or other enforceable
source to assure that federal financial obligations are discharged. A
tribunal capable of evaluating violations, assessing fines, and com-
pelling compliance must be stipulated in the MRS agreement.
497. The Nuclear Waste Fund would be the logical vehicle for such action. It
would, however, require an amendment to force Congress to take non-revocable ac-
tion to keep funding at a level sufficient to meet current needs. Since this option
would require expanding the list of currently authorized Nuclear Waste Fund uses,
Congress would need to escrow additional federal funds in order to meet future de-
mands. NWPA § 302 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10222).
498. See supra § I-A (discussing history of radioactive waste buildup).
499. See Walker & Gover, Commercial, supra note 260, at 261-62 (discussing the
need for congressional provision of funds to permit Indian nations to regulate waste
disposal projects on their own lands).
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Enforcing promises made by the United States to leave the
reservation at a date certain or after an accident and to remove all
nuclear waste will be far more difficult to resolve since the govern-
ment itself must be compelled to act. One alternative is a treaty
between the tribe and the U.S., one of the treaty terms including a
stipulation by the U.S. that a violation of health, safety, sovereignty
or nuclear material removal are subject to United Nations and
World Court jurisdiction.50 0 Such stipulated jurisdiction would en-
able tribes to resort to an entity other than the sovereign whom
they oppose in this matter.
Another protection which seems absolutely essential is that
the United States stipulate to provide an alternative sovereign
homeland for the tribe if some or all of the Indian land is damaged
or destroyed and the tribe elects to abandon some or all of that land.
The land should be targeted in advance, the agreement must be en-
forceable by specific performance and not by money damages, and
final enforcement of those promises would require either binding
arbitration or resort to an international tribunal.
Conclusion
Governments must respect democratic decision making within
Indian communities and must ensure that relations between In-
dians and their neighbors are based on agreement rather than
domination. Although Indian communities, like all others, have
difficult decisions to make about their development, there is good
reason to believe that if Indians are permitted to chart their ownfuture they will continue to serve not only themselves, but also
the global environment. Working together as equals, Indian
communities and the rest of the world can share important les-
sons about how best to provide for all future generations.5 0 1
Many will respond to this article by asserting that what is
happening to Indians is not any different from what happens to
other American communities; the path of development is always
costly to someone whose land is crossed. The nation has asked
many to sacrifice for national development. Why, then, is the issue
different for Native Americans, especially if the siting is compen-
sated? The answer is that the history and the law concerning In-
dian nations, and the status and role of Indian tribes differs from
that of any other community. Through conquest, military might
500. A framework for international support of Indian environmental rights exists
in the United Nations. Wiggins, supra note 285, at 351-54. The status of "depen-
dent sovereigns" within the United States may, however, be incompatible with U.N.
definitions of independent indigenous peoples and may therefore raise jurisdictional
problems. Id.
501. Id. at 354.
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and federal legislation, the U.S. took the land of Native Americans
and made it the land of white settlers. Through generations of trea-
ties between sovereign Indian nations and the new American na-
tion, the United States secured that land for its own use. As the
United States broke one treaty after another,502 the land base and
population base of Indian nations were drastically reduced. Many
tribal cultures were destroyed after contact with Europeans and
Euro-Americans.503 Each remaining tribe is a nation and to de-
stroy that nation's land will annihilate a nation within America's
borders.
Now, the United States asks a single community to volunteer
to take half a century of nuclear waste onto its own lands. It is the
decision of each of those sovereign nations whether to accept the
bargain the U.S. offers. We must remember that most Indian reser-
vations are where they are, in the vast and open regions of our
country, free of population centers, because the United States chose
to banish them there. In order to exercise their sovereignty, to em-
ploy each generation of young tribal citizens, and to move further
into the future of their nation, most tribes must create jobs and gen-
erate income in regions far removed from urban centers of com-
merce and economic power. The waste trade offers one of very few
alternatives.
There is no single answer for all Indian nations, no single vi-
sion imposed upon all those considering the nuclear waste trade.
Instead, there must be a kaleidoscope of visions, turned by the hand
of Indian nations. But the stones within the kaleidoscope are often
limited by the reality of what opportunities the U.S. extends to In-
dian nations; what access to markets and technology the U.S. opens
to them; and the degree to which United States' law permits tribes
to participate freely in the world economy. The dominant society is
not in control of the vision, but it is in control of access to many of
the stones, primarily the stones of knowledge, political power, and
economic development. These stones are necessary for a vision of
502. Congress has plenary power to abrogate treaties with Indian tribes. Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) ("The power exists to abrogate the provisions
of an Indian treaty, though presumably such power will be exercised only when cir-
cumstances arise which will not only justify the government in disregarding the stip-
ulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of the country and the
Indians themselves, that it should do so.").
503. See generally Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cul-
tural Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigra-
tion-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CAL. L. REv. 863, 922 (1993) (discussing federal
policy of assimilating Native American children); see also Wilson, supra note 164
(discussing periods of assimiliation).
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sovereignty, environmental protection and economic success. 50 4
The dominant society's visions must stand beside those of the In-
dian peoples if we are to discover the full range of vision.
Although the people have known the experience and difficulty of
loss, they did not understand the meaning of that strange dawn
in 1945 and in some ways they still don't. And it is because U.S.
society doesn't understand either and refuses to deal with it.
Thorough knowledge was what was always required to live by
for Indian people; since the Mericano, knowledge has been kept
in some hidden place and has been used as a controlling
power.50 5
It is important to know both the unrealistic reactions of fear and
the worst scenario of doomsday in order to balance accurately. It
may be equally important to understand the United States' record
of honoring its treaties and agreements with Native Americans and
its record on equitably protecting their environment.
Native Americans must have both full knowledge and real al-
ternatives to the nuclear waste trade if they are to have true free-
dom of choice. It is states and federal governments, industries and
academic institutions who have the ability to offer economic alter-
natives to nuclear waste trade. No government or environmental
group should demand that Native Americans reject nuclear waste.
They are sovereign nations.
Let the Yakima speak for us all: "In this nuclear age the
Yakimas stand not for or against nuclear energy, but for the Safety
and Protection of the Balances of Nature so that generations yet un-
born may live on this earth in peace and health."506 Indians bear
the scourge of generations of removal, genocide, stigmatization, dis-
empowerment and forced isolation. The weight of United States'
environmental oversights, crimes and general neglect has fallen
heavily upon these land-based sovereigns while the benefits and en-
vironmental advances affected them little. Non-Indian people must
stand beside them while they decide how to treat the waste of the
nation which laid them waste for so long.
504. See generally Philip J. Smith, Indian Sovereignty and Self-Determination: Is
A Moral Economy Possible? An Essay, 36 S.D. L. REv. 299 (1991); see also Dean B.
Suagee, Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples at the Dawn of the Solar Age, 25
U. MicH. J.L. REF. 671 (1992).
505. Ortiz, supra note 21, at 63-64.
506. Hovis, supra note 39, at 54 (citing Oral testimony at Public Hearings of the
United States Department of Transportation, Material Transportation Bureau, Re-
search and Special Programs Administration, Seattle, Washington (Apr. 18, 1980))
("The testimony was on behalf of the Yakima Indian Nation and the public hearing
concerned highway routing of radioactive material.").
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